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ABSTRACT 
One of the most significant consumer trends of the 21st century has been proactive 
digital self-tracking. Proactive self-tracking refers to the everyday utilisation of a 
wide variety of hardware devices and mobile applications through which people 
gather data on their activity, sleep, bodily functions and behavioural patterns. 
Based on interviews, media materials and observations in self-tracking related 
environments, this doctoral dissertation examines how the practices of self-tracking 
and human-technology co-operation in everyday self-tracking assemblages shape 
peoples’ lifeworlds and their sense of themselves. 
This ethnographically oriented dissertation draws from the interdisciplinary 
field of science and technology studies, combining influences mainly from 
sociology, anthropology and continental philosophy in order to empirically 
investigate the multifaceted experiences of living with and through self-tracking 
devices and the data they produce. Specifically, it makes use of assemblage theory 
and various critiques of human-technology bifurcation in order to focus on the 
complex relations and associations between human beings and their technological 
supplements. While everyday imaginaries, marketing discourses and even research 
accounts too often construct technological devices as ’tools’ that human beings use 
for their own purposes, these theoretical resources enable a viewpoint that treats 
technology as more-than-a-tool, which, I argue, is essential for revealing the 
multiple paradoxicalities and contradictions that characterise practices of everyday 
self-tracking. The detailed pinpointing of such paradoxes is essential for 
understanding how self-tracking technologies organise and effectively change the 
world by reconfiguring, e.g. the practical understanding and experience of the self. 
The dissertation also contributes to theoretical understandings of ’therapeutic 
culture’ by considering how digital health technologies intertwine with and diverge 
from common therapeutic discourses of self-awareness and self-knowledge. Thus, 
it proposes further research on the reconfiguration of therapeutic culture in 
emerging digital new media assemblages. 
This dissertation consists of a summary and four empirical articles. Three of 
the articles have been published in peer-reviewed scientific journals and one is in 
an internationally published edited volume. The first article (I) investigates 
everyday self-tracking assemblages as systems of moral knowledge production. 
 4 
Through these assemblages, people seek self-control and health awareness by 
delegating control to algorithmic digital companions. These companions may 
provide people with positive effects, but they also underline existing modes of 
body politics and constantly produce ’problematic’ or problematised bodies. The 
second article (II) shows how proactive self-tracking produces experiences of both 
self-knowledge and perpetual uncertainty. The article then develops our theoretical 
understanding of the temporalisation of the self in such practices. The third article 
(III) argues that proactive self-tracking is often closely intertwined with the idea of 
attaining holistic viewpoints to oneself, yet in practice it promotes fragmented 
vistas into one’s life as bodies and selves are continuously divided into ever-more 
nuanced and detailed functionalities and longitudinal trajectories. The fourth article 
(IV) relates self-tracking more closely to other ’alternative’ and/or critical health 
practices and develops an understanding of self-tracking as a sociotechnical 
manifestation of ’everyday fringe medicine’, i.e. a regime of everyday self-care in 
which scientific and ’alternative’ modes of knowledge production become 
negotiated and are sometimes mixed and matched. 
All of the articles highlight the contradictions and paradoxicalities inherent in 
self-tracking practices. The summary of this dissertation synthesises the findings 
from separate articles and thus deepens our understanding of the inherent 
multiplicity and complexity of technology, especially in relation to self-tracking. 
The paradoxes (including but not limited to persistent dynamics between 
knowledge/uncertainty, holistic individualisation/fragmentary dividualisation, 
becoming ’oneself’/’the other’ and knowing about health in terms of 
’official’/’alternative’ knowledge) explain and show how self-tracking 
technologies shape everyday realities of therapeutic action and self-understanding, 
and produce new complexities instead of simply alleviating problems.  
To summarise, this dissertation argues that the application of process ontology 
and the notion of paradoxes are analytically and methodologically inspiring and 
forceful approaches for looking past the surface of human-technology interaction 
and beyond common sense use-relations with technology. They help us 
acknowledge material agencies, and they help us observe how self-tracking 
assemblages actually ’work’ in everyday life, even if people often tend to think of 
themselves as being ultimately in charge of what happens with technology. 
Paradoxes also show how technology actively produces needs and desires instead 
of simply fulfilling them. Thus, in order to think ethically about self-tracking and 
related developments in society, these technologies must be treated as more-than-
tools. This dissertation creates a fertile basis for future research on self-tracking 
technology within different groups of people in order to see how these and other 
relevant paradoxes and contradictions play out in different cultural, material and 
personal contexts.  
KEYWORDS: self-tracking, self, technology, materiality, paradoxes   
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Yksi 2000-luvun suurista kuluttajatrendeistä on ollut proaktiivinen digitaalinen 
itsenmittaaminen. Proaktiivisella itsenmittaamisella viittaan erilaisten laitteiden ja 
mobiilisovellusten arkiseen käyttöön, jonka avulla ihmiset keräävät dataa elämäs-
tään ja kehonsa toiminnoista, esimerkiksi aktiivisuudesta, unesta, sykkeistä ja 
käyttäytymisen kaavoista. Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastelen henkilöhaastatteluihin, 
mediamateriaaleihin sekä itsenmittaukseen liittyviin havainnointiaineistoihin 
perustuen sitä, miten itsenmittaamisen käytännöt ja niissä tapahtuva ihmis-
teknologia-yhteistyö muovaavat ihmisten elämismaailmaa sekä ymmärrystä ja 
kokemusta itsestään. 
Etnografisesti orientoitunut väitöskirja kytkeytyy etenkin monitieteiseen 
tieteen- ja teknologiantutkimuksen kenttään. Väitöskirja ammentaa vaikutteita 
esimerkiksi sosiologiasta, antropologiasta ja mannermaisen filosofian perinteestä 
paneutuessaan itsenmittaamislaitteiden ja niiden tuottaman datan kanssa elämiseen 
liittyviin kokemuksiin. Hyödynnän etenkin assemblage-teoriaa ja ihmis-teknologia-
bifurkaation kritiikkiä paikantaakseni ja avatakseni arkiseen itsenmittaamiseen 
liittyvää kompleksisuutta. Siinä missä arkiset ajattelutavat, markkinointidiskurssit 
ja jopa tutkimustekstit usein rakentavat itsenmittauslaitteet “välineinä”, joita 
ihmiset käyttävät omien päämääriensä toteuttamiseen, bifurkaatiokritiikki avaa 
näkökulmia, joista käsin teknologiaa tarkastellaan “enemmän-kuin-välineenä”. 
Näin arkisista itsenmittaamiskäytännöistä löytyy monia ristiriitaisuuksia ja para-
doksaalisuuksia, joiden käsittelyn väitän olevan tärkeää mikäli halutaan ymmärtää 
syvällisesti itsenmittausteknologian yksilöllisiä ja yhteiskunnallisia vaikutuksia, ja 
itsenmittauskäytännöissä tapahtuvaa ihmisen ja teknologian yhteismuotoutumista. 
Väitöskirja kontribuoi myös ”terapeuttisen kulttuurin” keskusteluihin avatessaan 
sitä, miten digitalisoituvat ja datavetoiset terveysteknologiat kytkeytyvät terapeut-
tisiin puhe- ja toimintatapoihin käytännössä. Näin avataan keskustelua terapeutti-
sen kulttuurin paikantuneisuudesta, ja sen muotoutumisesta digitalisoituvissa 
(media)verkostoissa. 
 
Väitöskirja koostuu kolmesta vertaisarvioidusta journaaliartikkelista, sekä 
yhdestä toimitetussa teoksessa julkaistusta luvusta. Ensimmäinen artikkeli (I) 
tarkastelee arkisia itsenmittauskokoonpanoja (assemblages) moraalisen tiedontuo-
tannon järjestelminä, joissa itsekontrollia ja terveystietoisuutta tavoitellaan 
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delegoimalla kontrollia osittain digitaalisille, teknologisille kumppaneille. Näissä 
kokoonpanoissa teknologiat voivat tuottaa ihmisille positiivisia kokemuksia, 
alleviivaten samalla ruumiinpoliittisia arvottamisen käytäntöjä ja tuottaen ruumiin 
”problemaattisuutta” käytännössä. Toinen artikkeli (II) valottaa, kuinka pro-
aktiivinen itsenmittaaminen tuottaa käytännössä sekä tietoa että epätietoisuutta ja 
kiinnostusta itseä kohtaan. Artikkeli liittää itsenmittaamiseen liittyvän tiedon ja 
epätiedon välisen dynamiikan teoreettiseen keskusteluun minuuden tempo-
ralisaatiosta. Kolmas artikkeli (III) havainnoi itsenmittaamisen kiinnittyvän usein 
holistisen itsetietoisuuden diskursseihin ja argumentoi mittaamisen käytännössä 
kääntävän kokonaisvaltaisen itsetietoisuuden logiikan päälaelleen jakaessaan kehot 
ja elämät yhä yksityiskohtaisemmiksi parametreiksi ja datajatkumoiksi. Neljäs 
artikkeli (IV) suhteuttaa itsenmittaamisen muihin ”vaihtoehtoisen” itsehoivan 
käytäntöihin ja käsitteellistää arkista itsehoivaa ”arjen rajalääketieteenä”, joka avaa 
tilaa yhdistää erilaisia tietojärjestelmiä, ja sekä vahvistaa että toisinaan haastaa tai 
neuvotella ”virallisen” tiedon merkitystä. 
Väitöskirjan yhteenveto tuottaa artikkeleihin perustuen laajemman argumentin 
itsenmittaamisen monitahoisesta paradoksaalisuudesta, mikä syventää aiemmassa 
tutkimuksessa tuotettua ymmärrystä teknologian monitahoisesta luonteesta. Kaikki 
artikkelit tuovat esiin arkiseen itsenmittaamiseen liittyviä spesifejä paradokseja ja 
ristiriitaisuuksia, joiden pohjalta yhteenveto rakentuu. Paradokseihin kuuluu esi-
merkiksi jatkuva tiedon ja epätiedon, holistisen individualisaation ja fragmen-
taarisen dividuaalisuuden, minuuden ja ”toiseuden” sekä ”virallisen” ja ”vaihtoeh-
toisen” terveystietoisuuden välinen dynamiikka. Paradoksit osoittavat, kuinka mit-
taamiskäytännöt muovaavat ymmärrystä itsestä ja maailmasta, ja tuovat elämiin 
uudenlaista kompleksisuutta, vaikka ”välineinä” mittarien usein kuvitellaan 
helpottavan elämää.  
Väitöskirja esittää, että prosessiontologian soveltaminen ja ristiriitaisuuksien 
esiintuominen ovat analyyttisesti ja metodologisesti hyödyllisiä välineitä, kun 
pyritään katsomaan syvälle ihmis-teknologia-vuorovaikutuksen pinnan alle, ja yli 
arkijärkisen tavan ajatella teknologiaa välineellisyyden ja käyttösuhteiden kautta. 
Nämä teoreettiset ja käsitteelliset resurssit auttavat suhtautumaan ei-inhimilliseen 
toimijuuteen vakavasti ja tarkastelemaan sitä, miten arkiset itsenmittauskokoon-
panot käytännössä toimivat ja muuttavat maailmaa sekä itseymmärrystä. Paradoksit 
myös osoittavat kuinka teknologiat tuottavat tarpeita eivätkä vain palvele niitä. 
Itsenmittaamisen ja siihen liittyvien kehityskulkujen eettinen käsittely vaatiikin 
teknologian ymmärtämistä enemmän-kuin-välineenä. Väitöskirja luo hedelmällisen 
pohjan tarkastella sitä, millaisia muotoja siinä mainitut ja mahdolliset muut 
paradoksit ja ristiriidat saavat erilaisissa kulttuurisissa, materiaalisissa ja 
henkilökohtaisissa konteksteissa 
ASIASANAT: Itsenmittaaminen, itse, teknologia, materiaalisuus, paradoksit  
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1 Introduction 
Things vibrate. From the simplest of organisms to complex life forms, from the 
simplest of tools to the most advanced technological gadgets, all things vibrate. 
Beyond every static surface, there is constant vibration: if there were no vibration, 
there would be no life, only an eternity of still non-movement. However, by 
highlighting vibration not only do I refer to the physical-material understanding of 
’existence’ as atom-level vibration, but also to the symbolic understanding that all 
things organise and affect the world around them. Things – be they organisms, 
ideas, discourses, simple objects or complex technologies – emanate effects into 
their surroundings and come into being only through their relations to the 
environment. If things contain an ’essence’, as famously argued by the sociologist 
and philosopher Bruno Latour (1999: 197), ’essence is existence and existence is 
action’. In this sense, vibration becomes resonance, as things exist only by 
resonating with their surroundings, i.e. by acting on, and shaping, the world. In a 
very general sense, this study is about vibrations in human-technology co-
operation. More specifically, it focuses on a now popular and widespread everyday 
therapeutic life-management practice called self-tracking. I will explore how the 
human-technology co-work in self-tracking practices shape people’s everyday 
life, their lifeworld and their sense of oneself. By highlighting various self-related 
paradoxicalities that arise in everyday self-tracking practices, I will participate in 
the ongoing discussion about how humans and their technologies affect and 
reconfigure each other, and what this specifically means in the context of everyday 
self-tracking in a time permeated by therapeutic calls for taking charge of one’s life 
and wellbeing. 
 In the Western world, millions of people now possess and employ self-tracking 
gadgets and related digital health applications (Schüll, 2016a; Lupton, 2016a) 
through which they can gather data on their lives and bodily functions and then 
consider using this data to improve their lives in some fashion. During my 
research, I have been one of these people. I initially bought a self-tracking device 
in 2015, a fitness tracking wristband (FitBit Charge HR) that helped me gather 
numerical data on my daily step counts, heart rate, sleep quality and calorie 
Harley Bergroth 
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consumption, among other things. I wore the device consistently for 8 months, 
seemingly learning new things about my body’s functionalities and the patterns of 
my behaviour as the related mobile application in my phone gradually filled up 
with figures, graphs, averages and other mediums of insight. Furthermore, I learned 
not only about myself, but also about my surroundings, as my everyday urban 
living environment became ‘quantified’. It became framed by the amount of steps 
it takes to walk certain routes, through which my relation to the environment 
changed; e.g. when walking to work, some route choices became more ‘beneficial’ 
than others (see also Prasopoulou, 2017; Pink & Fors, 2017). In everyday life, the 
actual hardware on my wrist gradually became easy to forget about. However, 
sometimes the wristband reminded me of its existence by providing gentle haptic 
vibrations to indicate, for example, that I had hit 10,000 daily steps – an 
achievement which in the current preventive medical discourse is often regarded as 
an indicator of sufficient activity for the maintenance of a healthy cardiovascular 
system1. 
At some point, I decided to stop wearing the device regularly, as in some sense 
I felt that there was nothing left for me to learn about myself through it at that time, 
an experience that researchers (Kristensen & Ruckenstein, 2018) have described as 
‘hitting a wall’. However, now, as I often find myself sitting down for extended 
periods of time working and trying to make sense of this chaotic mass of text that 
should someday become a thesis, it is obvious to me that there never really was a 
wall. In a sense I never really stopped wearing it – I never really ‘gave up’ the 
technology – even though the concrete wristband hardware has had a dead battery 
for a while and is currently buried under some junk somewhere at home. The 
activity of tracking left a mark. I now have a different smart watch device that I 
occasionally use, but even when I don’t use a concrete device at all, which is quite 
often, I do think about my being differently than I did before getting entangled with 
technologies of self-tracking in my everyday life. In some ways, I am changed and, 
in a sense, I am self-tracking although I am not wearing a self-tracking device, for I 
often find myself reflecting on the very processes of my personal everyday being 
 
 
1  The proliferation of wearables has instantiated an understanding of the health benefits 
of taking 10,000 steps a day as a kind of common knowledge. However, recent 
research has rendered the scientific basis of such a recommendation questionable. It 
has been suggested that the often-heard recommendation actually stems from the trade 
name of a Japanese pedometer sold in the 1960’s. The trade name of the device was 
Manpo-Kei, which translates to ”10,000 steps meter”. This trade name may have been 
chosen because the Japanese character for the number 10,000 resembles a man 
walking or running. However, according to research, actual health benefits can also be 
associated with notably lower levels of daily step activity (Lee et al., 2019). 
Introduction 
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that these devices taught me to monitor and manage in certain ways. Often, these 
days, I still live the sticky connection as I think about the daily step count and then 
find myself thinking that I really haven’t been very active. 
This position of an active non-user – or perhaps that of a passive user – is one 
example of the practical paradoxicality of self-tracking in everyday life. It invites 
us to rethink many of the common ways of thinking and talking about what 
‘happens’ in self-tracking, i.e. in relation to ‘learning’ about oneself or ‘knowing’ 
oneself better through such practices. This study attempts to dive deep into such 
paradoxicalities by letting go of the idea of technology as a ‘tool’ that merely 
enables us to pursue human purposes such as self-knowledge. In a sense, tracker 
devices – as technologies and technological practices more generally – may be 
thought of through philosopher Jacques Derrida’s (1976) ideas on the ‘logic of 
supplement’, which offers an illuminating way of thinking about what it might 
mean to say that technology is a paradox. In common language, the term 
supplement refers to an object that is ‘added on to something’, and we may 
intuitively think of a tracker device as a supplement in the sense that it is simply 
added on to one’s life and body as an extra-bodily device, like a technological 
appendage, to empower or ‘enrich’ us in our pursuit of a better life.  When thinking 
of enrichment in this sense, Derrida’s logic of supplement sees supplementation as 
completion without there really being a lack. However, the supplement also 
completes something as if filling a void, simultaneously signifying incompleteness. 
When applied to technology, the supplement is not just a useful ‘thing’ or device 
but also an event or ‘instance’ that is a ‘mark of an emptiness’ (Ibid.: 145); it not 
only aids or enriches but also promotes change and correction by marking 
incompleteness. Supplementation is, thus, always both addition to and substitution 
for something that is in some sense already ‘natural’ or complete – such as writing 
is to speech or masturbation is to sex. 
This means that self-tracking technologies can, for example, be argued to both 
enrich our ability to know ourselves and change or correct the conditions 
surrounding how we know about ourselves. For example, for better or worse, since 
well before the advent of contemporary self-tracking technologies or older, analog 
self-measurement technologies, human beings have had embodied and discursive 
ways of producing knowledge about their activity and wellbeing in general, and 
these ways sometimes sit uneasily with the quantified, number-driven logic of self-
tracking. We might then say that self-tracking technologies do not merely enable 
knowledge production (as the marketing would like us to believe), but also change 
its conditions and possibilities. A supplement, such as in our case a self-tracking 
device for a self-interested, health-conscious subject, both adds to and substitutes 
for (or replaces) one’s self-observation capabilities. In this sense, the logic of 
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supplement also questions the absence/presence dichotomy (in terms of using or 
not using self-tracking technologies) that so often haunts our accounts and 
imaginaries of self-tracking in practice. As will be argued later, we may relate to 
self-tracking technologies, and think through them, regardless of whether or not 
actual devices are tethered to our bodies. In any case, in this thesis, this framework 
of supplementarity invites the researcher to think through paradoxes; technology 
only enhances anything by and through changing it. For example, self-tracking 
may be seen as a practice of ‘ordering’ life – as a quest for enhanced order in terms 
of wellbeing – but as a transformative practice ordering is always also a process of 
dis-ordering existing orders. 
Building on interview accounts, media materials and observations in self-
tracking-related practices, this dissertation will shed light on the paradoxes and 
contradictions of self-tracking in everyday life. As a simple example of 
supplementarity and practical complexity in self-tracking, anyone who has personal 
experience with tracking aspects of their body in quantified form with common 
tracker devices such as fitness tracker wristbands and sleep trackers can probably 
relate to the experience of wondering whether to put their faith in the data and 
numbers or in their ‘gut feeling’. While rhetorically we often claim to favour one 
side of this dichotomy over the other, in practice self-tracking often becomes a 
matter of fitting together different modes of knowing about oneself and juggling 
multiple modes of knowing about oneself, even (or especially) when the 
quantitative and qualitative data seem tensioned or incompatible. While this 
problem in some sense surely also applies to older, analog technologies of self-
measurement, the proliferation of digital, algorithmic self-tracking poses 
interesting questions in relation to the intensification of such paradoxes in everyday 
life. Some of the other paradoxes investigated in this thesis include questions of 
how we strive for ongoing control of that which is inherently uncontrollable, how 
we attempt to confirm and ‘actualise’ our bodily states or personal feelings in the 
present while lingering in the future (and perhaps in the past), how we 
simultaneously produce experiences of self-knowledge and uncertainty in self-
tracking practice, and finally, how through the activity of self-tracking we can both 
attach to and detach from ‘official’ biomedical modes of knowing about health and 
wellbeing. 
It could be said that as a social phenomenon self-tracking is a distinctive 
‘culture’, a contemporary craze, a consumer trend, a lifestyle fad or even a 
digitalised mode of class-based distinction. All of these aspects can offer valuable 
insights into the phenomenon and are to some extent discussed in the pages of this 
study. However, overall, the main objective of this study as a whole is to ‘keep a 
steady eye in looking back at the machine’ (an expression borrowed from 
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discussions on teletechnology in Clough, 2000: 69), which in my case means that 
my focus is not on the ‘cultures’ (consumer culture, health culture, a culture of 
metricisation or a culture of therapeutic self-management, for example) that self-
tracking machinery mediates, but on the technics, the machine. My focus is on how 
our self-tracking technologies vibrate, how they feed back into our mindsets of 
everyday therapeutic and wellbeing-oriented action. This study is about examining 
how the hardware and software of self-tracking prescribes (Latour, 1992) modes of 
being in the world and being with oneself. It is about examining how these 
technologies tap into the technological subconsciousness or technology-related 
non-conscious cognisation of human beings, directing how we act and think about 
ourselves (Hayles, 2006; see also Thrift, 2004), and doing so in ways that surpass 
our everyday consciousness over what we think we do with technologies. I want to 
look at how the human-technology arrangements of self-tracking ‘work’ in 
everyday life by inducing or promoting changes in modes of being and thinking. I 
will refer to this tendency of self-tracking technology to prescribe modes of action 
and certain mindsets as the ‘techno-logic’ of self-tracking. 
This work thus owes much to the deconstructionist tradition, material semiotics 
and actor-network theoretical premises (see chapter 2) of trying to think beyond 
untenable binaries in terms of human-technology relationships. Despite its 
occasionally critical tone, my intention is not to claim that self-tracking 
technologies are inherently or unequivocally a negative phenomenon. Rather, my 
aim is to demystify self-tracking. In deconstructionist terms, technology is always 
pharmakon, i.e. both medicine and poison, and in order to grasp the profound 
effects technology has on the world it is necessary to map technological 
contradictions and ambiguities instead of simply endorsing or rebelling against any 
specific technological application.2 Self-tracking technologies surely ‘work’ in 
different ways with different people in different situations and circumstances. Even 
more importantly, what I eventually think of as the central argument of this 
dissertation is condensed into the title of this PhD thesis – as an everyday means of 
self-care, therapeutic, proactive self-tracking often presents itself as a paradoxical 
activity. Self-tracking speaks to us in many tongues and lures us into many often 
contradictory directions.  
 
 
2  Modern technology – from industrial production to spacefaring and from 
communication to health care – has ’always’ been indispensably intertwined with the 
dramaturgy of hope and the ethos of salvation. Yet, the dialectic of hope necessitates 
that hopeful visions of technological progress are accompanied by visions of 
technological dystopia. We then feel compelled to take a stand in relation to the 
question of whether technology is a boon or a bane, a blessing or a curse. 
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The multiple and sometimes contradictory character of technology in society is, 
of course, not my own invention. Rather, in this work, it has become a starting 
point, one that owes much to a plethora of previous research influenced, for 
example, by the idea of the ‘social construction of technology’ (e.g. Bijker et al., 
1987). This tradition has aptly shown us how people relate to technologies in 
various ways, how technologies are tinkered with and how the ‘same’ technologies 
are effectively made into different things in different social contexts (although such 
academic works can sometimes be accused of replacing technological determinism 
with anthropocentric determinism). The more original side of this work relates to 
the detailed attempt to recognise and flesh out specific paradoxicalities of 
contemporary digital health technologies. I call the contradictions evident in 
everyday self-tracking practices ‘paradoxes’ because they are, in my view, 
contradictions that are highlighted by human action in self-tracking practices and in 
principle ever-present, even unresolvable, in the techno-logic of contemporary 
digital self-tracking. To repeat what was already said above, the intensified 
struggles for everyday ‘order’ – e.g. through ever more automated technologies of 
‘knowing oneself’ and acting ‘right’ – always intensify the unexpected production 
of dis-order, which incites more action. 
As anthropologist Dawn Nafus (2016, xii) once put it, self-tracking 
technologies represent a ‘significant new chapter in the ongoing story of what it is 
that numbers do for us, and do to us’ (and what numbers do not do, we might add). 
In opposition to our everyday imaginaries, which commonly propose self-tracking 
technologies as simple instruments of self-related knowledge production that 
enable self-control through numbers3, such technologies can in many ways make 
everyday life more rather than less complex. After all, even as early as almost a 
hundred years ago, the sociologist Robert K. Merton (1936) stated in a more down-
to-earth fashion that complex systems in complex lifeworlds may deliver on some 
of their promises and purposes but also always bring about unintended 
consequences. It is, I think, by diving into the contradictions, paradoxes and 
unintended consequences of self-tracking that we can still gain new insights into 
how these technologies – in their various manifestations as specific devices – not 
 
 
3  The idea of the importance of self-tracking and numbers in everyday life management 
has in recent decades been most clearly promoted by the Quantified Self movement. 
Born in the Bay Area of California in the first decade of the 2000s, it is a relatively 
loosely organised, global movement that brings together people who are interested in 
tracking, quantifying and self-managing various aspects of their lives. These people 
often share their findings with others. The spirit and telos of the movement is captured 
in the slogan ’self-knowledge through numbers’ (see https://quantifiedself.com) 
(Lupton, 2016a). 
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only add to our social reality and sense of self, but also effectively reconfigure 
worlds. 
1.1 What is proactive self-tracking and why should 
we care? 
The term ‘self-tracking’ commonly denotes a wide range of life management 
technologies and activities with different wearable or near-body mobile 
technologies and biosensor devices through which people gather data about their 
lives and bodies (Lupton, 2016; Nafus, 2016; Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2018). The 
term ‘proactive’ employed here indicates that in this study my attention is focused 
on self-tracking that is conducted in everyday contexts as a voluntary and 
preventive means of health-monitoring and ‘risk management’, detached from 
clinical regimes and treatment programs through which people would monitor 
diagnosed illnesses.4  
Contemporary proactive self-tracking technologies include, but are by no 
means limited to, smart watches and activity tracking fitness wristbands, exercise-
related heart rate monitors, sleep tracking devices, and a plethora of digital health 
applications with which one can track one’s everyday activities and bodily 
processes, from general time-use patterns to menstrual cycles to daily water 
consumption to mood changes. Self-tracking has been practised in some form for 
centuries via the ‘logging’ of analog measurements produced with tools such as 
measurement poles and weight scales (Selke, 2016; Crawford et al. 2015). 
Arguably, however, the possibilities for modern everyday self-tracking have 
exploded with the development of new tools such as accelerometers and pressure, 
light or electricity-based biosensors through which information about movement 
and bodily rhythms and processes can be gathered automatically, often without 
paying continued attention to counting one’s steps, measuring one’s own pulse or 
consciously reflecting on personal stress levels and quality of sleep. For example, 
activity tracking wristbands (e.g. Polar Loop, FitBit) employ the accelerometer to 
measure daily step counts, while some sleep tracking technologies (e.g. Beddit) 
 
 
4  The line between proactive and clinical self-tracking is of course sometimes 
somewhat blurry, especially in relation to so-called ’lifestyle diseases’ such as type 2 
diabetes and atherosclerosis. For example, three of my interviewees linked their 
current self-tracking activities to contacts with medical personnel who had informed 
them of elevated risks of such diseases, or even to past medical emergencies such as 
strokes. However, all interviewees stated that the employment of self-tracking gadgets 
in their everyday life was of their own initiative and was in no way encouraged or 
promoted by medical personnel. 
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employ a pressure-based sensor to measure heart rates and breathing rhythms 
during the time spent in bed. Some technologies for preventive stress management 
and ‘emotional intelligence’ (e.g. MoodMetric) measure electrodermal activity in 
order to analyse stress levels via the functioning of the body’s nervous systems. 
Self-tracking is now a billion-dollar business worldwide and a central part of 
many health and wellness-related retail contexts as well as health-related events 
across Euro-American societies (Schüll 2016a; Sharon, 2017). This is also the case 
in Finland, which is where my empirical work has taken place. My participatory 
observation in recent years has involved events such the Upgraded Life Festival (in 
2014 and 2015), which was organised within the premises of two distinguished 
universities in the Helsinki area, as well as Biohacker Summit (in 2015), which 
was organised in a prominent event venue in Helsinki and has since expanded 
abroad. Such events have provided platforms for Finnish start-up companies 
related to digital health and self-tracking (such as FirstBeat, Oura, Beddit, 
MoodMetric and others) to present and popularise their products in conference-
style environments. Typically, these events bring together speakers from both 
scientific and entrepreneurial backgrounds who give presentations with themes 
ranging from nutritional coaching to transhumanist technoscience utopias. And in 
Finland, the digital health start-up scene has been booming indeed. For example, 
the national Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (called Business Finland since 
2018) has in recent years boasted a ‘Bits of Health’ program that has aimed to turn 
Finland into a ‘significant digital health hub where internationally successful 
companies are born’.5 Such goals have been realised, as evidenced by significant 
success stories, such as the purchase of Finnish sleep-tracking device manufacturer 
Beddit by international technology giant Apple in the spring of 2017. 
Finnish sociologist Mika Pantzar (2012) has noted that while some Finnish 
technology companies – especially Polar Electro – have designed and developed 
modern self-tracking equipment such as wireless heart rate monitors since as early 
as the 1980s, near-body monitoring devices have traditionally occupied quite 
specific domains of professional life, such as clinical health care and professional 
sports. During the last few decades, the rise of individualistic and ‘therapeutic’ 
discourses on health and wellbeing in Finland and other Euro-American societies 
(Rose, 1990; McGee, 2005; Madsen, 2015; Salmenniemi et al. 2019) has 
propagated markets for algorithm-based self-monitoring devices that enable people 
to passively gather and visualise real-time information about themselves in an 
 
 
5  See https://www.businessfinland.fi/en/for-finnish-customers/services/programs/ 
ended-programs/bits-of-health/ [last accessed 30/09/2020] 
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unprecedented way, all while going about their often busy and stressful lives. 
These therapeutic discourses, after all, typically promote reflective self-inspection 
and the attainment of self-knowledge. Thus, they also typically highlight self-
responsibility and one’s own ability to be in charge of one’s life and wellbeing. In 
the fields of health care and digital health, such ideas surface through and mix with 
discourses of ‘personalised’ and patient-driven medicine (Swan, 2012; Topol, 
2015; see also Sharon, 2017; Lupton 2016a; articles III and IV). These discourses 
encourage data-driven and individualised solutions for wellbeing and support 
preventive self-monitoring, which fits well with the increasing pressure for more 
efficiency that national health care systems face through the rhetoric of austerity (in 
Finland, see Wrede, 2008). 
The users, the developers and the promoters of self-tracking technologies are 
all usually very aware of the limited objectivity – i.e. the technical limitations, 
inaccuracies and glitches – of current self-tracking technologies and specific 
gadgets. Yet, the phenomenon of self-tracking is in many ways surrounded by 
hyperbolic imaginaries on its enabling and empowering effects; how self-tracking 
data gadgets empower individuals to work on themselves, to better look after 
themselves and to lead healthier, happier and more productive lives. The 
empowering aspects of self-tracking may relate to a variety of arguments. For 
example, it may be pointed out that people’s access to healthcare is limited, and 
thus self-tracking technologies bring (health) care closer to the individual. It may 
also be argued that self-tracking provides cost and time efficient care, helping 
individuals and service providers save time and money. Finally, it may be said that 
self-tracking helps people stay in better shape, both physically and mentally. For 
these reasons, among others, self-tracking technologies may of course be rightly 
seen as capable of producing empowering experiences for many people in many 
situations.  
However, as will be shown throughout this study, when we consider how 
technologies ‘vibrate’ by conditioning our modes of knowing (about) the world and 
ourselves, such hyperbolic claims which  ‘black box’ (Latour, 1999) self-tracking 
technologies in the sense of rendering them relatively free of complexities may also 
be quite detached from the everyday realities of living with self-tracking 
technologies and the data they produce. For example, self-tracking is definitely not 
an empowering regime of everyday self-care for everyone in every situation 
(article I). Even more importantly, based on our intuitive tendency to think of 
technology as a passive ‘tool’ for human purposes, we rarely consider how 
technology may be productive of new problems and even productive of the very 
conditions it is trying to alleviate or address in everyday life. For example, it may 
be argued that in practice self-tracking actively produces regimes of continuous 
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self-interest, (self-)control, anticipation and desire (cf. Introna, 2016; Adams et al. 
2009; articles II and III), which in part explains why people often ‘stick with’ the 
mindset of tracking. While a specific technological gadget may produce 
experiences of knowing oneself better, the techno-logic of self-tracking – such as 
prescribing longitudinally extended acts of continuous monitoring – simultaneously 
produces a sustaining will to knowledge. After all, with the focus on the ‘self’, 
what we are actually tracking and constantly made aware of through self-tracking 
interfaces is not a coherent person in a single point in time, but an ever-developing 
process. 
Moreover, self-tracking technologies – especially near-body gadgets that 
‘automatically’ monitor the body and its processes – are now an integral part of 
social policy imaginaries from education to healthcare to housing to insurance 
across Euro-America (e.g. Lupton 2016a; Sharon, 2017; McFall, 2019). This 
means that while the technical gadgets themselves may shrink in size and become 
ubiquitous, ambient intelligence (Verbeek, 2009) in everyday use, we are currently 
looking at futures in which citizens’ lives become increasingly entangled with the 
big and small data they produce. These imagined developments and related 
possible futures also further blur the ‘voluntary’ character of self-tracking. As of 
today, most self-trackers still see their practice as a voluntary choice, but the more 
these technologies become entangled with people’s sense of social security, the 
more they also become ‘enforced’ (Lupton, 2016a: 10). Obviously the gathering 
and use of health data and related big data relates to an abundance of ethical issues 
that fall outside the scope of this thesis but have been fleshed out elsewhere in the 
field of digital humanities (for an overview, see e.g. Richterich, 2018; Sharon & 
Lucivero, 2019). However, it is also vital to probe deeper into the experiences of 
self-trackers – early-adopters as well as more ‘casual’ self-trackers – to learn more 
about how these technological data practices shape people’s modes of being, 
thinking and relating to themselves or others in everyday life. Thinking ethically 
about self-tracking calls for a deeper focus on thinking of technology as more-than-
a-tool in everyday life, and this is one of the central aims of this thesis. 
1.2 Mapping the literature on everyday self-
tracking 
Owing to the hype, everyday proactive self-tracking with wearable technology has 
been a hot topic across a wide range of fields in recent years. In the field of medical 
science, studies have often been interested in whether self-tracking devices can 
provide accurate health data (e.g. Case et al., 2015, for a review see Feehan et al., 
2018) or help people improve their wellbeing in line with dominant conceptions of 
what counts as good health, such as by losing weight (Jakicic et al., 2016) or 
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becoming more active (DiFrancisco-Donoghue et al., 2018). In Human-Computer 
interaction studies, more interest has been directed towards mapping different 
patterns, habits of use and impacts of interaction with self-tracking technologies 
(Rooksby et al, 2014; Liu et al, 2015; Lazar et al., 2015, Kari et al., 2016). Studies 
in these fields show how the effects of self-tracking technology on individuals are 
not always in line with marketing claims promising health-related empowerment 
and improved wellbeing via data-based informatics. Such studies typically 
conceive of the ‘technology’ as ultimately a (passive) ‘tool’ subject to human use, 
interpretation and agency, and often aim to conceptualise human-technology 
interaction in terms that provide relevant insights and solutions for technology 
developers. 
However, self-tracking – like any technological practice – is thoroughly a 
social phenomenon in that it both reflects and reconfigures the social and cultural 
context within which it is imagined, negotiated and conducted. Hence, there now 
also exists a diverse body of social scientific critical studies on self-tracking that 
probe the sociocultural and political conditions of the phenomenon, as well as the 
agential capacities of self-tracking technology. In what follows, I will review and 
evaluate this social scientific literature in order to ground my approach in existing 
scholarship on the topic. Specifically, I will tease out three thematic dimensions of 
analysing self-tracking, which nevertheless should not be understood as clear-cut 
categories of research, but as overlapping in a myriad of ways. 
One influential line of thinking that has been drawn upon by many scholars 
relates to the Foucauldian tradition of governance and biopolitics. Many critical 
accounts have focused on how the human-technical ‘work’ conducted in 
everyday self-tracking relates to ideas of health- or wellbeing-related 
‘assessment’ and ‘evaluation’ of bodies – whether this happens on the macro-
level of big data mining or the micro-level of everyday self-evaluation. The 
framework of biopolitics, combined with a Foucauldian understanding of 
‘technology’ as an organised form of knowledge (see Willcocks, 2006), suggests 
that self-tracking functions as an integral part of contemporary processes of 
enacting bodies and lives along the binaries of proper/improper or 
ideal/pathological in contemporary societies. Leisurely, proactive self-tracking 
then becomes a practice that is about (self-)discipline, (self-)control, and self-
reflective normalisation (Lupton, 2012; 2013; Reigeluth, 2014; Ajana, 2017; 
Fotopoulou & O’Riordan, 2017; Sanders, 2017; article I). This is because self-
tracking devices train and guide users to become and behave like good (health) 
citizens in relation to discourses on ‘proper’ being and in alignment with the 
requirements of the productive machinery (Foucault, 2010). This machinery 
summons an active workforce that is self-sufficient in the sense of taking 
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responsibility for its own capabilities for productive action, such as through 
constant health consciousness. 
Of course, since the rise of digital infrastructures and networked data systems 
at the dawn of 21st century, processes of discipline and governance have also 
evolved and may now seem less tied to concrete institutions and expert instances 
(schools, hospitals, prisons) than is evident in Foucault’s main body of work. 
However, his influence relates to discussions on contemporary, digital forms of 
capitalism in the sense that critical studies have often reflected upon self-tracking 
in relation to capitalist, neoliberal modes of conduct (Lupton, 2017: 63–64; Ajana, 
2017; En & Pöll, 2016; Maturo et al. 2016) or, for example, as the management of 
labour force energies inside and outside concrete organisational contexts (Till, 
2014; Moore & Robinson, 2015, article III in this thesis). This relates to the ‘new 
spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005), which summons a flexible, 
active and self-regulative workforce that keeps track of its own adaptation to 
systemic productive demands through ‘liberating gadgets’ (Ibid: 437) that excite 
work on the self, e.g. by means of reconstructing potentially tedious self-
development as a potentially rewarding game. 
When analysed as such a technology of power, it can be argued that self-
tracking affects the world and reconfigures self-relations, not only by empowering 
people, but by mediating, entrenching, (re)producing and putting into practice 
existing processes of evaluation and valuation, inclusion and exclusion. In this 
context, healthy and wellbeing bodies are ‘proper’ productive bodies. Self-tracking 
may then be thought to manifest as human-technology co-operative work on 
maintaining relations of power, relations which are already coded into the software 
functionalities of such technologies, e.g. as various haptic vibration functions, 
‘educational’ colour codes indicating ‘proper’ modes of behaviour, or supportive 
on-screen messages executed by and through the biopedagogical language of 
algorithms (article I; Fotopoulou & O’Riordan, 2017). Algorithms, after all, are 
nothing more than sets of (in effect, a language of) executive commands through 
which computers and computation-based technologies solve the ‘problems’ they 
are faced with (Frabetti, 2015). In this way, following Foucault, we can think of 
self-tracking technology as an organised (or sociotechnical) form of discursive, 
normative language concerning health and wellbeing. While aptly taking issue with 
the normative (body) politics of self-tracking, this line of thinking can perhaps 
rightly be criticised for sometimes placing too much emphasis on structures or 
discourses in directing our use of technology. 
Late in his career, Foucault (1988) seemingly steered away from an emphasis 
on discipline and turned towards an ethics of the self, which saw power as not only 
repressive, but also productive of possibilities, counter-power and resistance. This 
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has been one of the crucial influences in another strand of studies of self-tracking, 
which may be characterised as the anthropological tradition. This tradition 
focuses on understanding the ‘culture(s)’ of self-tracking from within, and the 
everyday lived experiences of self-tracking. Several ethnographical studies have 
called for a deeper look into everyday lives with these technologies and 
acknowledged that people are (at least to some degree) able to ‘work with’ self-
tracking technologies to construct their own meaning for the practice and the data 
produced. People may use the devices differently than the designers intended. They 
may ‘sabotage’ or hack the functionalities of self-tracking devices, or simply 
control the ways in which (and what kind of) everyday data about them becomes 
registered and processed (see Nafus & Sherman, 2016; Sharon & Zandbergen, 
2016; Lupton, 2016a; Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2018). People often express a 
‘playful’ and experimental character with self-tracking technologies (Kristensen & 
Ruckenstein, 2018). For example, as evident in some of my interviews, a heart rate 
monitor may be designed to monitor resting heart rate or active heart rates during 
exercise, but it may also be employed in the personal investigation of how alcohol 
consumption affects one’s sleep. Indeed, it seems futile to attempt to reduce the 
effects of technology to the technology itself (or the discourse it explicitly offers 
and mediates), as if technology (or discourse) were a deterministic force dictating 
the behaviour of human beings outside the context of practice. 
The anthropological tradition often highlights the idea that self-tracking may 
produce empowerment (Ruckenstein, 2014) and modes of ‘soft resistance’ (Nafus 
& Sherman, 2016) against capitalist demands. Hence, despite the focus on 
quantification and numbers in self-tracking practices and Quantified Self 
communities, the practice of self-tracking should not be understood as ‘data 
fetishist’ in the sense of people blindly acting by the numbers (Sharon & 
Zandbergen, 2016). Rather, it should be understood as a reflective practice in and 
through which the relevance and meaning of self-tracking technology and the data 
produced is evaluated in the context of unique situated circumstances and 
experiences (Pantzar & Ruckenstein, 2017). As such, what may be highlighted in 
this tradition, for example, are the potentials of self-tracking in promoting affective 
elevation and empowerment instead of repressive discipline. 
Consequently, in this line of thinking, self-tracking practices are rendered a 
phenomenon permeated by complexity. It seems that self-tracking is not a case of 
either-or, not simply governance, but also some form of (perhaps covert) resistance 
(Nafus & Sherman 2014; Sharon & Zandbergen, 2016). It is not simply a quest for 
‘objectivity’ (although metric data currently does hold significant cultural power as 
a medium of ‘truth’), but rather a quest for ‘situated objectivity’. People in their 
respective positions and situations always interpret datafied representations of 
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themselves, or ‘put data to use’, in various ways in relation to their own systems of 
knowledge (Pantzar & Ruckenstein, 2017, see also Fiore-Gartland & Neff, 2015). 
Furthermore, this line of thinking correctly highlights how self-tracking, especially 
within the related pioneering Quantified Self movement, may become productive 
of social relationships, solidarity and communicative communion. It may also 
liberate people from sometimes restrictive forms of institutionalised expertise, e.g. 
in relation to medical knowledge and medical conditions (Sharon & Zandbergen, 
2016). 
However, reflecting the age old debates between deterministic and social 
constructivist approaches to technology, it may be argued that in their effort to 
avoid reducing self-tracking to ‘discourse’ or systemic structures, this tradition 
often favours the human factor, affording the human beings and communities (most 
of) the agency in negotiating the use and effects of self-tracking technology. 
Furthermore, while human-oriented accounts aptly characterise what self-tracking 
may become in tech-savvy QS communities, it still bares well to keep in mind that 
although humans can and do play or ‘misbehave’ with technology – depending 
greatly on their know-how in tinkering with technical milieus of hardware and code 
– it may still be argued that technology conditions the ways in which we think and 
go about resisting its (perceived or actual) effects. For example, even within the 
more tech-savvy communities it seems implausible that people would ‘misbehave’ 
with an analog or digital measurement device (apart from declining to use it 
altogether) without making use of the affordance(s) of measurement in some 
fashion. Often, the acts of ‘resistance’ are conditioned by technology as well. A 
hasty analogy might concern reading a book that presents a social critique of the 
corrosive effect of smart technology after learning about the book from a tweet and 
ordering home delivery via a smartphone application. Resistance may then also be 
seen as being ‘brought to life’ by and through the very object of critique. 
To be fair, both the Foucauldian and anthropological traditions commonly seek 
to engage with ideas emanating from the field of continental philosophy on 
knowledge, science and technology, and the broad field of science & technology 
studies (STS). Furthermore, as I have argued, they both offer illuminating vistas 
into what it may mean in practice to think that ‘technology conditions our 
experience of the world’. However, there now appears a third tradition, which I call 
the socio-technical tradition. By this I refer to studies that emphasise the ways in 
which human-technical assemblages ‘work’ in everyday life by conditioning 
experience and which (to at least some degree) aim to highlight technological and 
non-human agencies in practice. As a whole, this tradition involves an 
interdisciplinary emphasis that draws from philosophy, anthropology, sociology, 
human-computer interaction, human geography, psychology, and media studies, 
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along with a diversity of methods. The focus is less on practical interpretation of 
data by humans and more on datafied experience of the world. One of the earlier 
texts incorporating such views was presented by Bode & Kristensen (2015), who 
were critical of the concept of ‘data double’ (which focuses on how people 
interpret datafied representations of themselves) and suggested that self-tracking is 
rather a process of ‘doppelgängering’ in which representations become actors in 
self-enactment. As a cultural historical actant, the notion of the doppelgänger 
invokes the political aspect of the becoming of a person with and through the ‘evil’ 
or ‘deviant’ within. 
In their work influenced by sensory ethnography, Sarah Pink and Vaike Fors 
(2017) have demonstrated that self-tracking tacitly invokes modes of being-in-the-
world, as quantified measures on one’s activity can enact a new kind of 
understanding of one’s surrounding environment, e.g. by actualising in data the 
steepness of a hill. A similar idea is present in the work of information systems 
researcher Elpida Prasopoulou (2017), who writes about mundane activities and 
environments becoming quantified: ‘a trip to the supermarket is 500 steps. If I 
decide to make a longer walk on my way to the grocery shop to clear my head 
before dinner, I’ll record 2000 steps.’ As our lifeworlds become datafied, they also 
concretely change. In her more recent work, critical sociologist Deborah Lupton 
(2016b) considered self-tracking and data in terms of human-technology 
companionship and the metaphor of ‘eating data’ (see also Mol, 2008). This 
metaphor implies that just as with ingesting nutritional ingredients, parts of data 
become processed and absorbed into the body when ‘ingested’, and in the end it 
becomes impossible to separate foodstuff from oneself. 
In some instances, anthropologically-oriented writers have brought up the 
centrality of (the experience of) time and temporality in self-tracking, which invites 
further ties to STS. In empirical studies focusing on human-data relationships, 
anthropologists Natascha Dow Schüll (2016b) and Jamie Sherman (2016) have 
brought up the idea that self-tracking is a practice of assembling together 
temporally scattered data points. Schüll (2016b) refers to this process by 
mentioning notions of the production of ‘time-series self’ in self-tracking practices. 
Sherman (2016) posits that this relational character enables people to establish and 
experience objectivity because, although the tracking technology itself may not be 
found to be objectively accurate, measurements can still be seen as accurate in 
relation to similar measurements of the same people in different points in time. 
Sherman’s (ibid.) work also highlights self-tracking as an aesthetic practice, 
drawing connections to technologies of film and photography. Day & Lury (2016) 
suggest that self-tracking may be conceived of as an ongoing process of self-
composition by drawing an analogy to acts of ‘stitching’. This gives rise to the 
interpretation that tracking practices present an active making of ‘tracks’ which, in 
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principle, always lead people on. These studies have directed me to reflect upon 
how one’s digitalising and digitally visualised relation to the self may invoke new 
modes of being and temporality in everyday experience and self-orientation. 
This line of work resonates with geographer Nigel Thrift’s (2004) notions of 
the ‘technological unconscious’ and literary critic Katherine Hayles’ (2006; 2017) 
ideas on how we do not just (consciously) think with technology but (subtly) 
cognise with technology, meaning that technologies change not only our thoughts, 
but also the very contextual conditions of our thinking (in this case, in relation to 
ourselves). For example, media scholars Lomborg et al. (2018) focus on 
(socio)psychological notions of flow and repetition as a central means of 
understanding how the experience of self-tracking propagates engagement with the 
technologies of self-tracking. They contend that users are not ‘hooked’ to self-
tracking by the technologies themselves since, for example, users may disengage if 
the technologies push or nudge their message of optimisation too hard. Rather, the 
user’s use of technology prescribes experiences of temporal flow as users sustain 
their negotiations with the data or with other people (such as personal trainers, 
coaches or friends) who contribute to interpreting the data with and through the use 
of technology.  
In general, STS-influenced research invites us to think about how technologies 
condition our ways of being in the world and knowing about the world and 
ourselves. Self-tracking technologies do this not only by ‘nudging’ (e.g. Schüll, 
2016a) us with haptic alerts for idleness or by encouraging e-mails, but by 
vibrating in our (sub)consciousness. They do this by tying our sense of self into the 
flow of time, by hooking or luring us into the repetitive patterns and distinctive 
‘choreographies’ of human-data feedback loops (Parviainen, 2016) and repetitive 
flows of quantified information. They do this by promoting an experimental 
mindset and, as Foucault might say, a ‘will to knowledge’, rather than by offering 
any definitive, stable knowledge. While being sympathetic to such views, I do 
think, however, that the related processual ontologies are not often followed as far 
as they could be, despite the now common vocabularies of assemblages, 
mediations and human-data (or human-technology) interactions in self-tracking 
research. 
For example, most studies on the topic of self-tracking still seem to build on 
the premise that the human is the ‘user’ and the device is the one that is ‘used’, be 
it talk about governance, lived experience or human-technical data mediations. In 
other words, while these studies aptly illuminate the ways in which data practices 
shape and condition our behaviour in relating to ourselves, in terms of human-
technology relationship they tend to focus on how the human and the non-human 
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interact instead of focusing on how the ‘human’ and that which is thought of as 
‘non-human’ emerge or intra-act (Barad, 2007) through each other6. This implicitly 
means that the human ‘user’ is essentialised as an autonomous agent who acts in 
certain ways under the influence of technology (or wields one’s agential capacities 
over technology) instead of being merely one of the actors that emerge and 
transform in technological practice. I argue that this is not enough for us to truly 
grasp the profound effects of technological practice in general, or the now popular 
phenomenon of digital self-tracking in particular. Technology not only affects the 
way we act (including acts of knowing/thinking), it also changes the very 
conditions of acting. 
While drawing notable theoretical and methodological influence from all of the 
important types of research mentioned above, this thesis also seeks to create 
something new from them and further develop the field. Following Lucas Introna 
(2013), I argue that despite our fine-tuned theoretical concepts of sociomateriality 
and our will to surpass limiting dualisms (such as those between ‘the social’ and 
‘the material’ or the ‘human’ and the ‘technical’) we still tend to draw boundaries 
between these apparently different sides of reality. This may often prevent us from 
grasping the complexity of technological practices. Such human-technology 
bifurcation is in part constructed by our attachment to linguistic expression, for in 
the practice of language we still tend to separate humans and their ‘tools’ in terms 
of agency, e.g. by speaking about ‘users’ and human-technology interactions (this 
line of criticism is elaborated further in chapter 2).  
This is a problem because by drawing these boundaries, we involuntarily risk 
prioritising the agential properties of one side over the other. Thus, we also risk 
missing some aspects of what the ‘actuality’ or the ‘phenomenon’ of self-tracking 
assemblages at work is (cf. ibid.) or what the ‘self’ is that emerges in these 
assemblages. This thesis addresses this lacuna by teasing out some of the 
paradoxicalities of self-tracking in practice, and argues for a call to let go of the 
underlying presupposition of the human as the ultimate ‘author’ of ‘reality’. This is 
 
 
6  The concept of intra-action stems from Barad’s (2007) ’agential realist’ reading of 
quantum physical phenomena. Unlike ’interaction’, which takes place between two or 
more pre-established entities that then interact with each other, the concept of ’intra-
action’ refers to the process of things (humans, technologies, ideas) becoming through 
each other. To put it another way, any ’stuff’ or ’object’ only ever emerges through 
relations, and not the other way around; relata do not exist independent of the 
relation. The concept of intra-action has sometimes been brought up in relation to 
self-tracking (see e.g. En & Pöll, 2016; Gardner & Jenkins, 2016), laying the 
groundwork for further investigation into the emergences and reconfigurations taking 
place in everyday self-tracking assemblages. 
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why I am not happy with contending that in self-tracking we make the self divided 
in time, for example. Rather, I speak of the self becoming dividual or a temporal 
object, for once the self becomes anew by and through technology, it cannot 
exactly un-become into what it was before. 
By shifting the focus from cultures to technology, I contribute to the 
understanding of mundane everyday regimes of self-tracking. While there now 
exists empirical social scientific research on everyday life with self-tracking 
technologies, an ethnographically and ‘technographically’ (see chapter 3) oriented 
focus on everyday experiences beyond the tech-savvy Quantified Self communities 
is still relatively rare in research. This study builds on the idea that technology is 
always acquiring multiple meanings and purposes, and yet attempts to relate this 
idea with an understanding of how technologies of self-tracking frame our ways of 
knowing about ourselves. Through its novel emphasis on the paradox-ridden 
techno-logic of everyday therapeutic self-tracking, it contributes to our 
understanding of the everyday activities and actualities of self-tracking. In addition 
to focusing on (and fleshing out) various paradoxes in everyday self-tracking 
practices in a novel fashion, the main contributions of this work to existing 
scholarly literatures are the following:  
First, this study advances theorisation on self-tracking by arguing for and 
applying process ontological premises (elaborated further in subchapter 2.2). It 
seeks to make sense of what ‘happens’ in self-tracking in everyday lives, including 
beyond the often-discussed dynamics of governance/resistance. This means a shift 
away from looking at self-tracking practices through human-directed use-relations 
and towards seeing these practices through relations of becoming (Introna, 2013; 
Barad, 2006; DeLanda, 2006; Stiegler 1998). In terms of the research question 
focusing on the formation and emergence of the self in these practices, this shift 
enables a focus not so much on what is ‘made’ of the self through representation, 
interpretation, desire, etc., but on what ‘becomes’ of the self through the co-work 
of humans and technologies in everyday self-tracking practices. In the context of 
this dissertation, this contribution entails novel theoretical discussions of the 
repercussions of proactive self-tracking in everyday lives, such as the emergence of 
the self as a ‘temporal object’ through the phenomenon of self-related 
temporalisation (article II). 
Second, the study contributes to literature on therapeutic cultures (see chapter 
2) by discussing what becomes of therapeutic discourses in the context of digital 
everyday self-tracking. In existing literature, self-tracking is sometimes connected 
to a cultural framework of therapeutic culture (Maturo et al. 2016; Lupton, 2016a), 
but it is usually not empirically investigated how self-tracking actually becomes 
therapeutic to people in practice and how self-tracking as a data-driven practice 
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shapes what becomes of therapeutic culture. In this sense, this dissertation 
promotes discussions of how assemblage theorising can deepen our understanding 
of the sociotechnical (re)configuration of therapeutic discourses in the context of 
datafication. While wellbeing-oriented therapeutic culture, as described in chapter 
2, no doubt influences and propagates the use and commercial success of self-
tracking technologies, such culture should not be understood as a static framework 
that functions independently of the technologies and applications through which it 
is mediated (Salmenniemi et al., 2019: 7–8). This entails discussions of how self-
tracking excites therapeutic action by dividing selves and by what may be called 
‘fragmentary holism’ (article III), for example, or about how self-tracking as an 
everyday activity participates in the sometimes subtle, sometimes notable 
reconfiguration of public understanding of (medical) science and expertise (article 
IV). 
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2 Therapeutic agencements of self-
tracking 
In this section, I will present the main theoretical foundations that have guided this 
research. I will begin by discussing self-tracking as related to contemporary 
’therapeutic culture’ from a relationalist point of view. I will then further elaborate 
on the philosophical foundations of thinking about the active, constructive role of 
technology in human experience of the world and oneself.  
2.1 Tracking the self in therapeutic culture 
’Therapeutic culture’ typically refers to a cultural framework in and through which 
health and wellbeing are made sense of through psychological and psychologised 
modes of knowing about the self and working on the self. This is evident in the rise 
of life coaching services and pop-psychological self-help literature, for example, as 
well as in many public policy practices through which the contexts of working life 
and education have become saturated by proactive life management discourses and 
the promotion of emotional skills (Illouz, 2008; Madsen, 2014; Nehring et al. 
2016). One of the most notable observers and critics of therapeutic culture in recent 
decades has been sociologist Nikolas Rose (see 1990; 1999), who analyses the 
post-war development of psy disciplines – especially psychology – and their 
intertwining with advanced liberal art of government. Rose applies Foucauldian 
analytics of power and shows that psy disciplines are central in how modern 
‘selves’ have become understood and experienced as something that can, and 
should, be ‘made up’, worked upon and constantly reinvented to the point that it 
now seems to be a ‘natural’ state of matters that humans strive for continuous self-
awareness and self-realisation. In Rose’s view, this enacts new kinds of governable 
subjects and enables, in effect, neoliberal rule at a distance as individuals learn to 
maintain self-management according to, for example, the guidelines of experts or 
authority.  
Of course, criticism of therapy culture did not start with Rose. Inspired by 
Philip Rieff’s (1966) and Christopher Lasch’s (1979) critical writings on the 
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‘triumph of the therapeutic’ and the rise of self-centred ’culture of narcissism’ in 
contemporary (American) capitalism, cultural critics have long bashed therapeutic 
culture. They have seen it as a kind of opium for the masses in productivity and 
profit-oriented societies in which people are increasingly encouraged to work on 
themselves in order to cope with issues stemming from structural inequality, 
consumerism, productivity demands, and related ills such as experienced 
meaninglessness and burnouts, for example (e.g. Lasch 1979, Madsen, 2015). Such 
cultural criticism has typically centred on the individualising tendencies of 
therapeutic culture, and seen it as a paramount threat to solidarity, social 
engagement and the common good. 
Critical studies have argued from various angles that while the proliferation of 
therapeutic culture may of course sometimes help individuals, it is also deeply 
problematic as it tends to render structural issues into personal pathologies and 
matters of self-development, and act as a form of governance or discipline. In the 
21st Century, Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz has attempted to draw from, and move 
beyond, the American cultural criticism and governmentality studies in relation to 
therapy cultures. For example, in Saving the Modern Soul (2008) she attempts to 
look more deeply into how therapeutic narratives adapt and work in the everyday 
contexts of work and family life, instead of presupposing such a culture as solely 
disciplinary. One of the ideas in her book is that the significance of emotional self-
control has taken root in both the work and family spheres as part of the therapy-
infused rationalisation of modern capitalism. In the process, it reconfigures 
contemporary gender dynamics, for the self should now be constructed by 
reconciling ‘masculine’ assertiveness and ‘feminine’ emotional intelligence (Ibid., 
240). While it does in some ways reproduce totalising notions of ‘the therapeutic 
era’, Illouz’s work has since inspired nuanced investigations into how therapeutic 
culture is engaged with and works with other notable cultural and possibly 
subversive frameworks (see e.g. Aubry & Travis, 2015; Salmenniemi, 2017; 
Nehring & Kerrigan 2019; Perheentupa, 2019).  
In any case, at the core of most scholarly attempts to understand therapeutic 
culture is the idea that the ‘self’ and particular notions of selfhood have gained a 
novel significance in modern life and modern capitalism. As mentioned earlier, 
self-tracking has sometimes been connected with the rise of therapeutic discourses 
of individualised wellbeing and selfhood (Maturo et al., 2016; Lupton, 2016a: 38–
39; Article I). The connection between self-tracking and therapeutic culture makes 
sense not only theoretically, but also empirically. Popular self-tracking imaginaries 
– meaning, for example, the marketing imaginaries through which self-tracking is 
envisaged to help people – and common therapeutic discourses often explicitly 
highlight quests to become ‘a better version of oneself’ and find one’s own 
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authentic, personalised recipe for health, wellbeing and happiness through 
continuous self-monitoring, self-reflection and self-awareness. In self-tracking, 
people are encouraged to take control of their lives – or some complex aspects of 
their lives – and become fitter, healthier and happier. This should be done via the 
monitoring and optimisation of their habits and bodily functions. As noted by 
Schüll (2016a) in her observations of digital health-related events in the US, 
consumers are eagerly led to believe that our data reveals something about who we 
really are.  
Should we wish to follow the idea of the (un)holy union between therapeutic 
culture and modern capitalism, self-tracking technologies may be seen as 
’liberating gadgets’ of the newly energised flexible capitalism (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005: 437–8, see also Till, 2014) as described earlier. They are 
liberating gadgets because they make ongoing self-management a fun game 
through which potential or actual workforce is nudged into maintaining wellbeing 
and productivity by investing in themselves and by, e.g. voluntary exercise and 
self-regulation. However, this dissertation holds that self-tracking is not simply or 
solely capitalist oppression (although capitalism and productivity-oriented 
discourses are, no doubt, important actants in popular self-tracking assemblages). 
Instead, I argue that digital gadgets such as self-tracking devices work as 
‘supplementary’, for they may offer empowerment by turning the self into an 
object of becoming and transformation, and in the process simultaneously reveal 
the self as persistently incomplete (a central aspect in articles II and III). In the 
latter sense, self-tracking fits firmly in the continuum of body projects and self-
projects of (post)modern society. Self-tracking gadgets can undoubtedly help and 
aid people in their self-improvement goals (at least temporarily) by providing 
experiences of becoming healthier, fitter and better informed about oneself and 
various aspects of one’s body, for example. However, self-tracking also prescribes 
and effectively enacts perpetual regimes of therapeutic action as much as it serves 
to help people achieve personal goals. As such, everyday self-tracking assemblages 
promote self-control in practice, but may also challenge and even undo personal 
therapeutic imaginaries of self-control. 
Indeed, in the opening pages of his book Optimizing the Self: Social 
Representations of Self-help, psychologist Ole Jacob Madsen (2015, 1–2) draws 
attention to the fundamental paradox of self-help books specifically, but also to the 
’therapeutic industry’ more generally. He argues that the lure of a variety of 
therapeutic technologies often stems from them not being very effective in doing 
what individual human beings think that they are supposed to do, i.e. enact happier, 
healthier, more balanced and better-informed lives. More to the point, it may be 
argued that while self-help books may indeed help people, they do so by and 
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through enacting problems. For example, the quest for, and perceived success in, 
developing ’self-awareness’ is dependent on the enactment of a related ’problem’, 
which may then be resolved. The problem being that the person is to some degree 
not aware of him or herself, at least not in the right way. 
In the context of digital self-tracking, here I wish to build a connection to the 
work of French philosopher Michel Serres, who in The Parasite (2007: 79; 86–90) 
writes about technological systems ’working because they do not work’. It is 
important to stress that this is definitely not to say that therapeutic technologies of 
self-development are, in general, useless. Sometimes self-help technologies or self-
tracking technologies do have beneficial effects in people’s personal quests for a 
better life. However, Serres’ phrase does convey the idea that dysfunction is always 
part of any functioning system, and Serres elaborates on this through the concept of 
noise. For example, a system of communication such as one’s personal system of 
self-tracking is programmed to transmit a signal, namely knowledge or 
understanding about one’s wellbeing. However, in Serres’ thought, noise is the 
‘third man’, always present in the system of communication, always haunting the 
channel and hindering the transmission, for noise (static, incoherence, or in the 
case of self-tracking perhaps randomness, delay, doubt, insufficiency or 
misunderstanding) is always part of the ’work’ of the system. If the signal were 
perfect, i.e. free of noise, the whole system would disappear or become 
meaningless, for every signal would be transmitted in perfect clarity, as if through 
instant telepathy and objectivity. If a signal of self-tracking was perfect, one would 
possess absolute knowledge on one’s wellbeing and would seek no further 
information on one’s life and body – there would be ‘no spaces of transformation’.  
One of the contributions of this study is then to consider more specifically what 
it would mean if digital therapeutic technologies of self-tracking ’work because 
they do not work’. As will be elaborated in the articles of this thesis, one way to 
make sense of this question is to suggest that such technologies actively enact the 
kind of everyday ’problems’ that they are thought to solve via therapeutic 
intervention. It may be argued that most, if not all, therapeutic technologies enact 
the self as a process or a project that should be worked upon in some way, but self-
tracking technologies contain unique characteristics in this regard. This is due to 
their data-driven design, through which selves are rendered un/problematic via 
various visual and haptic cues (article I) or in which selves emerge as perpetually 
incomplete via linear trajectories, graph designs and the divisive techno-logic of 
self-tracking (articles II and III). The articles in this thesis thus present some ways 
in which self-tracking technologies both work and do not work. 
So, while self-tracking can then be perceived of as part and parcel of 
’therapeutic culture’, I would prefer to characterise self-tracking technologies as 
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part of people’s everyday therapeutic agencements. This will be elaborated further 
in the following subchapter. The notion of ’therapeutic culture’ implies a more or 
less static and homogenic framework within which specific technologies can be 
situated, but which itself almost seems set in stone. It has been suggested elsewhere 
that with any form of therapeutic technologies, researchers should consider the 
notion of therapeutic assemblages/agencements instead of ‘therapeutic cultures’. 
This would allow for better consideration of the role of technologies in shaping 
what becomes of ’culture’ in various situated practices (Salmenniemi et al. 2019), 
such as in the context of digital self-tracking. In the context of this thesis, such a 
focus on assemblages reveals paradoxes in the ways in which self-tracking 
technologies, despite their ’therapeutic’ aura, may become (experienced as) 
counterproductive in practice. This is partly because while self-tracking 
imaginaries incorporate influences from more traditional therapeutic discourses 
such as holistic health and self-help parlance, in practice the digital milieus of self-
tracking constitute distinctive and sometimes contradictory therapeutic regimes of 
action in everyday life (see article III). 
2.2 Therapeutic agencements 
My focus on the relationality of self-tracking as a therapeutic technology stems 
from a tradition of assemblage theory that is typically linked to the work of French 
philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who developed the idea in their 
seminal work A Thousand Plateaus (1987; see also DeLanda, 2006). Assemblage 
theory highlights the processuality of social reality, referring to the idea that 
‘reality’ is not determined solely by nature, nurture nor any underlying ‘social 
structure’ (such as ‘culture’). Rather, reality comes into being and into effect 
through webs of heterogeneous relations; reality is a collection or an arrangement 
of components that join together in action. Practically, this means that things 
(material entities, ideologies, bodies, selves, etc.) are not essentially 
comprehensible apart from the relations that constitute them. To put it another way, 
things do not merely ‘exist’ out there in the world, but they ‘emerge’ through 
relations and become ‘actual’ through action and practice. For example, a thing 
such as a city ‘emerges’ (or is, in fact, constantly produced and reproduced) in 
action as ideas of urbanisation, networks of people, services and buildings as well 
as flows of traffic – both within and exterior to the thing itself – come together and 
make a city ‘happen’. It is the same thing with any entity and the same with 
therapeutic culture – culture is a collection of processes and events happening, of 
things coming together and acting together. 
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Importantly, an assemblage also shapes all entities that are part of the 
assemblage. For example, in and through the entity of a ‘city’ people become urban 
city dwellers with their distinctive urban patterns of thought and action. Human 
culture thus acquires specific urban flavours and car design may change to meet the 
demands of tight city parking. The capacity of assemblages to shape their 
constitutive components implies agency that is not reducible to any single entity 
such as a human being. In fact, the concept of assemblage is a translation of the 
French term agencement, which is a wordplay that accommodates both the idea of 
an arrangement (un agencement) and agency (agencer). Political scientist Koray 
Caliskan and sociologist Michel Callon (2010: 9) argue that ‘[...] agencies and 
arrangements are not separate. Agencements denote socio-technical arrangements 
when they are considered from the point [of] view of their capacity to act.’ In my 
investigation of self-tracking practices, I attempt to employ the concept of 
assemblage while remaining sensitive to the meaning inscribed in agencement. I try 
to employ the concept as not only an arrangement of different components, such as 
human bodies, self-tracking technologies, ideological influences, political 
discourses, etc., but also as meshworks of agency in which all components of the 
assemblage actively configure and reconfigure each other, however subtle these 
reconfigurations may be. 
Assemblage theory may be criticised for proposing that the researcher take into 
account every possible actant that ’works’ within the assemblage in order to 
adequately describe said assemblage. Even in a hypothetical world in which we 
have no word count limits for our research papers, this would of course be 
impossible. However, all research faces the same problem; we always have to limit 
our scope, whether we speak of factors, variables, causes, effects or actants. 
Assemblage can then be understood more as a theoretically-methodologically 
guiding sensibility than a methodical imperative of describing actant-bundles as a 
whole (I am fairly certain that it cannot be done!). In this study, assemblage is a 
theoretical-methodological sensibility in the sense of producing sensitivity for 
symmetrical relations in terms of agency, meaning that the aim is to avoid placing 
any actant (such as the human being, or the technical device, or an overarching 
’culture’) as the ’director’ of technological practice. 
Assemblage also works as a theoretical concept that deconstructs the binary 
between specificity/generality in research – through the idea of assemblage, the 
specific always resonates with the general and vice versa. In terms of specificity, 
different self-tracking devices certainly produce different modes of knowing about 
one’s body. The researcher can then look specifically at activity tracking 
wristbands, for example, and say that they shape one’s self-image by including 
measurements on movement and heart rate, while excluding other aspects of the 
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living organism through which the self could be assessed and understood (Lupton, 
2016a; Prasopoulou, 2017). We could then say, for example, that popular activity 
tracking wristbands ‘enact’ or individuate selves by and through algorithmically 
produced and morally charged conceptions of activity (Article I). However, while 
this is true, a fixation on specificity may also divert researchers from mapping the 
broader processes through which the techno-logic of self-tracking – or the working 
of the technological assemblage of self-tracking – shapes lifeworlds.  
The idea of a ‘technological assemblage’ is useful here as well because it is 
often hard to pinpoint everyday self-tracking to a specific set of equipment or 
measurements. This is underlined by the observation that, in practice, self-trackers 
often act with multiple devices (as well as with their personal observations ‘off the 
record’) that enable and produce biomarkers through which one can evaluate one’s 
self-development. Furthermore, as evident in my interviews as well as others’ work 
(e.g. Sherman, 2016; Sharon & Zandbergen, 2016), self-trackers are usually quite 
aware of the limitations of any specific device they happen to be using (‘that 
activity tracker could definitely measure steps more accurately!’) while still having 
faith in the general reliability and value of self-tracking measurements. Be that as it 
may, even if a person is simply ‘dabbling with’ a specific measurement technology 
(as might be argued with some of my interviewees) such as an activity tracking 
fitness wristband – which in any case would usually now contain multiple features 
such as step count tracking, calorie consumption tracking, sleep tracking, resting 
heart rate tracking, etc. with varying degrees of reliability – the practice of self-
tracking produces and invokes relations to other technologies of probing and 
investigating the self by measurement. Having begun measuring the self with any 
device, many interviewees talked about a gradual increased interest in measuring 
different things with different devices, more accurately and in different situations. 
 The questioning of specificity also underlines the idea that no technology is 
imagined, developed, marketed and finally used in a vacuum. Rather, all 
technology is always an exteriorisation of our existing ways of acting and thinking 
in the world. As already argued, the practice of engaging with visual (and often 
numeric and quantifiable) data for evaluative purposes is nothing especially new. It 
has been around for centuries (see e.g. Crawford et al., 2015; Martin, 2007), for 
technologies for self-tracking also include analog wooden measurement poles, 
notebooks, mood charts and weight scales, among other things. However, at least 
two things can be argued to be ‘new’ in the contemporary, digitised movement of 
self-tracking. One is the commodification of self-monitoring within therapeutic 
industries (McGee, 2005, Madsen, 2015, Salmenniemi et al. 2019). The other is the 
intensity through which digital, algorithmic technologies ‘work with’ us and (are 
designed to) steer our behaviour and thoughts in and through the interfaces and 
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backstages of everyday life, for the evaluative gaze of these technologies reaches 
beneath our skin and often collects data about us even when we are occupied with 
mundane activities in our everyday lives. In this sense, the wider techno-logic of 
self-tracking is itself a historical assemblage/agencement that acquires various 
forms in and through the therapeutic industry of today. 
2.3 Vibrant technology 
Assemblage/agencement theorising may seem abstract and distinct from the 
everyday experience of human beings. After all, we tend to see technologies as 
tools that surely do not act in their own right. Yet, at the same time, this line of 
thinking appears to be a powerful analytical tool that enables us to re-focus our 
gaze on technological practice and stare back at the machine. Instead of focusing 
on what people say or think they do with technologies, we can become more 
sensitive to tracing the (unexpected) consequences taking place or ‘happening’ in 
our interactions with technology if we think of technological practice as a complex 
bundle of relations. Furthermore, such thinking enables a reading of technology as 
material politics and a mode of ‘doing’ the world. As the political theorist Jane 
Bennett puts it in the opening pages of Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of 
Things (2010: 3), it is important to acknowledge the agential powers of things in 
order to ’acknowledge that which refuses to dissolve completely into the milieu of 
human knowledge’ and ’give voice to a vitality intrinsic to materiality’. This is to 
say that as a kind of companion species (Lupton, 2016b), matter does things with 
and through us, and from a sociological perspective, the most interesting are those 
that we rarely notice or think about. Bennett herself also insists that we can notice 
such things as children, for example, when we are still more intuitively open to the 
idea that the material world can really come alive.  
Imagine a human being reading something online on a smartphone. For the 
observer, it is kind of boring; there doesn’t seem to be much happening. And yet 
there are all kinds of vibrations at play. There are atomic level vibrations which we 
cannot see, electro-magnetic vibrations which we cannot feel (unless something is 
seriously wrong with the device), and vibrations of light which we don’t pay 
attention to. Furthermore, the intuitive focus is typically set on the seemingly active 
person who is doing something (reading) on a smartphone. It therefore goes 
unnoticed how the device ‘vibrates’ by performing all kinds of actions—by 
suggesting an activity (reading), by establishing or enabling a connection (to the 
internet, to a text), by distracting (from work-related thoughts, perhaps) and by 
postponing other actions (some people claim that people would have more sex in a 
world without smartphones). There are all kinds of things happening before, during 
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and after the actual act of reading, things that, in everyday contexts, commonly 
pass more or less right through our consciousness.  
In the sense of agency, it is the human being (like our ’user’ of the 
smartphone), whom we commonly afford with the power of agency in the sense 
that we see the human as the one who does and uses things. Bennett argues for an 
understanding that places the human as an actant node in assemblages of various 
kinds. In the case above, this involves much more than the human and the phone. It 
also involves actants such as the internet, the text that is being read, the author of 
the text, coders, algorithms, a phone charger, electrical grids, and all kinds of other 
objects that are as much ‘forces’ or ‘intensities’ as they are concrete ‘entities’. The 
idea of actants falling into relations with other actants and affecting each other is a 
crucial element of Bennett’s actor-network theoretical framework (see also Latour 
1992; 2005), in which agency or ’use’ or any ’act’ is not reducible to any single 
entity, but only to a complex bundle of relations. This framework is also applied 
when anthropologists Jeannette Pols and Ingunn Moser (2009: 161) describe ’user’ 
as a highly categorising and even intellectually lazy term. According to them, this 
is because the concept of ’user’ awards agency to the human even though ’use’ is 
always about action and about becoming something else in the sense that the object 
of use shapes and directs the subject as a user. It could perhaps be said that the act 
of successful ‘use’ is performative of the unity of an agencement. Successful ‘use’ 
in a certain situation could not be achieved if some of the other actants were 
missing. For example, a person does not so much ’use a smartphone’ as make a call 
or read a text online.7 Or when we turn to self-tracking, one does not so much ‘use’ 
a self-tracking device as perform the action of tracking8 one’s body and the self. 
According to philosopher Bernard Stiegler (1998), the need to rethink 
technology is the result of a long running trajectory in Western thought, rooted in 
the classical, philosophical separation of ‘tekhne’ and ‘episteme’; that of craft and 
knowledge. According to him, this separation, which was already evident in the 
way the ancient sophists were perceived to employ the craft (tekhne) of rhetorics to 
 
 
7  Of course, assemblages also fall apart; the connection can break when something (e.g. 
the human being, a link station or a mobile phone battery) falls out of the functional 
assemblage. However, successful ’use’ of technology is enabled by an assemblage of 
actants. 
8  It once occurred to me while tracking a mythical beast in a fantasy world (on 
PlayStation 4) that, as a verb, the concept of ’tracking’ is peculiar, as it implies an 
activity of following or tracing something, such as an animal, that has left traces but 
has since moved along. It implies an awareness of an entity or a being that 
nevertheless is usually not present via direct perception or experience, or is at least in 
the process of fleeing and dis-appearing. The tracked object is simultaneously there 
and not-really-there.  
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distort or manipulate ‘truth’, has resulted in an inability to conceptualise the 
technical or mechanic as originary of the human experience and knowledge of the 
world. This classical distinction thus separates the ideal world of knowledge from 
that of the world of practice and the human from the technical, ultimately insisting 
on the reduction of the technical domain as a domain of tools that serve human 
purposes (see also Simondon 1958: 1–5). For Stiegler, however, it makes no sense 
to think of the ‘human’ apart from the technical, as technology is merely a mode of 
being and doing. 
Of course, in modern philosophy of technology, the call for overcoming such 
human-technology bifurcation may be traced at least as far back as Martin 
Heidegger’s writings on technology. In his essay The Question Concerning 
Technology (1977), Heidegger perceived technology as ‘enframing’ (translated 
from the German term gestell) the modern human being’s lifeworld. Heidegger 
famously argued that to treat technology as a neutral tool is to fundamentally blind 
oneself to the ‘essence of technology’ (an essence that is, according to him, 
‘enframing’), and he attempted to offer an account of technology as a distinct 
‘mode of existence’. Practically, this means, for example, that modern technologies 
of (industrial) production ‘enframe’ or condition our existence in the sense of 
‘revealing’ nature as a reserve for productive action, such as mining, harvesting 
and energy production. However, Stiegler’s criticism of Heidegger focuses on 
Heidegger’s failure to really follow through with his ideas on the fundamental 
intertwining of the human and the technical, as Heidegger ultimately considers 
technological enframing through the production of ‘inauthentic’ or restrictive 
effects on human existence, which is why Heidegger is often claimed to revert to 
(overly) deterministic conceptions of technology. 
In relation to Heidegger’s call on how we should think about technology as 
not-neutral, it seems that the call is typically half-endorsed by scholars, yet often 
simultaneously overlooked. By this I mean that while it is now commonly 
acknowledged that technology is all but neutral (the design, appropriation and use 
of technology by individuals as well as by institutions and corporations always 
involves political, normative and value-laden purposes, and thus technology is, in a 
sense, politics in practice), technology is still too often conceptualised as a ‘tool’ 
for human beings to achieve their human purposes. In terms of self-tracking, this 
means that we often focus on how humans use and negotiate (or decide not to use) 
these mediators of health-oriented culture. In terms of everyday life, this implies, 
for example, that the technology of self-tracking really only works on us as long as 
it is tethered to the body and produces data – in other words, as long as it is 
actively ‘used’. For example, many studies draw attention in one way or another to 
the fact that people quite often abandon, stop, or quit active self-tracking, perhaps 
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even after a very short period of time (e.g. Lazar et al., 2015; Clawson et al. 2015; 
Kristensen & Ruckenstein, 2018). While this is of course interesting and relevant, 
such remarks can also promote thinking through use-relations, and if we do not 
observe in detail how self-observation practices are (dis)engaged from or related 
with post-abandonment, the techno-logic of self-tracking is rendered more or less 
irrelevant. Even studies that look into ‘life after self-tracking’ and categorise ways 
of talking about and relating to self-tracking technology after abandonment 
(Epstein et al. 2016) tend to speak in terms of ‘stopping’ and ‘returning to’ the 
activity. This itself can be read as a contradiction of sorts. 
As I see any specific technological biosensing device of self-tracking, such as a 
fitness tracking wristband or heart rate monitor, as also being related to a wider 
techno-logic of self-tracking and self-quantification, one of the crucial arguments 
of this study is that a relation between a person and a self-tracking device does not 
break via a separation of these actants. In fact, a separation event may also be an 
indication of the transformation of actants involved in self-tracking assemblages. 
For example, as described in the very beginning of this introduction, there often 
comes a time when we feel we no longer need a specific self-tracking device in 
order to know ourselves in terms of the insights of that specific device (Kristensen 
& Ruckenstein, 2018). However, it could also be argued that the person who 
‘abandons’ the device is not the same person who activated it, but rather a new 
person with a different type of being and self-related mindset. The relation between 
a tracker (human) and a tracker (technological gadget) is still there, visible in its 
absence, for a new mode of existence is ‘revealed’ through the working of a self-
tracking assemblage. Practically, as also described in the beginning of this 
introduction, this new mode may manifest in new forms of self-monitoring and 
self-evaluation in everyday life, regardless of whether a self-tracking device is 
worn. Furthermore, since assemblages are temporally unspecific (Marcus & Saka, 
2006), a relation between self-tracking technology and the human being also 
precedes actual use, for people relate to such technologies through, for example, 
marketing ads or user experiences of family members and friends.9  
Here we may briefly return to the abovementioned Derridan concept of the 
supplement in relation to human-technology relationships and how technological 
 
 
9  The process of attaching meaning to technology, and in a sense personalising it, prior 
to actually using it and tinkering with it has been discussed, for example, through the 
notion of ’pre-domestication’ of technology (e.g. Saariketo, 2018). What I would add 
to this perspective is the acknowledgement that human meaning-making itself is to 
some degree framed by technological agencies, e.g. via the affordances offered by the 
functionality of (longitudinal) measurement. 
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practice may be revealing. Just as agencement is a wordplay that accommodates 
the aspects of both (static) arrangement and (flowing) agency, the notion of 
supplement is an exercise in playing with the French language and the meanings of 
supplementary (supplémentaire), the substitute (suppléant) and substitutive 
supplementation (suppléance). Furthermore, there is the verb suppléer, referring to 
addition but also to the (paradoxical) action of ‘supplying a necessary surplus’ 
(Royle, 2003: 50). Adhering to this complexity, as described in the introduction, 
we may think that the supplement enriches, or completes, without a lack; i.e. it 
adds to something that is already complete, but it also substitutes, and while 
perhaps serving a need, it also becomes excess, and in the process ‘reveals’ the 
supplemented completeness as incomplete.10 While this perhaps applies in some 
sense to much of our relations with technology in general – at least when any 
technology is deemed applicable or in any sense ‘useful’ – in terms of self-tracking 
specifically, the production of incompleteness in terms of the self seems like a 
notable part of the actual user experience. This will be further examined and 
elaborated in the articles of this thesis. 
Stiegler (1998; 2011) finds in Heidegger’s, Derrida’s and phenomenologist 
Edmund Husserl’s analyses the basis for his own work on the originary technicity 
of the human being, and develops it further, especially in arguing how technics is 
central and indispensable for temporality, i.e. the human experience of time. For 
Stiegler, what is crucial in this process is the concept of exteriorisation, which 
refers to how culture is exteriorised in the technical, how the technical is the human 
and culture ‘outside of itself’. If we accept that a human being is a cultural being, 
we must also accept the originary technicity of being human. This implies the 
technical as originary of the habitual and affective consciousness of human beings, 
for it is through technics, which conditions our knowledge and praxis, that we live 
also that which has been. As such, for Stiegler, the invention of technics is the 
‘invention’ of the human itself, because technics is cultural epigenetics; it transmits 
lessons of experience and practice that biology, acts of education, or genes alone 
cannot transmit (see also Roberts, 2006). Thus, technical evolution and 
 
 
10 Also, if we think of how a specific self-tracking technology produces a digital 
representation of the self – a ’data double’ (see e.g. Ruckenstein, 2014, Lupton 2014) 
– we may also think of how the representation (or a digital ’copy’) is not just a 
representation, but an actor by its own right. The copy adds and replaces – a ‘copy’ is 
needed to truly establish an ‘original’, and the original self then also becomes a 
supplement to the digitalised self. This is a sort of schizophrenic stance which in 
practice can lead to persistent confusion over whether one should trust in the numbers 
or ’listen to one’s body’. 
Harley Bergroth 
 42 
development is always also re-invention of the human; the human is never separate 
from ‘tools’ that inscribe and prescribe culture. 
It could be argued here that self-tracking technologies are possible only 
through a history of self-measurement and (e.g. quantification-based) self-
assessment. A history of doing and knowing about the body in standardised terms 
is exteriorised in such technologies. New kinds of self-tracking devices also 
actualise gradual progress (or a shift in time) such as the move from one type of 
measurement to another, from relative inspecificity towards relative specificity or 
from analog to digital. In engaging with self-tracking, we live by doing through a 
history of self-measurement and self-assessment, just as in cooking with an electric 
stove we live by doing through a history of food culture. 
While for Stiegler all technology is about exteriorisation and transmission of 
culture and collective memory, his later work is mainly concerned with 
technologies that are specifically designed to transmit memory. Stiegler concerns 
himself with photography and film – in general with technologies of recording and 
of the (moving) image – and develops a philosophical, multifaceted account of how 
contemporary technologies of cinema intertwine with human consciousness, 
contributing to what he calls the industrialisation of memory or industrial 
conditioning of memory. By this he means that imagination is industrialised via 
mnemotechnics, via an industrially produced recapturing of the past (recording in 
different forms) that opens up vistas for the ‘objectivisation’ and measurement of 
experience on which the modern digital economy rests. It is here that his work 
becomes useful for me in terms of thinking about the links between technology and 
temporality, not just on the collective level, but also on the individual level, in 
everyday life and in relation to therapeutic self-development. As shown in article 
II, Stiegler’s work offers viable vistas into a crucial element of the techno-logic of 
self-tracking: its tendency to prescribe temporally extended, ‘tracking’ mindsets. 
This follows from how selves are ‘revealed’ and re-configured as ‘temporal 
objects’ or objects of (in principle) continuous, anticipatory observation and 
pursuit. In this sense, in self-tracking practices one’s being is actively enacted or 
individuated as being-in-duration, as an object of continuous interest rather than an 
object of in any sense ‘complete’ knowledge. This feeds back to the idea of 
technologies ‘working’ as therapeutic technologies precisely ‘because they do not 
work’. Once again, this does not mean that self-tracking technologies cannot help 
people. What it does mean, in my view, is that they do not usually alleviate 
complexity or a ‘will to knowledge’ without producing complexity and even 
uncertainty in individual lifeworlds. 
In other words, I draw from Stiegler’s work in elaborating how a self-related 
recording practice such as self-tracking intertwines with habitual and affective 
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lifeworlds in everyday life. As the practice of self-tracking is about recording and 
revisiting datafied images of oneself, it evokes an imaginary of the self as 
trajectories of standardised measures. For example, the accelerometer technology 
that is built into fitness tracking wristbands standardises ‘movement’ or ‘activity’ 
into recurrent step counts or values of intensity. It is through these quantified and 
visualised markers and trajectories that self-tracking devices retain personal 
histories and reveal possible futures for one to interpret. In this way, as elaborated 
further in article II, self-tracking also enacts new temporalities in one’s life – in a 
way, self-tracking is about producing an image of the self, an image that always 
‘flows into’ the future and the past. 
Together with assemblage theory, these ideas of originary technicity help to 
focus on the co-constitutioning of the human and the technical in self-tracking 
practice. Furthermore, the idea of technology as crucial to one’s experience of time 
and as objectivisation or standardisation of imagination (in terms of the self) relates 
to another theoretical discussion, one that has paved the way in this study for 
thinking of self-tracking – and the persistent incompleteness of the self-tracking 
subject – as inherently political techno-logic. I am referring to Gilles Deleuze’s 
discussion of dividualisation, which is employed in article III. The engagement 
with Deleuze’s (1995a; 1995b) theories of dividualisation builds on his tendency to 
try to think about power and politics in terms of a shift beyond Foucauldian 
‘discipline’ in the (political) milieu of a digitalising world. 
Deleuze conceives of a ‘control society’, which is his response to a 
Foucauldian idea of discipline. Foucault did not live to see the large-scale rise of 
digital networks, but writing at the beginning of the 1990s, Deleuze engaged with 
the idea of how evolving, ultimately all-pervasive digital systems and assemblages 
transform society. His idea was that if lives in ‘societies of discipline’ had been 
characterised by beginnings and completions, epitomised in movement between 
disciplinary institutions, such as from families to schools and schools to work, 
digital networks propagate a shift towards a ‘control society’ in which a person 
‘never finishes anything’. Lives become metastable objects of perpetual 
(bio)education, always open for alteration and always in process. The crucial 
factors or actants in this shift are the digital networks and systems that enable the 
monitoring and standardisation of lives through the algorithm-based collection and 
mining of huge masses of ever more nuanced big data. This development cuts 
through the public and the personal. 
In summary, the theoretical resources laid out in this chapter have given rise to 
the research problematic of how human-technology co-work shapes people’s sense 
and understanding of the world and themselves in practice. The discussion of self-
tracking as a part of therapeutic agencements – and the fact that this research was 
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conducted as part of a research project on therapeutic cultures – contributed to the 
centrality of the ‘self’ and self-knowledge in my research from the beginning. This 
is also a crucial reason why some other relevant concerns (e.g. big data-related 
information security) is not a significant part of this work. As will be elaborated in 
the next chapter, assemblage theorising and ideas of the originary technicity of 
human beings have served as both theoretical and methodological influences in my 
choice to focus on material agencies and the idea of ‘co-work’. Through this focus, 
we can understand and analyse technological practice as a mode of becoming, as a 
mode of world-making (in this case, especially in relation to oneself and one’s 
wellbeing), rather than as a simple use-relation. 
 
 
 
 45 
3 Research materials and notes on 
methodology 
This research – as any research – is itself an assemblage of sorts. In this section, I 
will first describe my research materials. I will then discuss how the theoretical 
background presented above has led me to assemble together research questions, 
situated experiences and empirical research materials in order to say something 
relevant or meaningful about how people’s self-tracking assemblages work in self-
related knowledge production in their everyday lives. The approach to self-tracking 
employed in this study can be described as ethnographically sensitised or 
ethnographically oriented. This means that in addition to interviewing people, I 
have immersed myself in the practice of self-tracking since the beginning of this 
research. For example, I have followed the phenomenon in online communities and 
social media, and used data-producing self-tracking devices on and off in my 
personal life. This also means that the process of data analysis in this research 
cannot be unconditionally separated from the process of data gathering and data 
production, as various research materials intertwine in producing understanding of 
the ‘field’ and the techno-logic of self-tracking (cf. Huttunen, 2010). 
Following the media scholar Taina Bucher, this research can perhaps be called 
a ’technography’ (see Bucher, 2012). Put simply, technography may be understood 
as extensive ethnography of technological practice in everyday life. Bucher (2012: 
69) writes that technography is ’a way of describing and observing technology in 
order to examine the interplay between a diverse set of actors (both human and 
non-human)’. Indeed, although this study draws upon interviews and observation 
with human beings, it has really been more about observing technology-in-action 
and technological practices than observing people or their personal beliefs. Bucher 
(ibid.), investigating mainly social media, notes that ’technographic inquiry starts 
by asking what the software itself is suggestive of’. I would argue that we can also 
incorporate hardware and technology more generally as a starting point – or, rather, 
a lens – for technographic inquiry. If ethnography traditionally seeks to understand 
’culture(s)’ from within, technography then specifically focuses on how technology 
shapes and is shaped by (and is constitutive of) culture(s) and action in everyday 
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life (Bucher, 2012; Jansen & Vellema, 2011). For example, while a more 
traditional ethnography of self-tracking may investigate movements such as the 
Quantified Self in their happenings and meet-ups11 (e.g. Nafus & Sherman, 2014; 
Sherman, 2016), a technography may zoom out from specific movements in order 
to focus on technologies (and their techno-logics) that extend far beyond early-
adopter communities. This, of course, does not restrict technographical accounts 
from interacting with people or events that have connections to social movements 
such as the Quantified Self. A technographical point of view may also be 
constitutive of a sort of resistant reading, one through which the researcher may 
locate the contradictions and paradoxes that follow from people narrating the use of 
technology from their human user position, while being also subject to the techno-
logic of self-tracking. 
In general, as a qualitative, ethnographically-oriented study, this work can of 
course be seen as subject to severe limitations in the sense that the knowledge 
produced here is not of a generalisable nature, e.g. due to a relatively small sample 
of research materials. Although, as already discussed, through assemblage thinking 
it can very well be questioned whether the general/specific dichotomy is 
meaningful at all in deciding the usefulness or validity of research, especially in 
qualitative and interpretative social science. In my view, more pressing limitations 
or challenges in this work then relate to the researcher’s access to ‘material 
agencies’ and ‘everyday lives’ through relatively conventional qualitative methods. 
It may be asked how one can access the constitutive ‘doings’ and ‘enactments’ of 
selves in practice by talking with people and observing spaces and practices, or 
how one can know what technologies ‘do’ by interviewing human beings. 
Furthermore, if the mundane ‘everyday’ is understood as that habitual, routine-
infested mode of being-in-the-world that is not really thought about while we are 
living it and goes more or less unnoticed (see e.g. Cooper, 2014: 6), there is the 
question of how the researcher could access and explicate other people’s (or even 
their own) ‘everyday lives’. While these questions remain open to debate, the 
following descriptions of research materials and methodological approaches 
present some ideas and strategies through which I have answered to these 
challenges in this work. Overall, I think said challenges can be meaningfully 
 
 
11 Meet-ups are informal events in which active self-trackers within the Quantified Self 
community – QSers – meet and share self-tracking related personal experiences, 
stories, illness narratives and tips with each other. Such events have been organised 
during the latter half of 2010s with varying degrees of regularity in hundreds of larger 
cities across the world, most notably in Europe and North America. 
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addressed here, although not completely overcome, by combining various types of 
research materials in exploratory and open ways. 
3.1 Research materials 
In this section, I will present the research materials of this thesis. I will first present 
the interview materials, after which I will elaborate on my autoethnographical 
observations as well as other observation materials and contextualising media 
materials. I will then present some thoughts on research ethics in the context of this 
study. 
3.1.1 Interview data 
The main body of research material in this study consists of semi-structured 
interviews with Finnish and/or Finland-based self-trackers. I have included 
interviews with 19 interviewees from 18 separate interview events, as one 
interview situation included a married couple. All interviews for this study were 
collected between 2015 and 2016. Of all the interview events, 17 were conducted 
either in face-to-face meetings, via Skype video calls or via Facetime video calls. 
All of these interviews were recorded, although some interviewees on Skype 
preferred that I only record audio and not video. In one instance, interview 
questions were sent by e-mail to the interviewee, to which she replied via e-mail, as 
we ultimately failed to schedule a time for a meeting. The recorded interviews 
lasted between 35 and 90 minutes. Of all interviewees, seven were men and 12 
were women. Two of the interviewees were immigrants with whom the interview 
was conducted in English. The interviewees ranged in age from their early 20s to 
their early 50s12. All interviewees were either working or studying at the time of 
the interview. In general, it can perhaps be said that self-tracking seems to appeal 
mostly to the relatively well-off portion of the population, and the most 
enthusiastic self-trackers in my research were definitely those who were studying 
to become (or already were) qualified as highly specialised professionals in fields 
such as healthcare, technical work or academia. There were also a few interviewees 
with a vocational education who were currently employed in more traditional 
working class jobs, such as waitresses or salespeople. The interviewees lived in 
 
 
12 On a curious side note, the oldest of my interviewees stated that based on the data he 
consistently acquires from his self-tracking devices, he tends to think that should the 
population register centre contact him to inform him of a mistake in their paperwork 
and inquire about his true age, he would have to take off 10 to 15 years.  
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different parts of Finland at the time of the interviews, although most resided in 
urban areas in southern Finland, and one Finnish interviewee was working in the 
UK. It could perhaps be said that highly educated participants possessed more 
resources to critically evaluate the functions and possibilities of self-tracking 
devices in their lives. However, I would say that a common denominator in almost 
all the interviews was how happy people were to attempt to critically reflect on 
their self-tracking, for by its very ’essence’ (an unfounded term, I know) it seems 
to be a practice that actively ’disappears’ into the canvas of everyday life, at least 
when self-tracking devices are functioning properly. 
The interviews were loosely structured around the themes of personal 
background and motivations for self-tracking, experiences during self-tracking, and 
thoughts about the current and/or future development of self-tracking technology, 
although the actual questions differed in different interviews depending on the 
direction of discussion. I also discussed the more general field of ’biohacking’ in 
more detail with some interviewees, as they were interested and/or engaged with it 
to some degree. However, all interviewees told me about how they were originally 
drawn into the practice of self-tracking and how they perceived self-tracking 
technologies as serving (or not serving) a purpose in their life. 
I originally found the first interviewees through the Quantified Self & 
Biohacking Finland Facebook community, in which I posted an invitation to 
anyone who might be interested in sharing their experiences with self-tracking. 
This Facebook community is a loose and multi-faceted group which brings 
together people who are interested in self-care and self-development via a plethora 
of strategies, ranging from nutritional choices to technological body augmentation, 
and from mindfulness practices to data-driven self-tracking. Such a group can be 
perceived as a fruitful platform for investigating self-tracking as part of a social 
movement of sorts and it originally served as a practical platform through which to 
access the field. However, as targeting ’early-adopters’ of self-tracking technology 
has not specifically been my aim in this study, I have also consulted some personal 
acquaintances to gain access to ’casual’ self-trackers. These are people who I do 
not know personally and who are not (as far as I know) related to movements or 
global discursive formations such as the Quantified Self. I also used a snowballing 
method to gain access to more interviewees. Overall, to my knowledge, six of my 
interviewees have had a concrete connection with the Quantified Self & 
Biohacking Finland community (in the sense of having been a member of the 
group on Facebook, having participated in conversations within the group, and/or 
having attended some of their exhibition events). However, none of them have 
participated in local Quantified Self meetups on a regular basis, at least not to my 
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knowledge, so in this sense they are not (nor do they usually think of themselves as 
being) deeply invested in an early-adopter ’culture’ of self-tracking.  
A common denominator in all interviewees was their interest in the self-
monitoring and everyday management of their wellbeing via datafied information. 
However, many (12) interviewees did not ’know’ about these activities in terms of 
’Quantified Self’ discourses, but rather employed whatever technologies of the self 
available to them in everyday health-related retail contexts. This heterogeneity of 
interviewees in terms of age, social position or Facebook community connections 
has been an advantage in pinpointing the ways in which human ’users’ of self-
tracking technology act and work with the deeper techno-logics of such 
technologies regardless of whether they identify with a distinct ’self-tracking 
culture’ (Lupton, 2014) or social movement of self-quantification. 
In addition to interview data on self-tracking, one of the articles (IV) in this 
thesis makes use of interviews conducted by fellow researchers among different 
therapeutic practices – namely body-mind-spirit therapies and vaccine hesitancy. 
These additional sets of interviews are employed as representative of different 
health practices that are related to the practice of self-tracking in regard to the now 
widespread contestation and appropriation of health-related expert knowledges in 
Western societies. A further description of these additional interview materials can 
be found in article IV. 
3.1.2 Observing the digital, physical and textual spaces of 
self-tracking 
A crucial part of any ethnographically oriented research is observation and 
participation in spaces and among practices that relate to the object of study. In 
addition to the interviews, I have conducted autoethnography by wearing a FitBit 
Charge HR activity tracking wristband consistently for 8 months in 2015–2016. 
After that, the device has stayed in my life by being on and off (mostly off) my 
body. The FitBit Charge HR is a self-tracking device that was released to consumer 
markets in 2015 and features many of the common tracking functionalities found in 
popular tracking devices today. Through tracking the body’s movement, it offers, 
for example, step count tracking, sleep tracking (providing information on 
estimated duration of sleep and whether the sleep has been deep or restless) and 
information on general activity on an hourly basis. In addition, through a light-
based sensor technology, the device also measures heart rates during exercise in a 
specific exercise mode and resting heart rate at all times. Furthermore, 
automatically gathered data can be supplemented, such as by manually entering 
data about calorie consumption, for example. I have personally never added data to 
the software manually (except for markers such as age, height and estimated 
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weight), but I have relied on data that is gathered automatically. Vistas on the 
interface of the related mobile application in my personal use are presented in 
figure 1 below. 
    
Figure 1.  Screenshots from an older (2016) version of the FitBit software. 
While autoethnographical observation may be considered a relevant – or even 
crucial – part of almost any kind of fieldwork ethnography on any specific culture 
or practice, it is especially relevant in technographical research on self-tracking for 
at least two reasons:  
First, by definition, self-tracking is often a very personal practice (as indicated 
by the concept of ’self’). Different self-tracking technologies offer various 
possibilities or affordances for self-making by connecting with others and sharing 
personal measurements online. However, it quickly became evident in the 
interviews that while people sometimes do make use of these affordances – they 
sometimes talk about being interested in other people’s data, comparing themselves 
to others or even competing with others – self-tracking is still mostly narrated as 
meaningful through personal self-actualisation in terms of one’s own actual or 
potential health, wellbeing, fitness and activity. For my research participants, the 
algorithmic landscape of self-tracking was not typically a crowded stadium full of 
competitors, but rather an arena for competing against oneself. My personal 
experiences of tracking myself have then helped me relate to research participants’ 
accounts and understand how much of the vibrant power of self-tracking 
technologies often lies in the ways they re-adjust our sense of self through numeric 
and visual cues. More theoretically speaking, they re-adjust our sense of self 
through dividualisation and temporalisation of the self, rather than through a 
fundamental rearrangement of sociality and sense of community in everyday life. 
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Second, self-tracking is a popular practice in part because it takes ’work’ away 
from self-monitoring, meaning that trackers become ubiquitous technology that 
operates automatically on algorithmic commands while human beings are busy 
with their everyday lives. In this sense, it is hard for a researcher to observe 
everyday self-tracking ’as it happens’, as most of the actual human-device 
interaction happens as woven into the mundane activities of everyday life and takes 
place on the move. Of course, the acts of working with the data and personally 
analysing one’s data are practices that can sometimes be more readily observed, 
although based on my interviews, such personal analysis is often a long-term 
process of self-reflection. Thus, a crucial way to experience self-tracking ’as it 
happens’ or to investigate such technological practice in all its ubiquity is to 
engage in self-tracking and relate one’s self-tracking experiences to what other 
people say about self-tracking. 
Furthermore, during the past few years, I have attended several self-tracking-
related events and exhibitions, such as Upgraded Life Festival 2014 and 2015 and 
Biohacker Summit 2015 in Helsinki, in order to familiarise myself with the hype 
and promotional ecosystem behind self-tracking in Finland. These events have 
boasted presentations as well as interactive exhibition spaces for technology 
developers. In the course of research, and in relation to getting to know many of 
the technologies of self-tracking that I have encountered in the exhibitions or in the 
interview narratives of research participants, I have also collected screenshots of 
self-tracking-related textual-visual materials such as public websites, guide videos, 
blog posts, online discussions, marketing ads and user manuals for specific devices.  
My engagement with the abovementioned materials has helped me familiarise 
myself with (marketing) imaginaries and common discourses surrounding self-
tracking technology. After all, a part of looking back at the machine consists of 
looking at representations of the machine for representations are also actants. For 
example, I have – in the dual role of aspiring amateur self-tracker and researcher – 
become acquainted with the websites of many popular Finnish and international 
self-tracking device manufacturers, including but not limited to Polar, FitBit, Oura, 
Withings, HeartMath and FirstBeat. These sites present self-tracking technologies 
to potential consumers. Websites change over time, of course, but such sites have 
served, and still serve, to produce an understanding of the normative and/or 
‘holistic’ character of self-tracking promotion (addressed in article III). This is 
evident not only in the typical language of self-development, self-understanding, 
self-control, (inner) balance and/or overall ‘improvement’ as a physical being, but 
also sometimes in the related visual imagery of happiness, fitness and joyful 
harmony. Ideas of holistic or empowering self-knowledge and control of course 
reflect the tendency to think of technology in solutionist terms, constructing 
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technologies as (simple) solutions to (complex) problems. Naturally, these sites 
often also state the specific functionalities of the devices they present, so in this 
sense the holistic ideal is also rendered questionable in the marketing materials. 
However, the benefits of tracking specific metrics and parameters of the body are 
typically rhetorically connected to overall improvement and being in charge of 
complex phenomena such as one’s health, recovery, fitness or wellbeing, in the 
hope that the potential consumer, too, buys into the idea of making big impacts 
through small, fragmentary data. The materials also typically highlight how the 
user can, in a sense, forget the burden of self-monitoring and self-related 
knowledge production, and let the technology push them towards making the 
’right’ decisions in terms of aspects such as activity or recovery.  
Textual-visual materials also include articles on websites, blog sites, and print 
media in which self-trackers have elaborated on their experiences and routines 
with, and thoughts on, self-tracking devices. In such materials, solutionist 
viewpoints and success stories are likewise often present, but user experiences in 
some ways often also reflect the same paradoxes that surface in the interview 
materials, a good example being the tension between growing self-knowledge and 
growing self-interest (elaborated in more detail in article II). Furthermore, having 
been a member of the Facebook group Quantified Self & Biohacking Finland since 
the beginning of this research, I have closely followed the group’s discussions 
about various self-tracking devices and the practice of self-tracking in general. 
These discussions have been critical, deep and and highly perceptive, as they have 
involved a lot of people with extensive experience with a variety of self-tracking 
devices and strategies. However, I would say that discussions are typically 
characterised by the general (solutionist) conception that, in principle, self-tracking 
technologies and contemporary technologies of self-measurement are enabling and 
empowering ’tools’ of self-awareness and knowledge production, provided that the 
human ‘users’ just use them appropriately and maintain realistic expectations. 
As a whole, such textual-visual materials have served as complementary and 
contextualising materials or additional ‘site documents’ that have helped me to 
understand imaginary creation and self-tracking related imaginaries in which the 
influence of therapeutic culture and personalisation of health, as well as 
technological solutionism, often becomes evident. In this regard, some materials 
have been presented as part of the analyses in the articles of this thesis. More 
generally, these materials have also supported the development of arguments on 
the paradoxical techno-logic of self-tracking, as they have resonated with and 
revealed a more general setting for the experiences articulated in the interview 
materials. The complementary materials, along with my own autoethnographic 
experiences and observations have also no doubt (in some ways) directed the 
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ways in which I, as a researcher, have talked about the subject matter with my 
interviewees. During the interviews, I sometimes brought up my own experiences 
with self-tracking or related online discussions, which has then provoked a 
response from the interviewees, or I have related my own experiences when they 
were similar to experiences first articulated by the interviewees. In this way, I 
now believe I have co-produced relatively rich interview material, with 
statements and discussions that I might have missed out on otherwise. I believe 
that instead of implanting paradoxes into the interviews, I have been able to co-
produce (with the interviewees) articulations of everyday complexities of self-
tracking in more detail. 
3.1.3 Research ethics 
This research has proceeded according to principles of ethical social scientific 
research. First of all, all interviewees have been asked for and clearly verbally 
expressed their consent that their interview may be recorded and quoted in this 
research, and to date none have expressed a wish to nullify this consent. I have 
stored all interview recordings safely, and no one except myself has had access to 
the original recordings during the research. The recordings (which contain 
identifying information such as names, voice audio, and in many cases video 
images) will be destroyed after the research, as promised to the interviewees. All 
the interview transcriptions based on these recordings have been carefully 
pseudonymised. The interviewees have been granted pseudonyms and I have 
removed or changed all mentions of real names, workplaces, specific degrees, 
places of residence and other such information that may identify the person.  
In terms of online observations in communities such as the Quantified Self and 
Biohacking Finland Facebook group and observations in Biohacking exhibitions, I 
have mainly observed as a so-called lurker, not making myself explicitly known, 
apart from occasions on which I have posted interview invitations to the Facebook 
group. First of all, Facebook groups and exhibitions can be considered public or 
semi-public spaces, although in this specific Facebook group one had to be 
accepted as a member by an administrator (this was in 2015) and no reason for 
joining was required. Second, a frequent lurker declaring their presence might 
change the way in which discussions are initiated and commented upon. However, 
I have not presented any direct quotes from the discussions and have described 
them on a very general level when applicable, because, according to my 
understanding, in principle everything that is written online can potentially be 
traced to the person who wrote it. 
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3.2 On making sense of a mess 
Social reality and the things that we typically attempt to capture and describe in 
social scientific research (attitudes, behaviours, causalities, correlations, 
experiences, modes of being, etc.) are ’complex, diffuse and messy’, which is why 
it can be argued that attempts to say something precise and factual about them 
through specific methods makes that messiness even messier. In a sense, in terms 
of the messy ’social’, clarity is paradoxically a distortion (Law, 2004: 2). 
On my behalf, this is not meant to stand as a statement against any specific 
methodological tradition nor as an attempt to reproduce any deep-rooted divides in 
social scientific research, such as the quantitative/qualitative divide. Some methods 
are relatively well equipped to describe and theorise the relations and correlations 
between phenomena (such as relations between technology use and class position, 
for example), while other methods are better equipped to describe and theorise 
experiences (the experiences related to the use of technology in specific contexts, 
for example). However, social scientific research always captures only some small 
part of a complex ’social reality’. This is why I think that it is crucial for 
researchers of the social world to always keep an open mind towards the idea 
expressed by Law (2004: 5), which states that methodology does not always have 
to follow a strict set of rules. Research can also embrace the messiness of the world 
and express in practice the attitude that Law (ibid., 6) describes as playing with the 
famous idea of ’thinking six impossible things before breakfast’. Perhaps in this 
way my research has been – in the spirit of interpretative ethnography – aversive to 
disciplinary and methodological borders or predefined limitations to what is 
’properly scientific’. I think of it as social science, but also as improvisatory 
storytelling, which is important in envisioning new questions and viewpoints, 
although to some it might (and does) seem ’somehow literary or something’ (see 
Cervonka & Malkki 2007, 10). 
Despite the framework described above, this study, with its methods of 
thematically oriented textual analyses and (auto)ethnographically oriented 
observational practices, presents quite ’conventional’ qualitative work. However, 
in going about my analyses, I have tried to embrace the idea of messiness; I feel 
that there are still many interesting things about self-tracking left to say through 
this line of thinking. I think of myself as mostly indebted to assemblage theorising. 
As already noted, the assemblage/agencement is not just a theoretical framework, 
but also very much a methodological framework through which all the articles in 
this thesis try, in a sense, to present and bring forth the messiness of our 
technological practices rather than attempt to fit such practices into neat models. 
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Law’s argument for embracing messiness stems from assemblage thinking and, 
more generally, from a line of philosophy of science typical to a field of social 
science now referred to as science and technology studies (STS). In its 
contemporary form, the field of STS usually incorporates a wide range of 
influences from (post)modern continental philosophy, social constructionism, as 
well as feminist studies and the arts, among others. STS attempts to critically 
analyse the processes and conditions of knowledge production and ’reality’ in a 
society permeated by scientific and technological modes of action and knowledge. 
STS encourages empirical investigations that lay a sensitive eye on the processes 
through which technoscientific contexts and practices condition our ways of seeing 
the world, being in the world and knowing about the world. Furthermore, it 
acknowledges how science, too, is a socio-material practice, subject to the context 
in which it takes place. There are at least four things prevalent in this tradition that 
have been especially methodologically influential in the ways that I have gone 
about conducting this study: 
First, a crucial theoretical-methodological point of departure is that the 
researcher always brings oneself into the research assemblage (see also Fox & 
Alldred, 2015; Kolehmainen, 2019). There is no way around it so it might as well 
explicitly be made part of the research, which is why I think the autoethnographical 
observation and my own embodied orientation towards the subject matter is crucial 
to spell out in the context of this research. Of course, drawing from a variety of 
backgrounds such as Marxist materialism, Foucauldian power analytics and 
phenomenology, feminists and anthropologists (see e.g. Csordas 1990; Ahmed 
2000; Bordo, 2003; Probyn, 2005) in particular have long highlighted the 
significance of embodiment in the construction of ’reality’ and our social 
environment. And of course, modern feminist philosophy of science (Haraway, 
1988) teaches us that all research is always situated in the personal lifeworlds of 
the researcher, which is why attempts to construct research as ’objective’ by 
ignoring personal situatedness are, in a sense, ultimately doomed to fail. 
In the context of this study, autoethnographic reflection has been constitutive of 
that which Sarah Pink and Vaike Fors (2017, 380) have employed in their self-
tracking related research and termed ’empathetic knowing’, meaning that it is 
through our own embodiment that we can relate to the embodied experiences of 
practices such as self-tracking. For example, when an interviewee speaks to me 
about ’joy’ or ’terror’ in the practice of self-tracking, it is only through my own 
embodied experiences of joyful empowerment or distress in general – but 
preferably in the context of self-tracking in particular – that I can relate to and 
utilise these experiences in the construction of my results.  
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Second, and in relation to the previous point, it might be argued that there is no 
static, objective reality out there waiting to be found. Instead, reality is enacted in 
practices, and this includes acts of speaking and thinking. Science, too, is a 
sociomaterial practice and ’craftwork’ that is situated, historical and contextual; 
hence, its facts are also in a sense produced and actively constructed rather than 
just found (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour, 1999; Law 2004). Scientific research 
results are always an assemblage, since research and its results are arranged in 
certain ways and they resonate (or should I say vibrate) in certain ways with the 
world around them. For example, as noted above, should the results of this study be 
presented as a categorisation of the ways in which human ’users’ use (or do not 
use) their self-tracking devices, that would contribute to the still lively reality of 
human-technology bifurcation (Introna, 2013). This relates closely to the idea of 
performativity, which calls for a focus on practices in which ’reality’ is formed and 
performed, and thus effectively made. 
Methodologically, this second point relates to the call to embrace the abductive 
logic in sociological knowledge production and theory construction, to draw our 
theories and imaginaries from things observed ’in the field’ with an open mind, all 
the while trying to avoid being locked into rigid categories and preconceptions 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Breaking from inductive (generalising) and 
deductive (logically rigid) reasoning, abduction concerns itself with probabilistic 
and explanatory reasoning – even initial improvised ’guesswork’ (Cerwonka & 
Malkki, 2007) – and ultimately looks to create new ways and modes of thinking 
about everyday life through cycles of interpretation and re-interpretation. Thus, 
abductive research, as an art of ’making sense’, of course closely intertwines with 
the long tradition of hermeneutics with its emphasis on interpretation and meaning 
making. 
Third, ideas of the messiness of social reality, and the idea of the ongoing 
production of reality in acts of doing, speaking and thinking, need not imply that it 
is useless or undesirable to use existing, well-established qualitative methods (such 
as thematic content analysis) in order to say something coherent or relevant about 
the world, or about whatever technological practice the researcher is interested in. 
Instead, the idea of messiness may be productive of a certain way of reading and 
thematising research material, one that explicitly focuses on that messiness, for 
example, through the idea of contradictions.  
Indeed, it is important and useful to describe ’laws of nature’ in the natural 
sciences or ’social facts’ in the social sciences. However, it is not a new idea that 
the relevance of sociology can also be found in the ways in which it can propagate 
new questions, new, unconventional ways of thinking and new ways of imagining 
the world via the application of abductive reasoning and by trying to build sense 
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into that which seems contradictory or paradoxical. In hindsight, the articles in this 
thesis have not been about finding facts about self-tracking at all, but about finding 
multiplicities and potentialities in relation to self-tracking practices. The articles 
have not been about finding the ‘essence’ of self-tracking, but more about 
deconstructing any such presumed essence through which contradictions and 
paradoxicalities are pushed aside. In finding contradictions, dissonances, ruptures, 
multiplicities and paradoxes in the world, we also uncover questions and gaps in 
our understanding, things that still need work. In order to do relevant research, we 
do not necessarily need to agree with the philosopher Kierkegaard, who allegedly 
argued that a thinker without a paradox is like a lover without passion. However, in 
qualitative analysis, building sense into that which seems paradoxical is a fruitful 
way of ’reaching beyond’ the text and (as is the case here) of ’staring back at the 
machine’ in order to say something new about the complexity of our everyday lives 
in digitalising environments.  
Fourth, the idea of assemblages/agencements draws attention to the materiality 
of self-tracking, which means that analysis is also guided by an overall sensibility 
towards new materialist ideas of the active agential capabilities of matter (Bennett 
2009; Latour 1992). This means that one crucial method of ’looking behind the 
text’ – interview accounts, marketing materials, or other textual materials – has 
been to consider how technology conditions the experiences or imaginaries present 
in these materials.  
Following Bruno Latour’s (1992) ideas, technologies and material objects 
actively function in society, constituting what he called the ’missing masses’ of 
social reality. Drawing an analogy to modern theoretical physics, Latour posits that 
just as dark matter or dark energy are both there and not-there in the universe – 
meaning that we do not directly perceive or sense such matter, though it still 
appears to add to the total mass of the universe, affecting how the universe and 
spacetime forms and ’works’ – technology is paradoxically both there and not-
there in our everyday life. We tend to think of technology as a more or less passive 
’tool’, yet technologies weigh on us, push us and suggest certain modes of thought 
and action. In order to grasp the multifaceted and often unexpected or unintended 
effects that technology induces in ’social reality’, it is then necessary to 
acknowledge technology as an active force, as a concrete, vibrant mass of its own. 
3.3 Analyses of content and narrative 
To some extent, the analyses of the interviews and textual-visual materials in this 
study have followed the permissive and flexible principles of (thematic) content 
analysis. Traditionally, content analysis is understood as a systematic way of 
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cutting, typifying, coding and categorising the contents of textual or audiovisual 
data in order to draw meaning from it by and through constructing an 
understanding of the thematic ‘structure’ of the object of analysis (see e.g. Corbin 
& Strauss, 2014: 159–160; Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2018: 103–114). In practice, 
qualitative analysis usually involves some form of categorisation or thematization. 
In this work, the interviews and other material have been thematised in order to 
tease out different therapeutic imaginaries and functionalities, i.e. how self-tracking 
technologies are presented as improving or serving a purpose in one’s life, and the 
kinds of self-understandings people or technology developers articulate in these 
materials. 
In terms of the interview data, thinking in terms of content analytical 
categorisation was of course already coded into the planning and execution of the 
interviews, as they were structured around certain themes such as personal 
motivations for self-tracking, personal experiences during self-tracking, and 
personal future imaginaries regarding such activities. It now seems that my 
analytical perceptions in the beginning of this research were focused on more or 
less ’evident’ attitudes and descriptions, on what people say about self-tracking and 
about themselves, and perhaps to some extent what I personally think of self-
tracking. This is, of course, an important part of self-tracking; people, including the 
researcher, have thoughts, motivations, desires, aspirations and fears in relation to 
the activity. 
At first, the focus of the categorisation of interview accounts was in the 
different kinds of ’selves’ that were actualised in and through self-tracking 
technologies. For example, as self-tracking has often been characterised as the 
production of datafied representations of the self (Ruckenstein, 2014; Sharon & 
Zandbergen, 2016), I was interested in thematising how such representations were 
articulated in the interviews. I found that selves were often made sense of through 
binaries such as objective/subjective, numerical/embodied, healthy/unhealthy or 
active/inactive, any side of which may then become emphasised in people’s 
statements about themselves, depending on their situated position and experiences. 
For example, an active young person with an athletic background may find activity 
trackers highly rewarding and empowering, while someone suffering from health 
issues may struggle with feelings of inadequacy or even shame when engaging 
with self-tracking technologies. This fits well with the common critique that self-
tracking entrenches contemporary body politics and generally seems to appeal to 
people who are active and healthy to begin with (Ruckenstein, 2014; Sanders, 
2017; Article I).  
However, as I engaged more deeply with STS and actor-network theoretical 
literature, it started to seem that I was perhaps too concerned with what people say 
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or think about self-tracking without paying adequate attention to how they speak 
about what ’happens’ or what they ’do’ when engaging in these practices. It then 
started to become more obvious that self-tracking seems to entrench fundamental 
paradoxicalities in everyday being. For example, there was talk in the interviews 
about gaining more or less objective knowledge – or ’situatedly objective’ 
knowledge – which nevertheless never really seemed to ’stick’, was experienced as 
short-term or uncertain, or which did not merely fill gaps in self-knowledge, but 
also added new kinds of gaps. In relation to the ’selves’ being made in self-
tracking, there was much talk about self-tracking being motivated by a wish to 
actualise self-related states of being or self-related projects (being active, becoming 
fitter, etc.), yet in the end, actualisation often seemed to give way to 
potentialisation, which fuelled more tracking and more ’paying attention’. 
Consequently, rather than ’actualising’ the self (e.g. as healthy or unhealthy, or 
active/inactive) in any sustaining sense, people’s everyday self-tracking 
assemblages often seemed to work as continuous arenas of health or activity-
related individuation in which clear binaries are blurred due to the presence of a 
multiplicity of potential selves. So I started to analyse the interviews in a new way, 
focusing on such contradictions, and it started to look like there was often in some 
ways contradictory stories running parallel in the accounts of my interviewees—
accounts of what self-tracking is in theory and what it is in practice. A crucial focus 
in this research then became that of practice. For me, this has meant focusing on 
what people ’do’, or more precisely, what kind of ’realities of doing’ in terms of the 
self are constructed in people’s narratives of their self-tracking practices. Thus, the 
overall research question has come to deal with the idea of the continuous re-
configuration and shaping of the self and one’s lifeworld in these practices. 
We may contend that the social world is done in practice (Latour, 2005; Mol 
2002), but one might question how someone can employ interviews to describe 
what people or other objects do (the ’actuality’ of self-tracking) instead of 
describing what people say or what they think is happening (the imaginary of self-
tracking). Perhaps there is no simple answer to this, but for me, one way of 
working with this problem in the interview data has related to a shift in the 
analysis, a shift that has led to a hybridisation of thematic analysis of content and 
analysis of narrative. Many of the interviews run in the form of a (more or less) 
chronological narrative or story from one’s background to the present day and on 
towards the future. Within the interviews, people articulate big and small stories of 
action and consequence, thus presenting storied ways of knowing about their lives 
with self-tracking technologies (see e.g. Riessman, 2005) The paradoxicalities then 
become visible when the content does not always neatly match the narrative. For 
example, content may point to the technology as a ’tool’ that is ’used’ by the 
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human being in order to gain self-knowledge and actualise a ’better’ self. However, 
the narrative – e.g. the recapping of one’s time spent using or thinking about using 
various self-tracking technologies – may reveal how technologies of self-tracking 
’linger’13 in one’s life, how they concretely change things as they vibrate in 
personal lifeworlds, suggest certain actions and produce, for example, growing 
self-interest rather than reassuring self-knowledge. Content may point to increasing 
self-knowledge during the course of self-tracking, as people often readily highlight 
the ability of self-tracking devices to provide more or less ’real’ knowledge, given 
enough time or enough measurements. At the same time, the narrative of repetitive, 
ritualistic or habituated tracking, of the expansion of one’s self-tracking equipment 
arsenal or of a general will to knowledge in terms of the self points in another 
direction. It is in this way that I have later come to read and thematise the materials 
by looking for contradictions rather than trying to avoid or suppress them, since in 
a messy reality (interview discussions are indeed messy and inconsistent) they are 
often there anyway. 
This is also where the more (auto)ethnographically oriented materials have 
been quite helpful, as I have personally ’worked with’ the interfaces of self-
tracking technologies. I have become familiar with the functionalities of some of 
the most popular near-body self-tracking hardware and with the on-screen 
companion applications and interfaces of such hardware. This – together 
theoretical discussions in philosophy and sociology of technology – has also helped 
to look beyond ‘user speech’, and focus on the ways in which the technical 
affordances at play in self-tracking participate in constructing or directing people’s 
lifeworlds, and thus the narratives of self-tracking as well. As highlighted through 
the concept of gamification (Lupton, 2016a: 62–63; Maturo & Setiffi, 2016), self-
tracking practice may be understood as an everyday ’game’ of health and 
wellbeing, for self-tracking related software often appropriate and promote game-
like elements, e.g. point counts in different forms, goal attainment, guidance, 
challenges, rewards, trophies, and competition (against oneself if not others). It is 
then important to keep in mind, as scholars in game studies often tend to remind us, 
that the researcher cannot really comprehend or interpret a ’game’ by looking at 
someone else play it (Kirkpatrick, 2013: 160–161). Rather, any ‘game’ takes shape 
in what happens in and through one’s own embodied choreographies of gaming 
and processes of immersion, attachment and detachment. 
 
 
13 In the context of assisted reproductive technologies and IVF treatments, it has been 
suggested that the concept of ’lingering technological entanglements’ offers a viable 
way of exploring how technologies stick to lifeworlds and shape self-identifications 
long after specific periods of ’use’ (Helosvuori, 2020). 
 61 
4 Paradoxes of self-tracking in 
everyday self-tracking 
assemblages 
In this section, I will present a summary of each article included in this study. All 
of these articles aim to bring forth the techno-logic at work in everyday self-
tracking from different angles. All of them then illuminate different aspects of how 
the everyday presentation and imaginary of self-tracking is complicated in practice, 
of how the ’promise’ of self-tracking technology is one thing while the 
(unexpected) ’actuality’ of self-tracking can be something else. 
4.1 Self-tracking systems as assemblages of moral 
knowledge production and struggle against the 
’othered’ self (article I) 
The first of the four articles in this thesis examines self-tracking as an everyday 
regime of ’mundane governance’ (Woolgar & Neyland, 2013). This refers to the 
notion that Foucauldian ideas of governance and biopolitics should be intertwined 
with an understanding of the meaning of everyday materiality in mediating such 
strategies of power. The paradoxicality discussed in this article involves two 
things. First, that of the the breakdown of the binary between activity and 
passivity in self-tracking practice as moral knowledge production in terms of the 
self becomes distributed in people’s everyday self-tracking assemblages. Self-
control is sought by giving (some) self-control away (see also Gomart & Hennion, 
1999) to algorithmic actants that wield notable power in directing how we feel 
about ourselves as we affectively engage with oneself-as-data. Second, there 
appears the paradox of the ’othered’ self being, in practice, both struggled 
against and constantly reproduced in self-tracking through the material and 
algorithmic functionalities of common self-tracking devices such as idle alerts, 
visual cues and the continuous accumulation of steps in daily cycles. 
The argument here is based on interviews and observational data, and draws 
from interviewees’ descriptions of self-tracking devices as companions (cf. 
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Lupton, 2016b) through which they enact the self along the axis of 
ideal/pathological. In practice, the functionalities of the devices – which gather 
and algorithmically evaluate data on bodily acts such as movement and sleep – 
often serve to establish morally invested knowledge on oneself. The moral 
power of these devices is evident in the way interviewees talk about self-
tracking in terms of affectively oriented language: how self-tracking is 
productive of ‘urges’, how ’bad’ results ’bug’ them or taste bitter, and how 
’good’ results elevate their moods and feel rewarding. For several interviewees, 
one of the central aims of self-tracking activities seemed to be the construction 
of the self as ’active’. They meant this in both the concrete sense of being active 
in daily exercise/movement as well as in the symbolic sense of taking care of 
oneself in a discursive climate that resents idleness, inefficiency and, generally, 
bodies that are not worked upon. Of course, people also commonly explicitly 
mention that self-tracking is ‘not that serious’ for them and they do not let it 
stress them out, but this does not mean that the ideal/pathological-binary has no 
meaningful effects in their lives.  
One common conception about self-tracking practices is that they are 
productive of data doubles, i.e. datafied representations of the self, with which 
people negotiate in making sense of themselves (Ruckenstein, 2014; Lupton, 
2014). However, some have suggested a more active role for the data by 
characterising self-tracking as a process of doppelgängering, through which the self 
becomes not a static representation, but a process of including/excluding pathology 
(Bode & Kristensen, 2015). As self-tracking is narrated as a struggle against 
laziness, illness and other such signifiers, it is then possible to see self-tracking as a 
process in which the ideal and pathological selves are constantly present, for the 
person draws meaning for the data from ideals that should be strived for (e.g. being 
active and energetic, efficient recovery) and pathologies that should be excluded 
(e.g. ’laziness’, sickness). Body political discourses, as actants in self-tracking 
assemblages, do of course participate in defining what the concepts of ’ideal’ and 
’pathological’ actually signify. 
Different devices have their own ways of defining the ideal and pathological. 
For instance, a common activity tracking wristband participates in enacting 
’proper’ bodies via step counts (along with other markers), the monitoring of which 
is enabled by the built-in accelerometer technology. A proper body in this case is a 
body that is active in terms of movement on a daily basis, and this imperative is 
underlined via a range of strategies, from explicit encouragements to haptic 
vibrations and colour codes in the mobile application. However, it is important to 
note that by encouraging constant monitoring of activity, these devices do not 
merely work to solve or relieve a problem of inactivity, but also work to produce 
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and reproduce this problem in everyday life. As such, self-tracking assemblages 
participate in the sociotechnical process of ’othering’ in relation to oneself. In some 
ways they participate in the classificatory struggle over what kind of bodies are 
respectable, pointing to how classificatory everyday practices and body political 
thought patterns are evolving, materialising and retreating into ubiquitous code in 
our time.  
The article suggests that self-tracking assemblages can be conceived of as 
systems of activation and a kind of biopedagogy (see Fotopoulou & O’Riordan, 
2017) through which people are taught respectable modes of being through the 
monitoring of activity, sleep, heart rates, moods, etc. In self-tracking, people seek 
control over their wellbeing while actually giving some of that control away to 
digital self-tracking systems that actualise one’s body as proper or problematic in 
new ways. It may then be argued that self-tracking is indeed often a positive 
practice, at least for those who are already active, fit and healthy, or for those who 
possess the bodily resources to take care of themselves, as their properness is more 
readily verified by the data. But even in their case, the pathological is always 
present as the ’other’, as that which is excluded through maintenance of 
properness. 
To summarise, the main arguments in this article are as follows:  
1. Self-tracking systems are assemblages in which various actants such as 
human beings, technologies (e.g. fitness wristbands, accelerometers, 
etc.) and moral discourses on properness intertwine and co-operate. 
2. The significance of materiality is crucial when analysing the ways in 
which biopolitics works in and through the digitalising everyday 
contexts of today. Self-tracking is a case in point, as self-tracking 
devices are commonly hyped as all-around beneficial tools for 
preventive self-care, yet are also thoroughly permeated by algorithmic 
body politics and knowledge about ’proper’ (and ’improper’) modes of 
being. 
3. In the self-related knowledge production of self-tracking, the ‘other’ is 
always present as the pathological which is to be kept at bay. Self-
tracking does not only solve self or body-related ’problematics,’ but also 
produces them in practice, such as through the ever present dichotomy of 
activity/inactivity, for example. 
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4.2 Self-tracking as dis/assembly of self-
knowledge in everyday life (article II) 
The second article investigates everyday self-tracking assemblages as a technical 
practice of self-related knowledge production. In this article, the paradoxicality of 
self-tracking manifests through the interplay of experiences of self-knowledge 
and those of perpetual uncertainty. It argues that while self-tracking is often 
imagined and described as a practice of compiling and forming (health) knowledge 
about oneself, in practice self-tracking often enacts a sustaining will to knowledge 
and ’interested subjectivities’ rather than self-awareness.  
The argument is empirically drawn from 14 interviews with self-trackers who 
have employed their self-tracking devices, or collections of devices, for at least 6 
months. While most interviewees very explicitly describe how self-tracking helps 
them ‘actualise’ their behaviour (a step count may indicate whether one has ‘really’ 
been active over a certain period of time) or sensations (a heart rate measurement 
may ‘actualise’ relaxation or the effectiveness of training, and sleep measurement 
may ‘actualise’ the quality of sleep), the ways in which they (sometimes implicitly) 
describe their practices with self-tracking technologies also reveal a self that, once 
measured, gradually slips from grasp. While an experience of self-knowledge may 
more readily be achieved in a relatively short time-frame or with a project (such as 
one day of activity tracking, or a two-month specific project of body mass 
tracking), through self-tracking the self simultaneously becomes an object of 
interest to which one can pay attention and observe in new ways since one’s 
longitudinal observational capabilities are enhanced in new ways. So, it can be said 
that a self-tracking device is (or can be effective as) a ‘means to an end’ but that it 
is never ‘only’ a means to an end, because it always changes the human being who 
we tend to think of as the origin of those specific ‘ends’. 
Theoretically, through an engagement of Stiegler’s (2011; 2012) ideas on 
cinematic time, the article contributes to existing literature on the topic by 
proposing a new approach to the evident temporalisation of the self in self-tracking 
practices. More specifically, the article discusses self-tracking practice as the 
production of the self as a ‘temporal object’. In his philosophy, Stiegler builds 
upon Husserl’s notion of the temporal object, a classic example of which is a 
melody. A melody is an object composed of smaller components – notes – and a 
melody becomes coherent as a multiplicity of notes set into relations with each 
other. Melody requires the appearance of new notes, but importantly, it also 
requires the disappearance of notes, which enables variation. However, notes do 
not completely disappear, but are rather ‘suspended’, as all notes have some kind 
of relation (ascension, descension, repetition, etc.) to other notes within the 
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melody. Importantly, this is not to be understood as saying that an object is in time, 
as all objects in human perception are in time, i.e. affected by the flow of time. A 
temporal object is an object that is not only in time, but constitutes in duration. 
This means that the object only becomes coherent as ‘unfolding’ or as ‘movement’. 
Of course, philosophically thinking, the ‘self’ may generally be thought of as 
always constituted in duration, at least when considered through the now-prevalent 
therapeutic ethos and therapeutic technologies via which selves are rendered 
objects of constant development. However, this is not so in our everyday perception 
of ourselves, as anchoring the self in time and place makes existence easier to 
handle. Yet, in practice, the digital technicalisation of therapeutic self-tracking 
practices seems to complicate the process of anchoring the self in time and place. 
In the context of this article, I employ the notion of the temporal object to 
sociological empirical analysis of everyday life in order to describe how the 
relation to the self forms or transforms in self-tracking practice. Here, the way 
Stiegler engages with the idea of film as a temporal object is crucial: a film is a 
collection and an arrangement of images in series and, like melody, it becomes 
coherent by the process of ‘flowing away’ (Stiegler 2012: 446–447). Any 
temporal object ‘weaves itself in the thread of time[…] as that, which manifests 
itself in disappearing, as a flux vanishing as it is produced’ (Stiegler, 2011: 36–
37, quoted in Roberts, 2006). The flow of a temporal object ‘coincides with the 
spectator’s consciousness’ so that the spectator lives the unfolding. In self-
tracking practice, the self is the spectator and assessor of itself as something that 
is woven in time through temporally scattered measurements and then ‘vanishes’ 
into the ongoing trajectories, potentialities and averages, for the self that is 
produced in any specific measurement event also becomes a fragment of a wider 
databank. As such a time-series self, the self becomes lived as an entity that is 
not only anchored in the present, but resonates with the self as just-past and as 
yet-to-be; it is thus always ‘becoming’ and in a persistent state of 
incompleteness. This explains a crucial aspect of the ‘actuality’ of self-tracking in 
practice. It also explains why people may be lured into and keep up with their 
ritual-like self-tracking practices and why they may keep thinking in terms of the 
temporally extensive techno-logic of self-tracking even after they have quit 
active tracking with any specific device. We can also relate such temporalisation 
of the self to the idea that contemporary forms of self-tracking seem generative of 
repetitive choreographies of checking-back and hitting (algorithmically defined 
or self-developed) targets (Parviainen, 2016: 65). 
This is not to say that self-tracking technology, or any technology, is in itself a 
negative or undesirable phenomenon. The interview accounts show that self-
tracking may well provide many people with positive experiences of being masters 
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of their own health, especially in the current health climate that champions 
preventive health consciousness and self-control (Topol, 2015; Sharon, 2017; 
Lupton 2016a). However, it is important to bear in mind that the effects and 
repercussions of technologies and technological practice indeed always intertwine 
with the sociopolitical contexts in which they become functional. For example, it 
serves us well to acknowledge that in contexts in which we are actively encouraged 
to look after our health and take control of our wellbeing, such technologies of self-
knowledge do not offer simple solutions or simply enable one to make the ‘right’ 
health choices, but often make life more complex and cause ongoing concern over 
personalised health monitoring. In summary, there are ultimately three main 
arguments in the article: 
1. While biopolitical processes of ‘normalisation’ explain much of the 
appeal of self-tracking technologies (Lupton, 2013; Fotopoulou & 
O’Riordan, 2017; Ajana, 2017; Article I), self-tracking practices also 
involve a deeper technological logic (techno-logic) of temporalisation 
upon which processes of normalisation operate. This logic is 
conceptualised here via the production of the self as a ‘temporal object’. 
2. While self-tracking technologies are typically (explicitly or implicitly) 
argued to enhance or support self-related knowledge production, in 
practice these technologies often seem to enact and reproduce the kind 
of self-interested subjectivities they promise to attenuate.  Thus, self-
tracking is equally re-productive of both self-knowledge and 
‘ontological uncertainty’ (as it is termed here). 
3. In terms of repetitive and ‘neurotic’ tracking, while it is often the 
‘human user’ who is intuitively deemed an ‘obsessive’ or ‘neurotic’ 
person, a tight attachment to repetitive tracking is actually a very logical 
way of working with or becoming with the techno-logic of self-tracking. 
4.3 Self-tracking as fragmentary holism in control 
society (article III) 
The third article of this thesis, co-authored with sociologist Ilpo Helén, investigates 
self-tracking as a therapeutic practice and asks how self-tracking technologies are 
imagined as contributing to a good life. The paradox here becomes that of a 
sustaining tension between a seemingly ’holistic’ or ’comprehensive’ 
understanding of the self and the fragmentary techno-logic of self-tracking 
systems. The article connects with the idea of a techno-logic of temporalisation, 
but theorises the human-technical co-work from a different angle.  
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The article starts with the idea that self-tracking technologies serve and 
function as a sociotechnical instantiation of ‘therapeutic culture’. This terms refers 
to a cultural framework of popular psychological life management discourses that 
are widely theorised, for example, in connection to self-help literature (Madsen, 
2015; Salmenniemi, 2017) and, more generally, the commodification of emotion 
(Illouz 2008; Ahmed, 2010; Davies, 2015). Therapeutic culture is typically thought 
to summon self-sufficient subjectivities that are willing and able to work on 
themselves, self-manage their emotional-physical wellbeing and take responsibility 
for their health. As such, they are often thought to align with neoliberal 
conceptions of ideal citizenship and being. However, ‘therapeutic culture’ is itself 
always an assemblage, meaning that it is not the ‘same thing’ across different 
contexts. Assemblage theory opens up possibilities to investigate the forms and 
functionalities that therapeutic discourses acquire in and through the technical 
context through which such discourses are appropriated. No ‘culture’ or discourse 
merely instantiates in technological practice, but also transforms or takes shape in 
these practices. Thus, we may investigate what becomes of the therapeutic in terms 
of (or through the data-driven techno-logic of) proactive self-tracking. Empirically, 
the article draws from various self-tracking related marketing materials and public 
texts as well as 15 interviews with Finnish self-trackers. It focuses on the ways in 
which self-tracking is imagined as promoting a ‘good’ or ‘better’ life, both in 
marketing promotion and in everyday narratives. 
The article first engages with technology developer’s materials to show how 
the therapeutic imaginaries of personally meaningful measurements leading to self-
understanding and transformation are a crucial part of the ways in which self-
tracking technologies are presented to consumers. This is in a sense logical, since 
the concept of self-tracking already attaches the activity of tracking to a ‘self’ that 
is typically understood to stand for a unique, whole and bounded individual. 
However, the ‘holistic’ logics of ever deeper self-understanding and self-
transformation are in principle contradicted by the logic of self-tracking 
technologies, for measurement focuses on algorithmically pre-determined nuances 
and specific functionalities of the body, and this, in practice, divides the individuals 
into ever-smaller parameters. Furthermore, self-tracking technologies monitor 
biomarkers such as step counts or heart rate rhythms, and based on them, may 
attempt to say something about ‘who we really are’ in the form of moral 
evaluations (for example, a daily step count of 10,000 steps indicates sufficient or 
‘good’ activity). However, even then people are encouraged to ‘keep track’ in order 
to gather data and produce these evaluations consistently (daily, weekly, monthly, 
etc.). The way in which technology developers encourage people to know and 
upgrade the self, and perhaps find out something about who they really are (cf. 
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Schüll, 2016a), but at the same time encourage a division of the self into data bits 
and longitudinal trajectories is conceptualised as ‘fragmentary holism’. In a manner 
reminiscent of what has been presented in the first two articles (I and II) of this 
study, this paradox or tension is a characteristic evident in interview narratives that 
focus on the use of self-tracking technologies. Most self-trackers say that self-
tracking helps make certain aspects of the self – such as health or daily activity – 
‘more real’, and thus contribute to a ‘bigger picture’ of oneself. However, the 
tensioned logic of fragmentary holism results in a ‘pervasive tension between 
becoming a self-informed subject and constantly pushing the boundaries of self-
knowledge further’. 
In terms of one’s relation to the self, self-tracking seems generative of ‘data 
derivatives’ that do not centre on ‘who we are, not even on what our data says 
about us, but what can be imagined and inferred about who we might be’ (see 
Amoore, 2011: 28). This, of course, involves the political aspect of what counts as 
ideal/pathological, which is evident in how interviewees describe an information-
deprived relation to themselves and posit self-tracking as a way to constantly 
psychologically motivate them to stay in good physical shape, good health, or to 
stay active and avoid ‘laziness’. In relation to this, self-control is considered in 
connection to politics of activation and politics of personalised medicine. We argue 
that through politics of activation (which is typically discussed in relation to 
activation of the unemployed, but which becomes something else in self-tracking 
assemblages), ‘the point of self-tracking is to educate people not on their daily step 
counts or heart rates during sleep per se, but mainly on caring for and managing 
personal ‘vitality’ by themselves in order to reduce the ‘deadweight’ in the 
productive system’ (see also Eversberg, 2015). Through politics of personalised 
medicine, which envisage the future of healthcare as ‘personalised, predictive, 
preventive, and participatory’ (Hood & Friend, 2011), self-tracking contributes to 
the data-driven future of healthcare and seemingly becomes a technique of 
‘progress’. At the same time, it instantiates perpetual struggles and preventive 
relations of control instead of experiences of wholeness or healing in individual 
lives. Again, it could also be said that this relation of control to the self also 
precedes and follows the acts of tracking with any specific device, for it can be 
applied and ‘brought to life’ in different ways via a variety of self-monitoring 
devices. 
The argument is theoretically tied to Deleuzian visions concerning the rise of 
societies of control. Facing the development of new digital systems in the final 
decades of 20th century, Deleuze argued that corrective and normalising 
interventions by public authorities and experts become replaced by new kinds of 
techniques that divide and fragment their objects (biopolitically thinking, our 
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bodies) into ever-smaller parameters and ‘action-units’. This, for Deleuze, is a very 
basic requirement in societies that rely on instant communication and continuous 
control instead of the time-specific and place-specific confinement of people 
(Deleuze, 1995a: 174). He saw the logic of control as pertaining to everything. 
Eventually, all people – as bodies, persons and communities – as well as the 
environment in which they live become divided and fragmented into clear-cut 
variables, and the cumulative data is ever more vigorously analysed in search of 
patterns, deviations and trends. What is crucial for us is the idea that the logic of 
dividualisation in terms of everyday self-tracking gives rise to fragmentary regimes 
of individualisation through which the self becomes a processual object of 
perpetual control. 
The text, then, considers self-tracking explicitly as an everyday political 
assemblage. The main arguments can be summarised as follows: 
1. While the language of therapy cultures typically encourages holistic self-
investigation through reflexive dialogue (such as with a therapist, a 
spiritual guide, even self-help manuals and the like), the techno-logic of 
self-tracking effectively inverts the focus on the self as something 
whole, thus supporting continuous control of specific parameters instead 
of holistic self-understanding. 
2. As a political technology of self-evaluation, self-tracking always 
‘precedes’ therapeutic transformation rather than actualises it in the 
sense that it motivates continuous self-monitoring and thus enacts 
struggles against social ills – in our case, for example, against the long-
running (and very lutherian) pathologies of illness and idleness.  
4.4 Self-tracking as everyday fringe medicine 
(article IV) 
The fourth article, co-authored with Pia Vuolanto, Johanna Nurmi and Suvi 
Salmenniemi, examines the relations to biomedicine and medical expertise in three 
different self-care practices, including self-tracking. The paradoxicality here stems 
from how it seems that while self-trackers often promote (strong) adherence to 
and engagement with science and scientific modes of knowledge production, in 
some ways self-tracking imaginaries also prescribe or suggest a move away 
from dominant biomedical modes of expertise and knowing about health. Self-
tracking is often experienced as ’evidence-based’ personal informatics, which is to 
say that while the activity may be perceived as a more or less situatedly objective 
source of self-related health knowledge, as such it also offers possibilities to move 
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away from population-based understandings of health on which official 
recommendations are often based. 
The article stems from a collaboration within the project Tracking the 
Therapeutic: Ethnographies of Wellbeing, Politics and Inequality (funded by the 
Academy of Finland in 2015–2019), and relates to the notion that was brought up 
in the previous article (III). Namely that self-tracking imaginaries sometimes 
appropriate influences from a range of ’alternative’ health practices. This article 
combines data from three different health-oriented ’groups’ in Finland, namely 
body-mind-spirit therapy groups, vaccine-hesitant families and self-trackers. It 
develops the concept of ’everyday fringe medicine’ (EFM) in order to bring these 
seemingly different groups together to relate them to the alleged crisis of expertise 
in contemporary societies (Collins 2014; Nichols 2017) and to argue that a variety 
of contemporary practices of everyday self-care may be understood as paradoxical 
practices that are, in a sense, both outside and inside hegemonic discourses of 
biomedicine, for they criticise, appropriate and/or ’work with’ biomedical health 
knowledge and medical science. The article contributes to our knowledge of the 
formation of public understanding of science in the tumultuous terrain of 
contemporary health knowledge.  
The article draws from long-term fieldwork among different EFM practitioners 
in order to argue that EFM in all its forms usually reflects a desire to engage with 
science instead of uncritically adopting it or simply abandoning or ignoring it. 
EFM practices are often characterised by varying degrees of critique towards the 
’official’ medical establishment and medical experts. Types of criticism brought up 
in the article are 1) criticism of medical knowledge production, 2) criticism of 
medical professional practices and 3) criticism of the knowledge base of medical 
experts and the meaning of ’evidence’. The first type of criticism argues that 
medical knowledge production should be free of all vested interests, such as the 
interests of pharmaceutical companies or local businesses. It sometimes constructs 
personal knowledge production as morally pure. The second type of criticism 
argues that medical practices are too professionalised or stuck in their own ways 
and thus often fail to respect people’s own experiences, views and emotions. This 
constructs personal knowledge production as a path towards more ’holistic’ health 
knowledge and wellbeing. The third type of criticism argues that population-level 
recommendations are blind to individual variation, which is why the gathering of 
’personal evidence’ is important in developing health-related knowledge.  
In addition to these types of criticism towards the medical establishment, EFM 
practices typically cast a critical gaze inwards towards ’other’ peers. This refers to 
how EFM practitioners evaluate other people in their reference group as uncredible 
(’amateurs’, ’conspiracy theorists’, etc.) or credible. Credibility is perceived as 
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stemming from the individuals’ capabilities and willingness to ’work with’ 
scientific materials and adhere to scientific principles of knowledge production. 
For instance, the self may be constructed as credible by bringing up one’s sceptical 
attitude or one’s university degree (especially in so-called hard sciences), for these 
supposedly offers adequate analytical tools in knowledge production through one’s 
observations and data. Thus, this inward critique may also be seen as underlining 
general trust towards science and scientific modes of knowing about the world. 
Self-tracking relates to other EFM practices mainly through its focus on 
‘working with science’ and/or through its personal, often ‘research-like’ attitude 
towards knowledge production about oneself (see also Heyen, 2020). Reflecting 
the cultural power of data as a more or less ’objective’ source of knowledge, self-
tracking as a data-driven practice is often seen (in public discussions and personal 
narratives) as a somewhat ’scientific’ or at least uncontroversial mode of knowing 
something seemingly ’factual’ about one’s health and wellbeing. In my study’s 
interview accounts of self-trackers, criticism of big pharma or industry ties in 
medical knowledge production were unsurprisingly virtually non-existent, while 
such critique was typical for vaccine-critical participants and body-mind-spirit 
practitioners. However, wider discourses around self-tracking in Finland have in 
recent years been linked to the field of science-inspired ‘biohacking’, within which 
such critique is not unheard of. The article draws attention to the appearance of 
traces of critical behaviour in self-tracking imaginaries. Self-tracking practices 
(from everyday consumer gadgets to private laboratory testing services) may be 
employed to support a form of self-care that mixes and matches official and 
‘alternative’ influences. This self-care may be employed to validate one’s own 
experiences, which may thus promote criticism of the professionalised expert 
system. Most of all, this self-care may be employed to experiment on oneself in 
order to produce personal-level health knowledge that may or may not challenge 
population-level recommendations. At the same time, science is held in high 
regard. In my interviews, there is frequently suspicion towards ’other’ self-trackers 
who are seemingly doing it wrong by not adhering to principles of scientific 
scepticism. Generally, of the three self-care practices investigated in this study, 
self-tracking most explicitly expresses trust in medicine and faith in scientific 
rationality. 
It is important to note here that the authors of this article do not wish to take 
sides in relation to health behaviour. Our aim is not to evaluate the truth-value of 
critical claims and related behaviour patterns of any kind, but to understand these 
different self-care practices from the practitioners’ own point of view while 
contributing to discussions on the public understanding of science. We argue that 
self-tracking – alongside other EFM practices – is not essentially for or against the 
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official medical establishment or scientific knowledge production, but is rather a 
sociotechnical regime of contemporary health assemblages within which we often 
encounter an eclectic mixing and matching of official and alternative influences. In 
this regard, it makes sense to analyse self-tracking further in relation to – and not in 
contrast to – other critical health practices (e.g. various alternative therapies and 
vaccine hesitancy) because they, too, are not simply for or opposed to the medical 
establishment, but reflect a wish to engage with scientific knowledge and in some 
ways develop scientific knowledge production. In this sense, self-tracking and 
other forms of EFM appear as contemporary forms of boundary work (Gieryn, 
1999) through which the boundaries between valid knowledge and invalid 
knowledge – and the demarcations between science and pseudoscience – are tested 
and, possibly, in some ways, reconfigured. 
EFM is a novel concept that in the authors’ view can be applied to a wide range 
of health practices – from those incorporating epistemologies of ‘complementary 
and alternative medicine’ (CAM) to new and emerging technoscientific practices 
such as self-tracking, which is in some ways aligned with biomedical (data) 
rationalities while also being often actively ‘non-medicalised’ by users, technology 
developers and medical experts. One of the strengths of the EFM concept is that it 
abandons the medical starting point of other concepts (mainly CAM) and adopts a 
social scientific starting point in which no practice is pre-established as being 
‘outside’ of ‘proper’ medical (or scientific) knowledge production.   
In terms of self-tracking, the main arguments of the article may be summarised 
as follows: 
1. As a situatedly objective method of self-care, self-tracking works as a 
sociotechnical regime of action within which influences from various 
official and ’alternative’ (or ’other’) health knowledges are being 
negotiated. These knowledges are also mixed and matched as people 
gather data and aim to use it to produce personal and personalised 
knowledge of their health and the self. It may then be argued that, in 
practice, self-tracking also reconfigures the self as an ‘expert’ instance, 
at least in relation to one’s own health and (possibly) health knowledge 
more generally. 
2. As such, self-tracking appears as a contemporary form of ’everyday 
fringe medicine’ (EFM) and boundary work through which the 
boundaries between valid and invalid knowledges– or possibly even 
between morally pure and impure knowledges– are being tested and 
perhaps reconfigured. 
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5 Conclusions 
This study has brought forth some of the various ways in which everyday self-
tracking practices can be seen as paradoxical practices. It is now time to draw some 
conclusions. The paradoxicalities presented above have been a way for me to 
explore and conceptualise the ways in which self-tracking practices shape and 
transform lives and ‘selves’, and a way to look beyond the usual questions of 
whether these technologies can help people or whether they are ‘useful’ in helping 
people lead better lives. They surely can be useful, but paradoxicalities, as they are 
presented here, also help to understand how the employment and introduction of 
technology is always a shift in being; it is always a trade-off and never only a 
means to an end. In self-tracking, the acquisition of datafied information about 
one’s activity or sleep can commonly be seen simply as a ‘natural’ act (who 
wouldn’t like to know themselves a bit better?), but upon closer inspection the 
potentialisation and temporalisation of selves, and the division of bodies into ever 
more nuanced bits of data are also transformative processes through which new 
kinds of orientations towards oneself and the world are enacted.   
Although I have drawn examples from the use of specific devices, such as 
fitness tracking wristbands and sleep tracking technologies, in some ways the 
paradoxes presented here pertain to self-tracking technologies more generally. 
Thus, more research is needed to investigate how the dynamics and tensions e.g. 
between activity/inactivity, knowledge/uncertainty, individualisation/ 
dividualisation and credibility/incredibility form and transform with new and 
emerging self-tracking technologies in different contexts. Whereas in a way the 
starting point of this research has been the notion that contradictions exist in the 
use of technology – meaning that technologies often acquire multiple, sometimes 
contradictory roles and functionalities in people’s lives depending on the situations 
in and through which they are utilised – paradoxicality in its various forms can be 
perceived as the main result. By saying that everyday therapeutic self-tracking is a 
paradox, or a bundle of paradoxes, I wish to convey the idea that self-tracking 
practices often seem to involve a paradoxical techno-logic; that these devices 
‘work’ through persistent contradictions, although the paradoxes presented here 
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may acquire different manifestations in different contexts. In self-related 
knowledge production, the noise always returns. As the tracked ‘self’ is ever 
changing, self-tracking both actualises and potentialises the self. It produces and 
un-produces knowledge, it both individuates and dividualises the body. I argue that 
sociology can make a contribution to our understanding of self-tracking practices, 
data-driven everyday milieus as well as technological practices more generally 
precisely by diving deep into such paradoxes and fleshing them out in a nuanced 
way, as I have attempted to do in this work. From the sociotechnical perspective, 
such paradoxes also underline how biopolitics – the political, productivity-driven 
administration and normative ‘ordering’ of bodies and lives – is shifting from 
institutions and expert instances into the background code of everyday health 
behaviour and personalised biochoreographies. 
I have shown that self-tracking systems change the world through affecting 
processes of knowledge production and everyday experiences of the self and 
others. As is the case with most of our everyday technologies, we tend to think of 
self-tracking technologies as tools, but they are more-than-tools: they effectively 
change the conditions of experiencing and understanding the world, including 
ourselves. Further questions need to be asked about what we mean by ’knowledge’ 
in the context of self-tracking and whether ’knowledge’ (in terms of the self) is a 
good concept at all for describing what accumulates and happens in everyday self-
tracking with related contemporary digital consumer services and technologies. 
The question is once again timely, as the world is struggling to understand and 
cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. In relation to the pandemic, the Finnish self-
tracking technology Oura – a smart ring that gathers data on heart rates and body 
temperature, for example – has recently been involved in academic studies 
investigating whether such technologies can help detect illness before notable 
symptoms appear, thus stopping it from spreading (Karppinen/YLE, 5.4.2020). The 
reception of such projects in expert instances underlines the supplementarity of 
technology in knowledge production—from an engineering perspective, the ring 
can help us understand the disease better, while from a medical perspective, 
connections between subtle changes in body temperature or other biomarkers and 
COVID-19 illness seem uncertain at best and problematic at worst. Importantly, 
both perspectives appeal to us and are present in how self-tracking technology 
‘works’ in society.  
Self-tracking technologies entrench the production of moral self-knowledge 
and evaluations, render selves perpetually uncertain, divide selves into ever smaller 
action units, and subtly reconfigure people’s relations to health knowledge and 
science. The ways in which they do this also bring up the question of what, in fact, 
is the relation between using technology and needing technology. Everyday 
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consumer gadgets for self-tracking may be commonly argued to serve certain needs 
that arise in Euro-American health-oriented cultures. Through discourses of 
healthcare-related austerity and preventive medicine, people experience the need to 
look after themselves according to health guidelines and due to scarcer healthcare 
resources, for example. However, when talking about self-tracking with people 
during my research in the last few years, I have never heard overall healthy people 
saying that they acquired a self-tracking technology such as a fitness tracking 
wristband or a sleep tracking device because they really, truly needed it. Rather, as 
is the case with many consumer technologies, there is first curiosity, and perhaps 
expectation, towards what can be done with the technology, and the actual need 
comes after, through practice. Need is a result as much as it is a precedent for the 
use of self-tracking devices. This work has laid out some ways in which self-
tracking practices are productive of needs, affective attachments and desires in 
everyday life. When looking into the question of how technologies change the 
world, the production of needs and desires is, in general, a good place to start.14 
Finally, academics and non-academics alike have often asked me whether I 
personally support or condemn the widespread commercialisation of self-tracking 
technologies. Unsurprisingly, I usually now respond by saying that the 
phenomenon is potentially both positive and negative, but in my view it’s generally 
not making peoples’ lives easier, at least not without making them also more 
complex. It’s a paradox. However, at this point I remember one of my interviewees 
saying that while it is positive that through self-tracking one can experience 
possibilities to nurture and care for oneself, becoming too focused on oneself is 
probably not a very ’sustainable way of living’. Finally, I cannot deny that a similar 
undercurrent of nagging cultural criticism has followed me during this work, 
during times of escalating ecological crisis and unprecedented global inequality. 
Maybe that influence has shown through, at least in the first few years of my 
project, as several humanities researchers have politely tried to remind me on 
different occasions that maybe I should sometimes try to see the upsides and 
empowering potentials of self-tracking in personal lifeworlds. After all, Quantified 
Self -communities, for instance, do present examples of how self-tracking is not 
 
 
14 For arguing this, I draw inspiration from the keynote speech of the prominent STS 
scholar Harro van Lente at Nordic Science and Technology Studies Conference 2019. 
He argued for treating the production of needs as one of the key programs for future 
studies of technology, as the production of needs for specific technological 
applications does not by any means stop with innovation, but continues after it. But in 
addition to the social production of needs, e.g. in and through the media, we also need 
to acknowledge materiality and the algorithm-based functionalities of contemporary 
machines in the production of needs and motivations. 
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only about self-centricity, of how people sometimes do extensive work with 
personal data and express solidarity by passing that information on to others 
according to the principles of open science, regardless of whether or not this 
information is in line with official sources of knowledge and biomedical expert 
discourses. 
Since I am trained as a critical sociologist, positivity has not always been easy 
for me. Only half-jokingly, one could say that positivity is for anthropologists! 
However, in the later stages of this work, the idea of paradoxes and technological 
assemblages has helped me avoid excessively depressing visions of self-tracking 
dystopia. Thus, just to end on a slightly positive note, while self-tracking 
assemblages, technologies of measurement and systems of health-related 
datafication may in many ways function as assemblages of control, affecting and 
altering our sense of self in ways that add complexity to lifeworlds instead of 
alleviating it, self-tracking, and in general the datafication of bodies and selves, is 
now a part of our social milieus and we can expect these activities to play a part in 
how we overcome, or do not overcome, the pressing challenges of our times. What, 
for example, could be the role of personal and wide-scale health data and self-
tracking in relation to our collective struggle against climate change, as such 
drastic change inevitably exacts its toll on human health in many regions of the 
world? How could health data and technologies of measurement work in 
combating or entrenching global and local inequalities? How may datafication 
developments eventually work to reconfigure or downgrade our economic-political 
systems? Such changes may be necessary in order to preserve most of our 
planetary natural habitat. These are important questions for future research, 
research in which the ability of self-tracking technologies to re-configure worlds 
and realities of living should be taken into account.  
On the other hand, I am still thinking about the interviewee who described his 
sustained, almost ‘neurotic’ practices of self-tracking in his search for an illusion of 
self-control, although it seemed that the practice had also in fact made concrete for 
him the experience of how one cannot really control the inherently unpredictable 
flow of life. And while he found the lack of control deeply distressing, I am still 
thinking how this, in fact, can also be empowering, at least in therapy-infused 
sociopolitical contexts in which we are still encouraged, even required, to become 
the masters of our own wellbeing and life in general. But this, again, leaks back to 
the binary idea that technology is either a curse or a salvation. However, if the 
human is already technical, if technology is originary of our humanness, maybe 
technology only affords salvation on the one hand and dystopia on the other in 
contexts where human beings try to wield mastery over it, when they try to control 
nature and themselves through it. It seems as if technology and related fantasies of 
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ever-developing automation can, indeed, be interpreted as our mode of maintaining 
slavery after slavery (Simondon, 1958/1980: 1–5), technology being the automated 
machine, the instrumentalised tool that now works (and is put to work) for us as an 
expression of our will to mastery of the living environment. After all, against 
widespread technological solutionism, the philosopher Gilbert Simondon suggested 
that a degree of technical ‘perfection’ or progress is not automation, which 
basically reduces the machine to pure utility and reveals it in instrumental terms 
rather than in practical and communal terms. His work was, among other things, an 
invitation to think about our existence among technical objects not through use-
relations but through relations of being-with (see also Lindberg, 2019) and 
becoming-with. This invitation is widely still pending today. 
For me, this thesis has not only been about understanding self-tracking, but 
about understanding technology, and has thus been an exercise in better 
understanding what it is to be human. Somehow, in these times of unprecedented 
global challenges, there seems to be a growing consensus in societies that we, as 
human beings, need to change, deeply and fundamentally. However, there also 
seems to exist a widespread belief in technological salvation, for example in 
relation to the climate battle. During this project, I’ve come to think that a crucial 
part, a necessary part, of our potential transformation as individuals and as 
communities involves the reinvention of our ‘tools’ and our relationship towards 
technology. It seems to me that the way forward towards more sustainable futures 
is not an anti-technological attitude (if we are technical beings, what would that 
really even mean?), but a new mode of relating to technology and a new mode of 
embracing ecologies of things, as suggested by Jane Bennett (2010), for example. 
We must acknowledge – as I think these paradoxes to some degree imply – that we 
are not, and never will be, masters of technology, nor masters of nature. 
Consequently, we will never even be masters of ourselves. Perhaps this way of 
looking at our existence, in terms of assemblages of matter and non-matter, is 
tragic, but it is in any case a mode of thinking that may free us from thinking about 
technology through the utopia/dystopia binary and enable a more harmonious 
coexistence with other beings, living or non-living, and a more harmonious 
coexistence with ourselves. 
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Viime vuosina erilaiset puettavat, kehon 
toimintoja ja rytmejä mittaavat laitteet 
ovat yleistyneet arkipäiväisessä käytössä 
(Ruckenstein 2012; 2014; Lupton 2014; 
2016; Schüll 2016). Ideaalin käyttötar-
koituksensa mukaan ihmiset voivat näi-
den laitteiden välityksellä kerätä nume-
raaliseen ja visuaaliseen muotoon muun-
nettua dataa elämästään sekä käyttää tä-
tä dataa pohjana elämänhallinnalle. Viit-
taan laitteisiin, jotka on otettu käyttöön 
ennemmin proaktiivisena kuin reaktii-
visena toimenpiteenä; niiden avulla ei 
yleensä ole tarkoitus todeta tai seura-
ta sairautta vaan ylläpitää hyvinvointia. 
Tyypillinen itsenmittausteknologia tä-
män artikkelin kontekstissa on aktiivi-
suusranneke, joka seuraa askelmääriä, 
unen rytmejä, kulutettuja kaloreita ja 
joissakin malleissa sykettä. Lisäksi haas-
tateltavat ovat käyttäneet muita yksit-
täisiä kehon toimintojen visualisointiin 
keskittyviä laitteita ja sovelluksia arkisen 
elämänsä ja kehonsa kartoittamiseen. Te-
rapeuttisena teknologiana tai minuutta 
koskevaan tietoon ja muutokseen pyrki-
vänä tekemisen tapana (Foucault 1988; 
Salmenniemi 2017; Lupton 2016, 39) it-
senmittaus ei käsittelyssäni palaudu mi-
hinkään tiettyyn laitteeseen vaan viit-
taa laajemmin kehon mittauksiin ja it-
sen monitorointiin perustuviin tapoi-
hin tuottaa ja kokea minuutta. Artikkeli 
Ihmisten kehoa ja elämää mittaavien hyvinvointiteknologioiden, kuten aktiivisuusrannekkeiden 
ja unenseurantateknologioiden, arkipäiväinen käyttö on yleistynyt voimakkaasti viime vuosina. 
Tässä artikkelissa tutkin haastattelu- ja havainnointiaineiston avulla sitä, miten itsenmittaus 
tulee toiminnalliseksi kehoa ja minuutta koskevan tiedontuotannon tekniikkana. Artikkeli 
valottaa itsenmittaukseen liittyvää minuuden tekemisen problematiikkaa ja tekee näkyväksi, 
miten erilaiset sosiomateriaaliset toimijat kytkeytyvät yhteen tekemään poliittista työtä. 
Terapeuttinen tiedontuotanto  
ja aktivoitumisen järjestelmät  
itsenmittaajien arjessa
Harley Bergroth
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avaa näkökulmia terapeuttisten teknolo-
gioiden sosiomateriaalisuuteen. Kysyn, 
kuinka itsenmittaus tulee toiminnalli-
seksi kehoa ja minuutta koskevassa tera-
peuttisessa tiedontuotannossa.
Sosiologisen itsenmittaustutkimuk-
sen piirissä pioneerityötä on tehnyt eten-
kin Deborah Lupton (2013a; 2013b; 
2014; 2016), joka on tarkastellut mobiili-
terveysteknologioiden sekä niitä popula-
risoineen globaalin Quantified Self -liik-
keen kytköksiä esimerkiksi uusliberalis-
tiseen yksilöä omasta terveydestään vas-
tuullistavaan kulttuuriseen kehykseen. 
Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa itsenmittaus-
ta ja siihen liittyvää tiedontuotantoa on 
usein lähestytty foucault’laisen (itsen) 
hallinnoinnin ja biovallan (Lupton 
2013b; 2016; Reigeluth 2014; Fotopou-
lou & O’Riordan 2017) sekä kapitalisti-
sen tuotantokoneiston ja sen tuottavan 
työvoiman sosioteknisen organisoinnin 
(Till 2014; Moore & Robinson 2015) 
näkökulmista. Antropologisesti orien-
toituneissa tutkimuksissa on toisaalta 
usein korostettu itsekontrollin ja hallin-
noinnin ohella sitä, kuinka datan kerää-
minen ja tulkitseminen saattaa myös voi-
maannuttaa ihmisiä määrittelemään uu-
delleen yksilöstä teknologian avulla tuo-
tetun datan merkitystä, arvoa tai poten-
tiaalista käyttötarkoitusta (Ruckenstein 
2012; 2014; Nafus & Sherman 2014; Sha-
ron & Zandbergen 2016) ja kenties näin 
haastamaan hallinnan tiedollisia meka-
nismeja. 
Keskustelut siitä, miten ihmiset, ih-
misryhmät tai ihmisinstituutiot tulkitse-
vat ja (väärin)käyttävät laitteita ja dataa 
vaikuttavat kuitenkin useimmiten pa-
lauttavan poliittisen toimijuuden lopulta 
ihmisiin. Tässä tutkimuksessa mittarei-
den toiminnallisuutta arjessa tarkastel-
laan sosiomateriaalisten aktanttien vä-
lisissä suhteissa rakentuvana prosessina 
(Latour 1990; 1992). Pyrkimyksenä on 
ottaa ei-inhimillinen toimijuus vakavas-
ti tavalla, jota ei itsenmittaukseen liitty-
vässä tutkimuksessa ole riittävästi hyö-
dynnetty.1 Vaikka esimerkiksi sosioma-
teriaalisten kokoonpanojen (assemblage) 
käsitettä on toki käytetty käsitteellistä-
mään ihmisten ja teknologian yhteen-
liittymiä mittauskäytännöissä (Lupton 
2014, 4; 2016), arkipäivän kokemusten 
empiirisen tarkastelun kautta on mahdol-
lista valottaa tarkemmin itsenmittauk-
seen liittyvää minuuksien tekemisen so-
siotekniikkaa. Woolgarin ja Neylandin 
(2013, 38–39) esittämää erontekoa seu-
raten tarkoitus ei ole niinkään esittää, 
että teknologiat ovat itsessään poliittisia 
vaan tutkia sitä, kuinka ihmisten, mit-
tariteknologioiden ja yhteiskuntapoliit-
tisten diskurssien muodostamassa ko-
koonpanossa toimijaverkoston aktantit 
kytkeytyvät yhteen tekemään (ruumiin)
poliittista työtä.
Tieteen- ja teknologiantutkimuksen 
keskustelujen mukaisesti oletan, ettei ke-
hon ja minuuden todellisuus ole pysyvä 
tai vakaa vaan aina muotoutumisen ja 
täytäntöönpanon prosessissa (Mol 2002; 
Mol & Law 2004). Minuutta toki teh-
dään suhteessa ajassa ja paikassa eläviin, 
moninaisiin moraalisiin ja poliittisiin ar-
viointeihin hyvästä ja huonosta tai kun-
niallisesta ja vaarallisesta (Skeggs 2014; 
Douglas 2000; Peteri tässä numerossa). 
Itsenmittauskokoonpanot, jotka ehdot-
tavat ja mahdollistavat intensiivistä tie-
dontuotantoa entistä useammista tie-
dostamattomankin kehollisen elämän 
osa-alueista, kuten arkisesta liikkeestä 
ja unesta, myös muovaavat aktiivisesti 
kunniallisen ja vaarallisen olemisen ta-
poja sekä käsityksiä siitä, miten mittaus-
käytännöissä dataksi hajoavaa potentiaa-
lista minuutta voidaan – tai tulisi – tietää 
ja hallinnoida.
Potentiaalisen minuuden hallinnoin- 
nin myötä artikkeli pohtii itsenmittaus-
ta suhteessa aktivoinnin yhteiskuntapo-
litiikkaan, joka saa itsessäänkin aktant-
tina mittauskäytännöissä uusia muoto-
ja. Kulttuuriantropologi Na tascha Dow 
Schüll (2016, 13–14) on esittänyt, kuinka 
itsenmittauksessa tuotettava minä ei lo-
pulta näyttäydy vain aktiivisena, valitse-
vana minä vaan yhtä lailla passiivisena 
minänä, joka delegoi itsen johtajuutta 
laitteille. Näin hän esittää, ettei mittaus 
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kiinnity yksiselitteisesti esimerkiksi uus-
liberaalin aktiivisen subjektin ihantee-
seen. Toisaalta ajatus toimijaverkostos-
ta voi auttaa kohdentamaan huomion sii-
hen, kuinka ihmisen ja teknologian suh-
de ei ole vain delegointia, vaan myös neu-
vottelua ja vaihtoa osana erilaisten inhi-
millisten ja ei-inhimillisten toimijoiden 
verkostoa (Olsen 2003, 88). Ei-ihmiset 
ovat toiminnan ja tulkinnan kohteita ja 
apuvälineitä, mutta ne myös tuottavat 
toimintoja ja tulkintoja ympäristöönsä 
(Latour 1992). Tästä jatkaen ja mittauk-
sen kokemuksiin perustuen tämä artik-
keli esittää itsenmittauksen aktivoinnin 
politiikan sosioteknisenä tilana: itsen-
mittauksessa minuutta koskeva tieto 
muodostuu aktivoinnin järjestelmässä, 
ja toimijoiden verkostossa yksittäisten 
toimijoiden aktiivisuuden ja passiivisuu-
den välinen raja hälvenee.
Aineiston esittelyn jälkeen tarkaste-
len ensin tiedontuotannon ja minuuden 
jäsentämisen työn jakautumista mittaus-
kokoon panoissa. Sen jälkeen pohdin it-
senmittauksen toiminnallisuutta ja te-
rapeuttisuutta etenkin suhteessa moraa-
liseen tiedontuotantoon. Kolmannessa 
alaluvussa keskiössä on tiedontuotan-
non (ja toimijoiden) muutos itsenmit-
tauskokoonpanoissa. Lopuksi vedän yh-
teen keskeiset johtopäätökset.
Aineisto ja menetelmät
Artikkelia varten olen hyödyntänyt hel-
mikuun 2015 ja helmikuun 2016 välise-
nä aikana keräämääni tutkimusaineis-
toa. Aineistoon kuuluu 18 puolistruktu-
roitua haastattelua itsenmittausteknolo-
gioita käyttävien henkilöiden kanssa se-
kä autoetnografista havainnointia itsen-
mittausteknologian parissa. Sijoittaak-
seni itseni tutkimalleni mittauskentälle 
olen käyttänyt FitBit Charge HR aktii-
visuusranneketta kahdeksan kuukauden 
ajan vuonna 2015 sekä satunnaisesti eri-
laisia itsenmittaamiseen liittyviä mobii-
lisovelluksia. Tämä on auttanut samas-
tumaan käyttäjien kokemuksiin ja tuot-
tamaan näin ”empaattista tietoa” (Pink 
& Fors 2017, 6) itsenmittauksesta. Muun 
tekstuaalis-visuaalisen materiaalin, ku-
ten käyttöohjeiden välityksellä olen myös 
tutustunut haastateltavien käyttämien 
teknologioiden ja sovellusten teknisiin 
ominaisuuksiin sekä siihen, miten nii-
den toiminnallisuus esitetään.
Kaikilla haastateltavilla oli haastatte-
luhetkellä tai lähivuosien aikana ollut it-
senmittausteknologiaa aktiivisessa käy-
tössä, joskin jotkut kertovat myös pyr-
kineensä lopettamaan mittareiden käy-
tön kokonaan tai osittain tai käyttäneen-
sä tiettyjä mittareita epäsäännöllisesti. 
Haastateltavat olivat 25–50-vuotiai ta, ja 
haastatteluhetkellä heillä kaikilla oli työ- 
tai opiskelupaikka. Haastateltavista nai-
sia oli 11 ja miehiä 7. Haastateltavien ni-
met on muutettu siten, että niistä selviää 
vastaajan sukupuoli.
Kysyin haastateltavilta esimerkik-
si mittausteknologian käyttöön ja elä-
mänhallinnan käytäntöihin yhdistyvis-
tä tavoista, motivaatioista, kokemuksis-
ta ja tuntemuksista. Lisäksi kartoitin hei-
dän ajatuksiaan itsenmittauksen yleisty-
mistä kohtaan yleisesti. En ole seurannut 
haastateltavien itsenmittauskäytäntöjä 
välittömästi niin kuin ne tapahtuvat arki-
päiväisessä elämässä haastattelutilantei-
den ulkopuolella, vaan heidän kertomus-
tensa pohjalta ja kentällä hankkimaani 
kokemukseen tukeutuen olen pyrkinyt 
tarkastelemaan mittauskokoonpanoon 
kytkeytymisen ja siinä elämisen vaiku-
tuksia itsesuhteeseen. Haastatteluaineis-
ton tekstianalyysia on ohjannut mate-
riaaliselle semiotiikalle ominainen sen-
sitiivisyys identiteettien prosessuaalista 
luonnetta sekä ihmisten ja ei-ihmisten 
yhteistoimijuutta kohtaan (Mol 2002; 
Law 2004). Haastattelujen lukemisen 
temaattisina kiintopisteinä korostuivat 
kysymykset siitä, milloin ja miten itsen-
mittauskokoonpanon kerrotaan rakenta-
van kehon ja minuuden tiedon, toimin-
nan ja mahdollisen muutoksen kohteek-
si. Jos ajatellaan, että käytännöt ja aktivi-
teetit (kuten kertominen, tekeminen ja 
tietäminen) myös edeltävät todellisuutta 
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eivätkä vain seuraa siitä (Law 2004), voi-
daan kertomus- ja kokemuspohjaisen ai-
neiston avulla avata näkökulmia kehoja 
ja elämää koskevaan tiedontuotantoon 
ja poliittisen toimijuuden hajautumi-
seen mittauskäytännöissä. Haastatte-
lut toimivat kertomuksina, jotka sekä il-
mentävät että tuottavat mittauskokoon-
panojen logiikkaa. Ne kertovat siitä, mi-
ten minuus on tullut tiedetyksi ja koe-
tuksi tai miten arkipäivässä on toteutet-
tu minuuden tietämisen tapoja. Omat 
kokemukseni mittausteknologian paris-
sa ovat osaltaan auttaneet reflektoimaan 
näitä kertomuksia. 
Minuuden tekemisen jaettu työ
"Polar Loop seuraa kaikkea aktiivi-
suuttasi – askel askeleelta ja hyppy hy-
pyltä pitkin päivää – ja kertoo, mitä hyö-
tyä siitä sinulle on.
Se palkitsee sinut aktiivisuudesta ja 
kannustaa lähtemään liikkeelle, jos et 
vielä ole saavuttanut päivittäistä aktiivi-
suustavoitettasi.
Yhdessä Polar Flow -verkkopalvelun 
ja -mobiilisovelluksen kanssa se on täydel-
linen ratkaisu aktivoitumiseen. 
(Polar Loop -käyttöohje, s. 3.)2
Arkipäivän ontologiassa ihmisen ja lait-
teen välinen asetelma on selvä: ihminen 
on itsestään huolehtiva toimija, tekno-
logia on väline. Toisaalta jo suositun Po-
lar Loop-aktiivisuusrannekkeen käyttö-
ohjeessa kerrotaan melko suoraan lait-
teen toimijuudesta ja laitteeseen liitty-
västä tiedontuotannosta. Ohjeessa ker-
rotaan, kuinka laite seuraa ja arvioi ih-
misen päivittäistä toimintaa, kannustaa 
ja on ”täydellinen ratkaisu aktivoitumi-
seen”. Itseä mittaavan laitteen käyttö on 
työnjakoa: ihmiskäyttäjä aktivoi laitteen 
seuraamaan itseään ja tuottamaan tietoa 
omasta toiminnasta (Schüll 2016). Kun 
laite omalla tavallaan kertoo mitä kan-
nattaa tehdä, laitteen toiminnassa raken-
tuu myös tietoa siitä, mitä aktiivisuus yli-
päätään on. Se on esimerkiksi liikettä ja 
askeleita. Jos ihminen toimii laitetta tyy-
dyttävällä tavalla, laite tyytyy seuraa-
maan vierestä ja palkitsemaan. Jos taas 
ihmisen kehollinen toiminta näyttäy-
tyy laitteelle epätyydyttävänä, laite jou-
tuu toden teolla töihin, motivoimaan ja 
aktivoimaan yksilöä erilaiseen suoriutu-
miseen.
Laitteet motivoivat monin tavoin. 
Prosessoituaan vastaanottamansa kehon 
rytmit ohjelmistossaan laitteet voivat 
tarjota tietoa minän tilasta esimerkik-
si värikoodein, virtuaalisin palkinnoin, 
tehokkuusprosentein sekä tuntoaistiin 
perustuvin haptisin värinöin. Esimer-
kiksi Marika, 43-vuotias kolmen lapsen 
äiti kertoo, kuinka Polarin aktiivisuus-
ranneke on toiminut hänen elämässään 
liikkeen motivaattorina rangaistusten ja 
palkintojen kautta:
Marika: […] tää [ranneke] ilmottaa 
myös että… tulee merkkei jos istuu 
kauan paikallaan ni tulee sellanen 
huomautus.
Harley: Okei, niin et siit tulee…
Marika: Nii, et tavallaan sit huomaa 
et mähän istun tosi paljon. Ja sit, et-
tä kun siihen tulee se 10 000 askelta 
vai mitä ni sitten tulee jo ilotulitus-
ta ja JEE et tuli päivän tavoite saavu-
tettua ni siit tulee sellanen… ja sit 
ku on niit päivii et jää vähästä kiin-
ni ja perheenjäsenetkin kysyy et mi-
tä sä oikeen teet, ni mä sanon et mä 
saan tän [päivän tavoitteen] täyteen 
(naurua). Et sillä tavalla vähän niin-
ku seuraa sitä omaa liikkumistaan.
Toimeenpanevaa voimaa edustavat myös 
haptiset, tuntoaistiin perustuvat värinä-
hälytykset, joista huomattavan moni 
haastateltava totesi, että ne todella teki-
sivät laitteesta hyödyllisen ja helpottai-
sivat itsen seurannan työtä entisestään. 
Tällaisen hälytyksen vaikutuksia kuvaa 
Mikael, 26-vuotias yliopisto-opiskelija, 
seuraavasti: 
Mikael: [Laitteessa] on ominaisuus, 
joka varoittaa tai antaa värinähäly-
tyksen sillon ku on istunut tunnin 
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paikallaan… muistuttaa et kannat-
tais välillä käydä jalkeilla et veren-
kierto lähtis paremmin liikkeelle ei-
kä sillä tavalla tulis altistuttua tällai-
sille istumisen haitoille. Et se on sil-
lä tavalla ehkä ollu suurimpia muu-
toksia omassa arjessa et ku tähän tu-
li toi istumisvaroitus tai passiivisuus-
varoitus […] kyllä se sillä tavalla mut 
saa aina liikkeelle et mä sillon käyn 
kiertämässä pienen ympyrän ja juo-
massa vaikka vähän vettä… et sillä 
tavalla mul ei tuu tuohon sovelluk-
seen sellasta passiivisuusleimaa tai 
niinku rangaistusta siitä et on ollu 
sen tunnin paikallaan
Nämä toiminnot ohjaavat usein onnis-
tuneesti kehoja toteuttamaan tietynlai-
sia toimintamalleja. Ne ovat eksplisiit-
tistä biopedagogiikkaa (Fotopoulou & 
O’Riordan 2017), jonka avulla yksilöitä 
koulutetaan kantamaan huolta itsestään. 
Edellä aktivoituminen rakentuu liikkeen 
lisäämisenä, kun laite kiihtyvyysantu-
rinsa (accelerometer) välityksellä mit-
taa liikettä ja palkitsee liiketavoitteiden 
saavuttamisesta kannustaen näin myös 
esimerkiksi ”kisailuun itseään vastaan” 
(Liisa, 38). Sosiologi Chris Till (2014) on 
tarkastellut itsenmittausta ja tällaista pe-
lillistämisen logiikkaa liittäen ne yhteis-
kunnalliseen termodynamiikkaan. Hä-
nellä digiajan kapitalismi kristallisoituu 
yhteiskunnan energiatehokkuutta ohjaa-
vissa teknologioissa, jotka kannustavat 
näen näisen vapaaehtoiseen, regeneroi-
vaan lii kuntaan, jota kuitenkin arvo(s)-
tetaan työnä tai ainakin pidetään yksi-
lön vastuuna ja ”hyvän” kansalaisuuden 
edellytyksenä. Usein mittarista tulee-
kin kiihdytin (thermal exciter) (Serres 
1997), joka stimuloi liikkeeseen.
Kaikki vastaajat eivät suinkaan ole 
kiinnostuneita ainoastaan varsinaisen 
tietoisen liikkeensä, kuten askelmäärien-
sä tai liikuntasuoritustensa, seuraami-
sesta. Esimerkiksi useissa uudemmissa 
aktiivisuusrannekkeissa on toimintona 
pinnallinen yön aikaiseen liikkeeseen 
ja mahdollisesti sykedataan perustuva 
unenseuranta. Lisäksi on saatavilla unen 
seurantaan erikoistuneita ohjelmistoja, 
joiden unta koskeva tiedontuotanto pe-
rustuu myös esimerkiksi sydämen syke-
välivaihteluihin ja hengitysrytmeihin. 
Monet kertovatkin, että liikkeen seuraa-
mista tärkeämpää tai kiinnostavampaa 
on unen seuraaminen. Myös unesta tulee 
näin aktivoinnin alusta ja terapeuttinen 
käytäntö, joka palauttaa (tai ei palauta) 
kehoa päivän rasituksesta ja myös jäsen-
tää minuutta. Kiihdytin-metaforan kaut-
ta en tässä kuvaakaan ainoastaan laittei-
den kykyä tuottaa lisää liikettä, vaan laa-
jemmin niiden tekemää työtä ”haitto-
ja” vastaan taistelussa; esimerkiksi sitä, 
kuinka ne tuottavat myös ei-liikkeen tie-
tynlaisen energiatehokkuuden vaalimi-
sen tilaksi. (Schüll 2016, 6; Williams ym. 
2015). Unen mittaamisen myötä paitsi 
liikkeestä (suoritus) myös ei-liikkeestä 
ja ”passiivisuuden” kehollisista rytmeistä 
(palautus) tulee tehostamisen ja minuut-
ta jäsentävän arvioinnin kohde.
Jotkut teknologiat hyödyntävät vä-
hemmän eksplisiittistä elämäntaitoval-
mennusta ja avaavat enemmän refleksii-
visiä mahdollisuuksia minuuden jäsentä-
miseen. Esimerkiksi Sakari, 50-vuotias 
aktiivinen itsenmittaaja, kertoo tera-
peuttisina teknologioina vaa’asta ja syke-
mittauksesta, jotka eivät ehdollista kovin 
eksplisiittisesti, vaikka kytkeytyvätkin 
käytössä esimerkiksi yleisiin hyvinvoin-
tidiskursseihin tai asiantuntijajärjestel-
missä tuotettuihin kontekstiriippuvai-
siin viitearvoihin. Samalla Sakari kuiten-
kin kertoo laitteiden aktiivisesta roolista 
tiedontuotannossa. Laitteita käytettäes-
sä minuus muotoutuu ”eri tavalla todel-
liseksi”. Tämä yhdistyy myös itsenmit-
tausta tutkineiden Matthias Boden ja 
Dorthe Kristensenin (2015, 124–125) 
huomioihin siitä, kuinka mittauksen ei 
usein koeta niinkään tuottavan uutta tie-
toa kehosta vaan todentavan minuutta:
Sakari: [M]ittaamisella asiat tulee 
niinku hirveen todelliseks. On ihan 
eri asia tietää paljon painaa mut jos 
sä tiedät vaikka viidellä tuhannella 
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mittauksella paljonko painat niin sii-
tä painosta tulee sulle tosi niinkun… 
todellista (nauraa). Ja kaikki niinku 
verenpaine ja syke… et mä meen il-
lalla nukkumaan ja mä aina mittaan 
ton leposykkeen niin okei vaikka mä 
tiedän että mä oon rentoutunu, mut-
ku mä nään sen lepo sykearvon mikä 
mulla on… ja sitten ku mul on hirvee 
määrä niitä mittauksia, ja tiedän sen 
mun lähtötason, niin siitä mun ren-
toutumisesta tulee ihan eri tavalla 
todellista. Mä todella tiedän sillai jol-
lain syvällisellä tasolla olevani rento.
Sakarin kokemus johdattaa myös pohti-
maan itsenmittausta todellisuuden mo-
ninaisuuden kannalta: hyvin perusta-
valla tasolla kyse on potentiaalin ja mo-
ninaisuuden hallinnoinnista ja minuu-
den aktiivisesta täytäntöönpanosta tek-
nologisessa verkostossa. Sakari tietää jol-
lain tasolla olevansa rento jo ennen mit-
tausta, mutta vasta rentouden systemaat-
tinen mittaaminen saa hänet vakuuttu-
neeksi. Kokemus kontrollista on mittaa-
misen ydin:
 
Sakari: [S]emmonen tyyppi joka 
mittailee vaikka kerran kuukaudessa 
vähän painoaan, niin se ei tajuu tätä 
ollenkaan, et sitten ku sulla on vaik-
ka 10 000 mittausta, sul on sellasta 
big dataa mistä sä voit louhia sellasia 
muuttujia, niin siitä tulee hirvee sel-
lanen kontrollin elämys… yleises-
ti elämässä ottaen on aina niin, et-
tä sama asia on sekä hyvä että paha, 
ja niinku tässäkin [mittaamisessa]. 
Et se perusidea minkä ympärillä tää 
pyörii on se kontrolli, ja hyvä fiilis tu-
lee siitä ku se kontrolli on ja se kauhu 
tulee siitä ku sitä kontrollia ei ole.
Sakarin kuvaama kontrolli, kuten myös 
eksplisiittisille palkinnoille ja rangais-
tuksille perustuva itsen toteuttaminen, 
voidaankin ajatella juuri epävarman, mo-
ninaisen minuuden parsimisena kasaan 
tietämisen käytännön kautta (Mol & Law 
2004). Mittauskokoonpanot kiihdyttävät 
kehoja toimintaan avaamalla arjen pro-
sesseja mitattavaksi ja tuottamalla näin 
potentiaalista minuutta, jonka hallin-
noinnista yksilö saa kontrollin elämyk-
sen. Kun minuuden tuottamisen työ jae-
taan laitteen kanssa, itsen kontrollista 
luovutaan yhtä lailla kuin sitä vahviste-
taan (Gomart & Hennion 1999, 221–227; 
Schüll 2016), vaikka ihminen kokee mita-
tessaan olevansa kontrolloiva, tietoinen 
osapuoli. Mittauskokoonpanoissa aktii-
visuuden ja passiivisuuden väliset rajan-
vedot siis hämärtyvät, mutta Sakarin ja 
muiden eksplikoimat affektiiviset koke-
mukset viittaavat myös kontrollin mie-
lekkääksi tekeviin moraalisiin arvioin-
teihin. Itsenmittauksen verkosto ei pääty 
ihmisen ja laitteen yhteenliittymään, saa-
ti ala siitä. Mittauskokoonpanoihin kyt-
keytyy myös yhteiskunta poliittisia ideoi-
ta, joiden kautta esimerkiksi Marikan af-
fektiiviset onnistumisen elämykset ilo- 
tulitusten näkemisestä tai Sakarin eks-
plikoimat ”hyvät fiilikset” ja kauhun ko-
kemukset tulevat ymmärrettäviksi. Kes-
kityn seuraavaksi tarkemmin siihen, mi-
ten objektiivisen tiedontuotannon sijaan 
mittauskokoonpanot tulevat toiminnal-
lisiksi ennen kaikkea moraalisen tiedon-
tuotannon kautta.
Aktivoitumisen järjestelmät 
ja moraalinen tieto itsestä
Veli (28): Se [unenseuranta] auttaa 
mua tavallaan niinkun pitämään it-
teni virkeenä. Joka on sinänsä vä-
hän hölmöä, koska kyllähän sitä ta-
vallaan ite huomaa et jos on väsynyt 
niin pitäis nukkua enemmän. Mutta 
sanotaan näin, että se pitää mut niin-
ku oikeella polulla.
Aiemmassa tutkimuksessa (Rucken-
stein 2012, 118; Sharon 2016) on todettu, 
kuinka mittaustuloksia pidetään usein 
riittämättöminä arjen ja elämän ”objek-
tiiviseen” tulkitsemiseen. Usein mittarit 
esimerkiksi rekisteröivät vain tietynlai-
sen liikkeen (askeleet, juoksu) aktiivi-
suudeksi, jolloin toisenlainen aktiivisuus 
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(jooga, pyöräily) jää rekisteröimättä. 
Mittarit voivat myös mitata sykettä eri 
tavoin riippuen siitä, missä kohtaa kehoa 
laitetta pidetään. Ihmiset antavat usein 
painoarvoa myös subjektiivisille tunte-
muksilleen, jotka eivät välttämättä suo-
raan vastaa mittareiden välittämää kuvaa 
kehon tilasta. 
Omassakin tutkimuksessani oli 
usein havaittavissa, kuinka ihmiset kri-
tisoivat mittareiden yksipuolisuutta, epä-
tarkkuutta, kömpelyyttä ja jopa turhuut-
ta. Voidaan ajatella, että mittauskäytän-
nöissä väistämättä muodostuvat tiedolli-
set aukot ajavat mittareiden käyttöä: tie-
toa on saatava lisää aukkojen paikkaa-
miseen. Toisaalta itsenmittaajille, kuten 
Velille edellä, erityisen merkityksellistä 
vaikuttaa usein olevan eritoten mittaus-
käytännöissä muotoutuva moraalinen 
tieto itsestä ja ”kunnon” minuudesta – 
ei niinkään mittareiden objektiivisuus. 
Tämä on yksi olennainen ulottuvuus, 
jonka kautta minuus tulee eri tavalla to-
delliseksi. 
Moraalinen dynamiikka tiivistyy 
myös esimerkiksi Jessican (32) kuvauk-
sessa siitä, kuinka hän koki aktiivisuus-
mittauksen turhauttavaksi, koska yhtääl-
tä se ei rekisteröinyt askelmääriä niin 
tarkasti kuin hän oli olettanut ja toisaalta 
näytti hänelle ”karvaan totuuden” siitä, 
että aktiivisuus ei ollut oletetulla tasolla. 
Tämä näennäinen paradoksi kuvaa hyvin 
mittareiden toiminnallisuutta: mittarit 
eivät tunne kehoa mutta tekevät sitä suh-
teessa ideaaliin ja patologiseen.
Sirkku (26) kertoo haluavansa teh-
dä asiat illalla ”oikein”, jotta aamulla 
unenmittaussovellus tarjoaisi tyydyttä-
vän pistemäärän, ja yöuni paikantuisi 
”vihreälle alueelle”. Sirkun kuvauksessa 
korostuu sekä laitteen voima liikuttaa 
(ohjata kävelylle), että pysäyttää (ohjata 
aiemmin nukkumaan).
 
Harley: Koetko, että itsenmittaami-
nen on muuttanut jotain arkisia tapo-
ja elämässäsi?
Sirkku: No on se silleen, just ton 
unen tarkkailun suhteen, että... kyl 
mä nyt haluan et sieltä tulee jotain 
säädyllisiä tuloksia sieltä [sovelluk-
sesta], et kyl mä haluun sen verran 
aikaisemmin mennä nukkumaan et-
tä sieltä ei tuu mitään 53[/100] sleep 
scoresta, kun se näyttää tosi pahalta 
ja harmittaa […] kyl mä niinku yri-
tän tehdä joitain asioita oikein sitten 
illalla, että mä nukkuisin paremmin. 
Et mä käyn sitten jossain kävelyllä tai 
yritän tehdä jotain muuta kuin tui-
jottaa läppäriä. (Sirkku, 26)
 
Jotta yön aikana kehon hengitysrytme-
jä, liikettä ja syketasoja tulostensa laa-
dintaan käyttävä unenseurantaohjelmis-
to tarjoaisi hyvän tehokkuusprosen tin, 
Sirkku kertoo muuttaneensa toimintata-
pojaan. Hän haluaa unen ja levon näyt-
täytyvän kunnollisena, sillä huono suo-
riutuminen ”näyttää pahalta ja harmit-
taa”. Pistemäärä (sleep score) tiivistää 
unen monimutkaisen kokonaisuuden 
yksinkertaiseksi luvuksi ja tuottaa nuk-
kumisen terapeuttiseksi käytännöksi ja 
potentiaalin hallinnoinniksi. Kun pato-
loginen minuus nostaa päätään esimer-
kiksi huonon unipistemäärän muodos-
sa, voidaan muutosvoima keskittää it-
seen. Laite toimii kiihdyttäjänä sekä pro-
vosoiden lisää liikettä että ohjaten aiem- 
min lepoon. Jälkeenpäin ajateltuna it-
sellänikin on kokemusta oman näennäi-
sen passiivisuuteni tuottamisesta aktii-
viseksi: kun aktivoin Withings-sovelluk-
sen mittaamaan leposykettäni istuessa-
ni passiivisena työtuolissa, sain palkin-
noksi vihreän merkin ja maininnan sii-
tä, kuinka matala leposykkeeni on ”tree-
natun urheilijan” syke. Kehon osalta tä-
mä tilastollinen yleistys meni harhaan 
eikä tuottanut niinkään tietoa kehoni 
”oikeasta” suorituskyvystä, mutta mo-
raalisena aktiivisen minän indikaattori-
na, osoituksena kunnon minuudesta, se 
tuntui palkitsevalta.
On jälleen huomattava, että Sirkku 
ajattelee jo olevansa huono, epäsäännöl-
linen nukkuja – aivan kuten itsekin tie-
sin jo omaavani matalan leposykkeen. 
Mittari vahvistaa (tai kenties haastaa) jo 
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olemassa olevaa tietoa itsestä. Moraali-
sessa ideaaliin ja patologiseen keskitty-
vässä tiedontuotannossa olennaista on 
se, ettei ideaalin tai patologisen napoja 
voida koskaan pysyvästi saavuttaa. Sen 
sijaan mittauskokoonpano tuottaa nä-
mä minuuden potentiaalit jatkuvas-
ti olemassa oleviksi mahdollisuuksiksi. 
Yksinkertaisimmillaan 10 000 askeleen 
ihanne on saavutettava joka päivä, ja uni 
on prosessi, joka toistuu yleensä joka yö. 
Käytännössä objektiivisesti epätarkak-
sikin tiedostettu mittari koetaan arki-
sessa käytössä usein melko luotettavak-
si suhteessa esimerkiksi aiempiin mit-
tauksiin. Näin mittari alleviivaa moraa-
lista suhdetta itseen, minkä myötä yksi-
lö voi ”potkia itseään perseelle” (Aino, 
39) ja esimerkiksi yrittää ”pysyä kartalla 
siitä, mikä on tänään se suhde eiliseen” 
(Mikael, 26). Mittauksessa tai sen kaut-
ta muodostuvassa tiedossa ei kuiten-
kaan ole pysyvyyttä vaan suhde itseen 
on luotava säännöllisin väliajoin uudel-
leen. Tässä mielessä jokainen yksittäi-
nen mittaus luo paitsi tietoa minuudes-
ta myös potentiaaliksi hajoavaa minuut-
ta, joka rakentuu ymmärrettäväksi vain 
suhteessa menneisiin ja tuleviin mitta-
uksiin (Sherman 2016, 33–34; Rucken-
stein 2012, 118). Informaatioarvoltaan 
vajavaiseksi koettua dataa voidaan myös 
tarkentaa täydentävän datan3 välityksel-
lä.
Bode ja Kristensen (2015) kytkevät 
mittauksen osuvasti ”kaksoisolennon” 
tuottamiseen (doppelgängering), jolloin 
korostuu minuuden tekeminen ”toista” 
minää ulossulkemalla. Mittaamisessa 
rakentuvasta itsesuhteesta on usein pu-
huttu termillä data double (Ruckenstein 
2014; Lupton 2014). Termi implikoi kah-
denvälistä suhdetta. Doppelgängering- 
käsite tuo lähemmäs prosessilogiikkaa 
ja moninaisuutta. Filosofi Michel Ser-
resille (1997) kaikkien suhteiden (myös 
itsesuhteen) perusmuoto on triadi, jos-
sa kahdenväliseen suhteeseen kiinnit-
tyy aina kolmas, joka on suljettava ulos 
mutta joka samalla mahdollistaa suh-
teen. Tämä ulossulkemisen dynamiik-
ka korostuu terapeuttisessa kielessä, jos-
sa keskiössä on itsen ymmärtäminen ja 
muuttaminen. Muutos tulee merkityk-
selliseksi vain suhteessa järjestykseen, 
joka luo muutoksen moraalin (ideaalin 
ja patologisen) pohjan: mittauksessa on 
jatkuvasti läsnä sekä parempi että huo-
nompi minä. 
Mittauskäytännöt havainnollistavat-
kin triadista itsesuhdetta. Terapeuttisena 
teknologiana mittauskokoonpano pyrkii 
sulkemaan kolmatta, patologista ja pas-
siivista minää ulos, vaikka käytännössä 
patologisen on aina myös oltava läsnä, 
jotta mittaus näyttäytyy toiminnallisena. 
Kokoonpanon on jatkuvasti tuotettava 
tietoa sekä siitä, millainen on oikeanlai-
nen minä, että siitä, millainen on väärän- 
lainen minä. Mittauskokoonpanon po-
liittinen työ tulee ymmärrettäväksi tais-
teluna patologista vastaan. Tämä taistelu 
on kuitenkin päättymätön, sillä ideaali-
minuutta ei tietenkään voi mittauskäy-
tännöissä todella saavuttaa tai patologis-
ta karkoittaa; ne vaanivat aina varjoissa 
matkalla seuraavaan mittaukseen. Tä-
mä tekee myös ymmärrettäväksi monien 
haastateltavien mainitsemaa mittauksen 
”koukuttavuutta” tai sitä, että mittaus 
synnyttää monille mielenkiintoa yhä 
kattavampaan tiedontuotantoon esimer-
kiksi uusien laitteiden muodossa.
”Toista” minää vastaan taistelu ei ai-
na onnistu eikä mittaus aina johda nä-
kyviin elämäntapamuutoksiin. Sari (46) 
kertoo käyttävänsä liikkeelle kehottavaa 
aktiivisuusranneketta, jotta ”mä tiedän 
et mä liikun tietyn määrän päivässä”. Hä-
nellä liikunnan lisäämiseen liittyy kak-
kostyypin diabeteksen riski, josta hän 
sanojensa mukaan saa joka vuosi työter-
veyslääkäriltä ”ukaasin”. Sari kertoo, et-
tei ole laitteen avulla onnistunut mieles-
tään lisäämään päivittäistä liikettään. Sa-
malla kuitenkin tulee selväksi, että ko-
koonpano on toiminut tuottaen tietoa 
minuudesta, kun Sari pohtii, että kenties 
”aktivoitumisen” on estänyt hänen ”lais-
ka” persoonallisuutensa. ”[T]avallaan mä 
jotenkin toivoinkin sitä et se [mittari] 
niinku aktivois mua liikkumaan enem-
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män. Mut ehkä mä oon sit vaan jotenkin 
niin laiska luonne et niin ei tapahtunut.”
Sarin kokemuksessa tulee näkyväk-
si, että vaikka laite ei aina onnistu akti-
voimaan, se tekee työtä tuottaessaan tie-
toa minuudesta. Tässä tapauksessa Sari 
pohtii henkilökohtaista laiskuuden pato-
logiaa syynä siihen, miksi laite ei ole toi-
minut niin kuin hän odotti sen toimivan. 
Mittauskokoonpanot siis tuottavat tietoa 
siitä, mitä aktiivisuus tai passiivisuus yli-
päätään tarkoittaa, ja muotoillessaan ke-
holliseen olemiseen liittyviä ratkaisu-
ja myös tuottavat ongelmia (Pols 2010, 
173). Mittarit siis tekevät työtä taistelus-
sa myös osaltaan itse tuottamiaan ”on-
gelmakehoja” ja ongelmaisia minuuksia 
vastaan. Voidaan ajatella, että mittareita 
ei ole pakko totella. Vaikka mittari yrittää 
kehottaa kävelemään enemmän, ihmi-
nen voisi tulkita tämän toisin ja käyttää 
esimerkiksi matalaa askelmäärää osoit-
tamaan, että vapaapäivä on ollut onnis-
tuneen rento. Usein näiden arkielämän 
mittaajien kohdalla näin ei kuitenkaan 
tapahdu, vaan ennemminkin vapaa-
päivän rentous (matalan askelmäärän 
muodossa) on asia, joka voidaan hyväk-
syä, kunhan muistaa ryhdistäytyä myö-
hemmin. 
Kehon potentiaalin hallinnointi ja 
taistelu patologista vastaan pitää liittää 
aikansa hallitseviin poliittisiin kehyk-
siin, jotka niin ikään saavat sekä toimijan 
että toiminnan kohteen ominaisuuksia 
itsenmittauskokoonpanoissa. Jos seura-
taan diskursiivista kehikkoa, jossa esi-
merkiksi liikettä ja unta seuraavia ran-
nekkeita on alettu yleisesti kutsua ”ak-
tiivisuusrannekkeiksi”, aktivointipoli-
tiikka näyttäytyy yhtenä keskeisimmis-
tä itsenmittausta aktiivisesti ehdottavis-
ta ja mielekkäitä itsenmittauskokoonpa-
noja tuottavista kehyksistä. Kriittisessä 
sosiaalipoliittisessa tutkimuksessa akti-
vointipolitiikalla on viitattu 1990-luvul-
la – rinnan uusliberaalin kapitalismin 
kanssa – kehittyneeseen eetokseen, jo-
ka korostaa työttömän (ts. potentiaali-
sen työntekijän) vastuuta omasta työl-
listettävyydestään, oman kompetenssin-
sa ylläpidosta (Keskitalo 2013; Julkunen 
2013). Aktivointi voi myös viitata laa-
jemmin sosiaaliseen ohjelmaan (Evers-
berg 2015, 173; Clarke 2005, 448; New-
man & Clarke 2009), jossa kansalaisen – 
jälleen, potentiaalisen työntekijän – on 
pidettävä huolta itsestään ja työkyvys-
tään. 
Aktivointi on siis kehon ja yksilön 
sosiaalista hyödyllistämistä, jos ajatel-
laan, että kehon hyödyllisyys viittaa en-
nen kaikkea sen potentiaaliseen (talou-
delliseen) tuottavuuteen tai vähintään 
ei-rasittavuuteen. Etenkin yhteiskunta-
tieteilijä Dennis Eversberg (2015) on 
Gilles Deleuzeen tukeutuen osuvasti 
luonnehtinut aktivointipolitiikan logiik-
kaa nykyajassa dividualisaation logiikka-
na, jossa potentiaalinen työvoima hajo-
tetaan ja kootaan uudelleen kasaan yhä 
pienempien parametrien (datan) väli-
tyksellä tuotantojärjestelmän energia-
tehokkuuden tehostamiseksi. Itsenmit-
taus vaikuttaa tuovan tällaisen logiikan 
myös arkielämään.
 Vaikka julkisen keskustelun tasol-
la aktivointi usein yhdistetään nimen-
omaan työttömiin, aktivoinnin politiikka 
vaikuttaa toimivan myös laajemmin ja 
näkymättömämmin arkipäivässä allevii-
vaten kunniallisuutta ajassa. ”Sosiaalise-
na ohjelmana” ja poliittisena aktanttina 
aktivointi saa samalla myös uusia muo-
toja mittauskäytännöissä: haptinen poli-
tiikka esimerkiksi värisee ranteessa, jol-
loin yksilö saa konkreettisen viestin toi-
mintansa kunniallisuudesta. Tiedontuo-
tantoa mittauskäytännöissä voidaan siis 
ajatella hyvin jännitteisenä. Mittari ei 
tosiasiassa tiedä paljoakaan kehoon vai-
kuttavista yhteyksistä: niistä moninai-
sista fysiologisista, mentaalisista tai kon-
tekstuaalisista syistä, miksi keho toimii 
niin kuin se toimii ja liikkuu niin kuin se 
liikkuu. Kehon tilan arviointi saa moti-
voivan voimansa ja toiminnallisuutensa 
diskursiivisesta moraalisesta arvioinnis-
ta, josta ihmiskäyttäjä jakaa vastuun lait-
teen kanssa. Seuraavassa osiossa syven-
nän vielä ajatusta siitä, miten aktivoin-
nin järjestelmän tai verkoston aktantit 
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ovat kytköksissä toisiinsa. Tämä auttaa 
myös pohtimaan sitä, kuinka aktivointi 
järjestyneenä terapeuttisia kokemuksia 
tuottavana moraalina ja politiikkana va-
kiintuu ja muuttaa muotoaan itsenmit-
tauskokoonpanoissa.
itsenmittaus ja 
tiedontuotannon siteet
Arkielämässä mittaus tuottaa siis usein 
tietynlaista (moraalista) faktuaalisuutta 
minuudesta, ja data saa näin merkittävän 
roolin tiedontuotannossa, vaikka sen ob-
jektiivisuus toki usein kyseenalaistetaan 
(Sherman 2016, 34). Näin itsenmittaus-
kokoonpano voi vakiinnuttaa sosiaalista 
järjestystä ehdottamansa ja tuottaman-
sa aktivoinnin logiikan ja itsekontrol-
lin taustalla. Yksilötasolla mittaamista 
voidaan retorisesti myös haastaa. Haas-
tatteluissa mittauksen negatiivisina as-
pekteina korostuvat yleensä mittaami-
sen taipumus kääntyä stressitekijäksi, 
sen riippuvuutta ja pakkomielteitä ruok-
kiva luonne tai sen kyky tuottaa pahaa 
oloa huonosta suoriutumisesta (Pols 
2010, 174–175; Ruckenstein 2012). Täl-
löin kuitenkin patologia – esimerkiksi 
”laiskuus” tai ”neuroottisuus” – vaikuttaa 
useimmiten palautuvan lopulta ihmis-
käyttäjään, joka syystä tai toisesta ei ky-
kene toimimaan ”oikein” aktivoinnin lo-
giikan kanssa, ja aktivoituminen sinänsä 
jää kritiikin ulkopuolelle. Negatiiviset 
kokemukset voivat johtaa laitteiden käy-
töstä luopumiseen. Poliittisen toimi-
juuden analyysille on kuitenkin tärkeää 
huomioida, ettei tällainen luopuva vasta-
rinta tarkoita mittauskokoonpanojen ha-
joamista.
Aiemmassa tutkimuksessa on todet-
tu, kuinka laitteet arkisessa käytössä vä-
hitellen ikään kuin katoavat, kun ihmi-
set unohtavat niiden läsnäolon ja samal-
la ne ”tarttuvat”, kun niistä tulee osa itseä 
(Ruckenstein 2012, 113). Toisin sanoen 
suhde itseen muuttuu, kun kehojen ja 
laitteiden välillä tuottuu minuutta kos-
kevaan tiedontuotantoon kytkeytyvä si-
de, joka usein kestää vaikka laite ei oli-
si fyysisenä objektina kiinni kehossa tar-
joamassa tietoaan. Aino (39) kertoo, et-
tä aktiiviurheiluaikoinaan hän mitta-
si usein sykkeitään tehostaakseen har-
joitteluaan. Tämä on johtanut siihen, et-
tä hän tuntee nyt kehonsa ja sen rytmit:
 
Aino: Nyt mä en ehkä sillai sitä syket-
tä enää sillee kato että sekin on... mä 
niinku tunnen itteni että mis kohtaa 
on joku keskisykealue et ei tarvi sitä 
niinku tuijottaa mistään, mut sillon 
just ekat vuodet ku sitä opetteli sitä 
hommaa ni aika paljonkin seurasin.
 
Tämä tuo oman sävynsä huomioihin 
siitä, että monet itsenmittaajat käyttävät 
tiettyjä laitteita aikansa ja siirtyvät sitten 
muihin laitteisiin tai lopettavat tyystin 
laitteiden käytön (Lazar ym. 2015; Lup-
ton 2016). Aino ei kerro luopuneensa sy-
kemittauksista siksi, että hän ei ole enää 
aktiiviurheilija, vaan siksi, että laite on 
tarttunut; hän tietää nyt sykkeistään eri 
tavalla. Perheenäitiyden ja esimiestyön 
välillä tasapainotteleva Aino kertoo ny-
kyään käyttävänsä aktiivisuusranneketta 
jälleen opettelutarkoituksessa ”potkiak-
seen itseään perseelle” ja ehkäistäkseen 
päiviä ”jolloin on ihan laiska”. Aino ker-
too työelämän olevan rankkaa ja pohtii, 
kuinka ilman motivaattoria liikuntaan 
hänen jaksamisensa työssä olisi luulta-
vasti merkittävästi huonompaa. Mitta-
ri siis motivoi osoittamalla ei-toivotun, 
laiskan minän, joka on pidettävä etäällä, 
ja näyttäytyy työelämän kuormittaviin 
vaatimuksiin sopeutumisen välineenä. 
Se on sekä työstä toipumisen että koet-
tujen kovien vaatimusten täyttämisen 
edellytys. Laite myös kehottaa ja opet-
taa aktiivisesti pohtimaan päiviä tietyn-
laisen logiikan kautta: Aino kertoo mit-
taamisen motivaatiokseen yrityksen väl-
tellä ”niitä päiviä kun aktiivisuus on käy-
tännössä nolla”. Tämä logiikka, päivien 
jäsentyminen esimerkisi suhteessa ”nol-
laan”, jää elämään.
Toimijaverkoston kautta voidaan 
kohdentaa huomio siihen, kuinka lait-
teista luopuminen on vain osa mittaus- 
 BERGROTH  |  TERAPEUTTINEN TIEDONTUOTANTOKULTTUURINTUTKIMUS 34 (2017): 1, 28–4038
kokoonpanojen tai aktivoinnin järjestel-
mien toimintaa itseä koskevassa tiedon-
tuotannossa. 
Toimistotyöntekijä Jessica (32) ker-
too, että vaikka hän on lopettanut aktii-
visuus- ja sykemittareiden säännöllisen 
käytön ja kokenut tämän johdosta myös 
”vapauden tunnetta” lähtiessään lenkille 
ilman mittareita, takaraivossa jyskyttää 
jatkuvasti ajatus siitä, että mittaria oli-
si käytettävä, jos mielii parantaa kunto-
aan. Kehon ja kunnon ajattelu datan lä-
pi on jäänyt elämään. Kun mittari irro-
tetaan kehosta, tekninen datavirta kat-
keaa, mutta mittauskokoonpanon mi-
nuuden tekemisen prosessissa suhde it-
seen on jo muuttunut ja side jollain ta-
solla usein jää. Vaikka siis konkreettinen 
laite häviää kehosta, terapeuttisena tek-
nologiana mittari on edelleen kiinni mi-
nuudessa tai sulautunut osaksi omaa te-
kemistä ja ajattelua. Tässä tilanteessa lie-
nee kyseenalaista luonnehtia ihmiskäyt-
täjää aktiiviseksi tai passiiviseksi, vaan 
ennemmin mittaus on luonut uudenlai-
sen maailmassa olemisen tavan (Pink & 
Fors 2017). Mitt auskokoonpanoissa ei 
ehkä ole mielekästä puhua yksiselittei-
sen aktiivisesta tai passiivisesta yksilös-
tä, mutta voitaneen puhua uudella taval-
la aktivoituneesta subjektista, joka tuot-
taa arjessaan itseen kohdistuvaa tietoa – 
ja itseään – uusin tavoin (Schüll 2016). 
Itse lopetin aktiivisuuden ja sykkeiden 
seurannan kahdeksan kuukauden aktii-
visen kauden jälkeen. Sittemmin olen 
kuitenkin toisinaan palannut lyhyem-
missä jaksoissa mittaamisen pariin esi-
merkiksi leposykkeen tiimoilta, ja, mikä 
tärkeintä, huomannut usein ajattelevani 
ja jäsentäväni toimintaani päivän aika-
na laitteiden ehdottaman kvantitatiivi-
sen logiikan mukaan.
Luna (43) kuvaa mittauskäytäntöjen 
myötä kasvanutta aktiivisuuttaan, kuin-
ka ”alussa se tuli väkisin, nyt se tulee it-
sestään”. Hän kertoo, että aluksi tavoit-
teen (10 000 askelta päivässä) eteen piti 
tehdä ”tosissaan työtä”, mutta nyt työs-
tä on tullut rutiinia. Luna myös valottaa, 
kuinka aluksi hän koki tärkeäksi katsoa 
aktiivisuutta osoittavaa, päivittäisen as-
kelmäärän ilmoittavaa numeroa rantees-
sa päivittäin. Enää laitteen pitäminen 
päällä ei ole kuitenkaan niin tärkeää, kos-
ka nykyään hän tuntee, kun tavoitteet on 
saavutettu. Elämään ovat tulleet pitkät 
lenkit ja tietyllä tavalla kasvanut aktii-
visuus, joten varsinainen laite voi jää-
dä pöytälaatikkoon seuraamaan etääl-
tä. Vaikka hän edelleen yleensä pitääkin 
laitetta aktiivisesti päällä, hetket, jolloin 
laite unohtuu kotiin tai ei syystä tai toi-
sesta toimi, eivät enää turhauta samalla 
tavalla kuin ennen, sillä kokemus päivän 
onnistumisesta tuottuu ilman konkreet-
tista yhteyttäkin. Luna tosin kertoo, et-
tä keskustelumme tuloksena hän miettii 
nyt laitteen valjastamista uudelleen ope-
tuskäyttöön; hän miettii minimitavoit-
teen nostamista vähintään 13 000 aske-
leeseen päivässä.
Mittauskokoonpanossa siis aktantit 
muuttuvat. Keho ja minuus muuttuvat 
uusin tavoin tunnettaviksi ja tunnetuik-
si. Teknologiat mukautuvat yksilökeho-
jen rytmeihin tarjoten eri tavalla moraa-
lista informaatiota sekä ehdottaen että 
heijastaen erilaisia toimintoja ympäris-
töönsä kehosta ja sen toiminnoista riip-
puen. Politiikka, joka muovaa niin itsen-
mittausteknologioiden syntyä ja yleisty-
mistä kuin niiden tuottaman datan tul-
kitsemistakin, muuttuu värinöiksi ja ke-
hotuksiksi sekä vakiintuu ruumiilliseen 
olemiseen ja toimintaan.
itsenmittaus terapeuttisena 
ja poliittisena käytäntönä
Tässä tutkimuksessa itsenmittaus kuva-
taan käytäntönä, jossa tiedontuotanto it-
sestä jaetaan ja jossa laitteet heijastavat 
vaikutuksiaan ihmiseen konkreettisen 
biopedagogisen ehdollistamisen välityk-
sellä tai avaamalla enemmän näennäisen 
refleksiivistä tilaa datan tulkinnalle. Jo-
ka tapauksessa mittauskokoonpanois-
sa minuus avautuu potentiaalina, jota 
laitteet sitten auttavat hallinnoimaan. 
Olen kuvannut, kuinka arkielämän tera-
peuttisessa tiedontuotannossa mittaus-
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kokoonpano tulee toiminnalliseksi mo-
raalista tietoa tuottavana aktivoitumisen 
järjestelmänä, jossa minuutta aktiviises-
ti tehdään. Terapeuttisena teknologiana 
mittarit sulautuvat ihmiselämiin myös 
ilman konkreettista kontaktia. Koke-
mukset vihjaavat, kuinka mittareista 
luopuminen voi olla vain osa mittausko-
koonpanojen poliittista toimijuutta arki-
elämässä. 
Aktivointipolitiikka voidaan ym-
märtää yhtenä nykyajan hegemonisena 
poliittisena aktanttina ja sosiaalisena oh-
jelmana, jossa tämä potentiaalin hallin-
nointi tulee mielekkääksi ja jonka myötä 
hyvinvoinnista ja elämän perustavanlaa-
tuisimmista prosesseista, kuten liikkes-
tä tai unesta, tulee helposti osa uuslibe-
raalin kapitalismin pohjalla vaikuttavaa 
kehoja erottelevaa ja luokittelevaa valta-
kamppailua. Itsenmittaus uppoaa vauh-
dilla yhteiskunnan käytäntöihin ja ra-
kenteisiin. Siksi on ajankohtaista tarkas-
tella digitaalisen politiikan toiminnalli-
suutta ja sosiomaterialisuutta nykypäi-
vässä. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella 
itsenmittauskokoonpanojen poliittista 
toimijuutta ei tule palauttaa ainoastaan 
inhimilliseen toimintaan. Tarvitaan li-
sää tutkimusta siitä, kuinka digitaaliset 
käytännöt muovaavat arkielämän kaa-
voja ja kokemuksia, ja kuinka arkipäivän 
politiikka tapahtuu arkielämissä erilai-
sissa itsenmittauskokoonpanoissa yhä 
moninaistuvien itsenmittaustarjoumien 
keskellä.
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For people who are willing or obliged to reflect on and proactively modify their 
personal conduct, a plethora of self-tracking devices are now widely available. By 
self-tracking devices we refer to near-body gadgets and related software applica-
tions that provide measurements of the rhythms and patterns of everyday life – for 
example, step counts, heart rate, walking distances and sleeping patterns. By pro-
viding quantitative data about vital functions or behavioural patterns, these tech-
nologies aim at helping people to enhance their self-knowledge, to adjust their 
behaviour and/or to accomplish self-improvement. As such, self-tracking technol-
ogies are entering and altering the domain of the ‘therapeutic’ that emerged and 
was consolidated during the 20th century (see Madsen, 2014, 2015; Moskowitz, 
2001). Instead of approaching self-tracking as merely an instantiation of an over-
arching and static ‘therapy culture’, in this chapter we study more closely the 
therapeutic imaginaries and functions of self-tracking in everyday life, and situate 
the phenomenon as part of always-emergent therapeutic assemblages.
Self-tracking has emerged in conjunction with sociotechnical trajectories that 
are characterised by the terms ‘data-driven’ and ‘datafication’ in recent discus-
sions (see Pentland, 2013; Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017). The terms ‘data-driven’ 
and ‘datafication’ refer to the collection and mining of masses of digital data by 
high-performance computers. Such practices are expanding to all walks of life, 
from healthcare to traffic and from energy production to mass entertainment. 
Advocates of data-driven technologies attach great expectations to their capability 
to provide precise and predictive control and steering of complex technical sys-
tems, including social organisations as well as individual human lives and behav-
iour (e.g. Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; Pentland, 2013; Topol, 2012, 
2015). Self-tracking is undoubtedly an important dimension of this development, 
as it is essentially about the collection and analysis of cumulative data on bod-
ies and personal lives. As self-tracking technologies increasingly saturate well-
being-related retail contexts and cultural imaginaries of self-care, self-tracking 
can well be conceived of as a mode of datafication of everyday life (Lupton, 2016; 
Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017).
In order to grasp the formation of therapeutic regimes of action within this 
data-driven practice, we approach self-tracking and its therapeutic functions with 
the help of two concepts. First, we deploy the idea of assemblage (agencement) 
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(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Marcus & Saka, 2006), which enables an analysis 
of self-tracking as a mode of action taking shape within and through networks 
and collections of things and discourses. We focus on how bodies, (technologi-
cal) objects and political ideas of self-development and self-care come together 
in self-tracking and form therapeutic assemblages that ‘hang together’ (Mol, 
2002) by and through the practice of gathering and analysing data about oneself. 
Furthermore, the concept of assemblage entails that the assemblage as a whole 
as well as its parts are in a constant state of emergence (Bennett, 2010; Latour, 
2005). This enables us to situate the phenomenon of self-tracking within a global 
therapeutic assemblage while being sensitive to the possibilities, affordances and 
relations through which the idea of the ‘therapeutic’ itself becomes a meaning-
ful concept in and through these practices. Second, we lean on Gilles Deleuze’s 
(1995a, 1995b) ideas of control society and, more specifically, of ‘dividualisa-
tion’, which are particularly relevant as regards the therapeutic and political func-
tioning of self-tracking. The concept of the dividual enables us to focus on the 
data-driven character of self-tracking, that is, how the practice of self-tracking 
becomes functional by and through data. It also helps us to situate self-tracking in 
current biopolitical assemblages in which individuals, their lives and their expe-
rienced selves increasingly become reduced to, as well as lived by and through, 
quantification-based haptic and visual information.
Drawing from qualitative analysis of promotional Internet material and inter-
views with Finnish self-trackers, we focus on the questions of how self-tracking 
becomes a therapeutic practice and what the idea of the ‘therapeutic’ might mean 
in the context of such a data-driven practice. We also ask how self-tracking, with 
its data-driven character, possibly shapes our understanding of the therapeutic. By 
studying self-tracking practices in this way, we are able to pinpoint contradictions 
that problematise a straightforward relationship between datafied life manage-
ment and the therapeutic ethos.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we consider self-tracking in relation to 
the current therapeutic ethos and as an embodiment of dividualisation (Deleuze, 
1995b). Then we present our data and methods. After this, we commence our 
analysis; first, we focus on the framing of self-tracking as a holistic therapeutic 
practice by technology developers, and show how self-tracking is reflective of 
what we call fragmentary holism. Secondly, we draw on interviews with Finnish 
self-trackers to elaborate on how self-tracking becomes a therapeutic practice 
in action and promotes regimes of perpetual self-assembly. Finally, we discuss 
briefly the political dimensions of self-tracking as self-control, and provide some 
concluding remarks.
Proactive self-tracking and the therapeutic ethos
People have used analogue technologies for self-measurement and lifelogging 
(Crawford et al., 2015; Lupton, 2016), for various reasons, for centuries. However, 
it may be argued that the rise of a ‘therapy culture’ – the relatively recent success of 
various forms of therapeutic life-management products and services which often 
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involve some sort of reflective tracking practices (see McGee, 2005; Madsen, 
2015) – has also driven the design, marketing and hype around contemporary 
digital self-tracking technologies. Whereas such technologies originally occupied 
quite specific domains such as (clinical) healthcare and competitive sports,1 the 
therapeutic idea of pursuing a better life through holistic self-improvement com-
bined with the cultural power of metrics and data (Ruckenstein, 2014: 77; Beer, 
2016) has paved the way for the adoption of quantification-driven self-tracking 
technologies in various spheres of everyday life. Today, consumers certainly find 
these technologies an integral part of wellness-related retail contexts, and digital 
self-tracking has consolidated its position as a mundane way of making sense of – 
and possibly transforming – the body and the self.
Although the variety of regimens of self-help and self-improvement is vast 
in Western therapy culture (Illouz, 2008; Madsen, 2015), it is quite common in 
the therapeutic landscape to see that such therapeutic hermeneutics of the self 
(Foucault, 1993) take place in a reflexive dialogue. In it, a therapeutic instance – a 
psychotherapist, spiritual guide, peer group, self-help manual or a website – func-
tions as a mirror or an echo that enables the person to acquire insights about who 
s/he actually is and what s/he can become. It is tempting to think of self-tracking 
technologies as such mirrors since self-tracking may be thought of as a practice of 
negotiation with ‘data doubles’ (Ruckenstein, 2014; Lupton, 2013; also Lomborg 
& Frandsen, 2016) that serve as a basis for investigating one’s own life. Sociologist 
Deborah Lupton (2013, 2016: 39) associates self-tracking more clearly with con-
temporary self-help, as she links the proliferation of self-monitoring practices to 
the rise of popular psychology discourses that offer individualised solutions to 
personal problems. She analyses self-tracking as self-help-like responsibilisation 
of citizens on their own health and well-being. Lupton’s arguments are congruent 
with critical studies that approach the Anglo-American therapeutic self-help as a 
field of neoliberal self-optimisation and governing. Such critical studies often see 
therapeutic self-help as a depoliticizing force as it may effectively hide structural 
and political problems by endorsing the management of personal qualities, traits 
or personality (e.g. Rimke, 2000; McGee, 2005; Madsen, 2015). However, the 
idea of an assemblage helps us to see that while self-tracking as a field of action is 
no doubt influenced and shaped by other forms of therapy culture, a focus on how 
the ‘self’ becomes enacted in practice within everyday self-tracking assemblages 
reveals a logic of dividualisation rather than that of individualisation. We argue 
that self-tracking reflects the interplay of the therapeutic ethos and contemporary, 
dividualising mechanisms of control, which also inverts the focus on the self/
person as a coherent whole found in much 20th-century self-help.
Dividualisation is a term employed by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze 
(1995a, 1995b). With an eye on the proliferation of information technologies at 
the dawn of the digital Internet age in the 1990s, he presented an outline of con-
trol society. He claimed that corrective and normalising interventions by public 
authorities and experts are increasingly being replaced by practices of control that 
divide its objects into ever smaller elements, parameters and action-units. Deleuze 
considered dividualisation as a basic requirement of the functioning of control 
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in ‘societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous 
control and instant communication’ (Deleuze, 1995a: 174). The rise of digital 
systems would bring about practices and technologies of monitoring and modula-
tion that work within the flows and transactions between the forces and capacities 
of living human beings, the environments they live in and the practices in which 
they participate. For Deleuze, control is continuous and anticipatory, and it works 
with the help of predictive and prognostic information. The objects of control are 
conceived of as ‘factors’ or ‘variables’, and their interaction and conjugations 
are assessable as ‘risks’ and open to modification by meticulous operations and 
interventions. As a consequence, living human beings as communities, persons 
and organisms – as units typically conceived of as individuals – as well as the 
environments they live in, become transformed and fragmented into dividuals 
within the matrices of control. In short, dividualization refers to the construction 
of clear-cut variables, dividing ‘everything’ – vital functions, life events, mood 
changes, the person, etc. – according to these variables, gathering data about these 
variables, and looking for patterns, trends or deviations by aggregating the data. 
Dividualisation pertains to all levels of human existence: to populations as well as 
to basic biological processes on the cellular and molecular level. It is in connec-
tion to dividualisation that we begin to see the logic of holistic self-understanding 
or holistic transformation, often emphasised in therapeutic parlance, giving way 
to a more fragmentary understanding of therapeutic life-management.
Data and methods
Our analysis is based on a variety of qualitative research material. In order to 
examine how self-tracking is presented within the cultural imaginary, we collected 
textual material from webpages of individuals and organisations that promote and 
endorse everyday self-tracking. These materials include Quantified Self-related 
website publications, public blog posts as well as promotional materials of pri-
vate enterprises that manufacture self-tracking devices. Furthermore, to grasp the 
experiences related to the therapeutic regimes of action in everyday self-tracking 
practices, we employed 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with Finnish 
self-trackers. The interviews were gathered during 2015–2016. Of the interview-
ees, six were men and nine were women, all of them were employed, studying 
or both at the time of the interviews. During the last few years, the first author 
has engaged in diverse self-tracking practices, including an eight-month period 
of consistently wearing a popular, consumer-grade activity tracking wristband 
(FitBit Charge HR). This, we feel, has enabled tacit knowledge on the studied 
field and the ‘workings’ of personal self-tracking assemblages in everyday life.
In order to investigate our overarching research questions, we conducted a 
close reading of our research material through two main themes. First, we looked 
into how self-tracking technologies and the data they produce are presented as 
being useful and meaningful for people in self-discovery, self-adjustment and 
self-improvement. Second, we investigated how the data serve – and how they 
are narrated as serving – the pursuit of a good life. Our analysis is not focused on 
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human-device relations, and we do not try to individuate patterns of use for the 
deployment of self-tracking devices. Instead, we study self-tracking as a practice 
and technology of the self (Foucault, 1988). This means that we have analysed 
how self-tracking as a regime of action springs from, mediates and shapes one’s 
relation to the self, and how the self becomes examined, understood and enacted 
through self-tracking. In addition, the concept of assemblage works as a meth-
odological stance that enables us to focus on constant change rather than stability. 
This is to say that our analysis is sensitive to the premise that things – such as 
‘the self’, the ‘therapeutic’ or the practice of ‘self-tracking’ – are constantly put 
together from diverse elements and are in a constant flux rather than fixed in place 
through notions of static ‘essences’ or ‘cultures’. In relation to self-tracking as a 
proliferating practice of life-management, then, our aim is to show that there is 
no unequivocal way in which self-tracking ‘is’ a therapeutic practice of self-care. 
Rather, self-tracking ‘becomes’ therapeutic relationally, that is, in relation to the 
sociotechnical and political context in which it is practised.
The fragmentary holism of self-tracking
Self-tracking technologies are often implemented in everyday life and social 
imaginaries in manners that resonate with the therapeutic ethos of self-discovery 
and the pursuit of a self that is somehow ‘whole’. Perhaps already due to the 
term self-tracking, the practice often becomes associated with the management of 
an undeniable uniqueness and wholeness of the person that an idea of the ‘self’ 
stands for. Yet, through general calls for ‘self-knowledge through numbers’, as 
the Quantified Self movement’s popular slogan goes, people are encouraged to 
assemble self-knowledge through a wide variety of quantified data (Lupton 2016; 
Berg 2017). Different instances of and devices for self-tracking measure differ-
ent and often very limited aspects of personal being – such as a step count or a 
heart rate. Therefore, self-tracking attracts very specific modes of knowing about 
personal existence. In being specific in this way, the activity already builds on a 
quite special notion of selfhood that steers away from looking at ‘unique’ life con-
ditions and settings. In this section, we examine how self-tracking is framed as a 
therapeutic practice of making sense of the self, and how it is presented as a means 
for self-improvement. Through this analysis, we shed light on a contradictory 
tension internal to the dynamics of self-tracking, that we call fragmentary holism.
Our research materials show a plethora of ways by which technology devel-
opers narrate self-tracking devices’ holistic capacities. Take, for example, Polar 
Electro Ltd., the manufacturer of popular fitness tracking wristbands that gather 
data on daily step counts and patterns of sleep. The company claims that monitor-
ing by the wristband helps the person to become physically more active which, 
in turn, reduces health risks, increases personal well-being and improves general 
vitality. In the developer’s promotional words, the device provides a ‘complete’ 
and ‘truly holistic’ picture of daily activity and ‘highlights the importance of 
every movement’.2 Similarly, the Finnish wellness ring manufacturer Oura claims 
that ‘[w]ith Oura, you learn your optimal times to move, eat and take a break to 
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get that restorative sleep’.3 The ring collects data on, for example, heart rates and 
nightly heart rate variability to inform users of their sleep quality. The developers 
call this a ‘holistic method […] built on years of experience in human perfor-
mance and the study of circadian rhythms of the body’. Taking another example, 
HeartMath Inc. is a technology developer that focuses on stress reduction via the 
measurement of heart rate patterns. The company promotes devices such as the 
‘inner balance’ sensor, and a method for constant monitoring of the changes of the 
heartbeat by claiming that such tracking leads one towards a state of coherence 
as long as one ‘stays with it’.4 It further claims that measuring heart rate helps the 
person to ‘incorporate the heart’s intelligence into their day-to-day experience of 
life’ and to ‘become the best version [of oneself] more often’. As anthropologist 
Natascha Dow Schüll (2016) noted in her ethnographic study of health tech exhi-
bitions in the US, the self-tracking industry’s marketing constantly implies that 
the choices we make (in terms of attaining activity, good sleep, relaxation, etc.) 
reflect something crucial about who we really are.
In the above examples we see an adaptation of the therapeutic language of 
holistic self-understanding brought into the domain of digital self-tracking. The 
developers’ claims often imply that the person may become something else as a 
whole through permanent tracking. For example, the individual is supposed to 
increase personal ‘general vitality’ and become ‘physically more active’ through 
step-focused activity tracking, or find ‘coherence’ and ‘inner balance’ via heart-
beat data. Yet the tension between a holistic approach to personal life (referring 
to transformation of the individual as a whole) and ‘fragmentary holism’ (refer-
ring to linear optimisation of nuanced functions of the body) becomes evident in 
the marketing language. The developers paradoxically encourage a better holistic 
version of oneself (e.g. a more ‘vital’ or ‘balanced’ self) by focusing on an algo-
rithmically predefined functionality (such as a step count or heart rate) or neces-
sarily limited combinations of such functionalities.5 In addition, by encouraging 
people to become an improved version of themselves more often – for instance 
daily – the self-tracking imaginaries refer to an ongoing struggle of transforma-
tion. Thus, Polar, Oura and HeartMath end up presenting self-improvement as a 
linear and ongoing process (see Bode & Kristensen, 2015) that is about constant 
monitoring and constant potentiality rather than about actuality.
Fragmentary holism highlights the idea that the ‘self’ is brought forth as an 
assemblage – disassembled and put back together through data – in self-tracking 
practices. First, the self consists of limited ‘functions’ or ‘parameters’ such as 
heartbeats or body movements, which are fragments of living that can be meas-
ured – and importantly, separated and combined – by means of self-tracking. 
In the case of an activity tracker, for example, a seemingly general picture of 
‘healthiness’ or ‘vitality’ can be assembled by combining measurements on, for 
example, movement, heart rate and sleep quality. Second, through longitudinal 
measurement of any specific fragment or vital function, the self is enacted as a 
data assemblage. Several scholars point out the relational character of tracking 
as a practice that requires assembly work on separate yet entangled data points 
or data nodes (Ruckenstein, 2014; Day & Lury, 2016; Schüll, 2016). This means 
 Datafying therapeutic life management 113
that in order to make sense of and indicate progress or regress, any individual 
measurement (e.g. a step count) needs to be related to other similar measurements 
at different points in time.
We can illustrate the idea of the self as a data assemblage through the typi-
cal features of self-tracking software. Most self-tracking software visualises 
self-related data as graphs and charts that can be employed for self-development 
purposes. For example, the Polar Loop wristband gathers individual steps into 
longitudinal (daily and weekly) indicators of activity. In this way, the individual is 
disassembled into individual units of movement by the device’s three- dimensional 
accelerometer, and re-assembled by the software. For example, depending on the 
device and software, a daily step assemblage on the application screen can take 
the form of a loop that gradually closes as one gathers steps and nears the daily 
goal, or a bar that fills up accordingly. A weekly activity assemblage may be visu-
ally presented e.g. as a bar chart. Similar logic pertains to measurements of heart 
rate, sleep, etc.; individual beats or movements are assembled into daily/nightly 
stats, which are then further assembled into longitudinal graphs. It is also typical 
that a simple number indicates the tracked self in a moral sense. For example, a 
self-tracking application may make complimentary claims about the person based 
on their total number of daily or weekly steps, or offer an ‘efficiency percentage’ 
for daily/weekly activity or sleep. Achieving high numbers or hitting 100 percent 
are then often virtually rewarded with animations, colour codes, trophies, etc. 
Here individual measurements or measurement combinations are algorithmically 
assembled into an evaluation. It is typical that such ‘holistic’ indicators of the self 
can again be disassembled into smaller-scale information in order to get more 
nuanced data on the specific function, for instance, to see the distribution of steps 
on a daily or hourly basis. However, in everyday use, to see the ‘importance of 
every movement’, as Polar mentions as a goal, is to ultimately trust the algorithm 
that assembles a personal evaluation. However, completion of a single evaluative 
checkpoint (e.g. a single day) is never really a completion at all. For example, in 
the Polar Loop activity tracking software, the person is implicitly encouraged to 
reach 100% activity (i.e. enough movement) daily. However, the weekly visuali-
sation of one’s activity shows a ‘daily goal completion average’, which groups 
together daily evaluations and offers a different number, the average.
Considering the self as a data assemblage also means that individual measure-
ments of different functions could or should also ideally be related to each other. 
For example, according to Polar, when combined with a heart rate monitor, the 
activity wristband can become an even more precise indicator of ‘activity’, as it 
can then offer more accurate quantification-based insight on the intensity of activ-
ity conducted, calories burned, etc. It can be argued that the more elements the 
assemblage has, the more ‘holistic’ the image of the self it paints. However, the 
more elements there are, the more data there are on separate functions that can, or 
need to, be tied together and related to other measurement data.
The point here is that as the tracked self is enacted as a data assemblage, self-
tracking as a way of working upon the self always feeds back to the user through 
its limitations. Data could always be more complete and more saturated through 
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relations, references and repetition. Therefore, the practice is in principle opposed 
to the idea of a ‘holistic’ understanding of the self. Of course, we do not deny that 
self-trackers often pay attention to qualitative data – for example, their experi-
ences and sensations – in order to make deeper sense of the quantitative data 
(see e.g. Ruckenstein, 2014; Lupton, 2016). However, while we grant that people 
may well experience the gaining of insights into their lives by contextualising the 
data, we think that holistic humanism and reflexive hermeneutics of the self often 
tend to be eclipsed or even be made redundant by the technical affordances of 
self-tracking: the precision of measurement of a specific function or activity at a 
specific point in time. Polar, for example, directly presents the process of ‘becom-
ing a more active person’ as a project in which the person becomes conscious of 
her/his step-based physical movement within a day in specific ways and adjusts 
her/his behaviour to modify these specific modes of action. Such awareness and 
a trajectory of personal action are induced by the measurement because physical 
movement (or lack of it) is what the devices and algorithms recognise, react to and 
respond to by producing data that then provide feedback for the user.
To sum up, from the viewpoint of assemblages of control at work in self-
tracking, individuals become increasingly conceived of as compounds of func-
tions, parameters, capacities and resources to be regulated and operated upon. 
Such control as a mode of governing people and their lives sits uneasily with the 
holism that nevertheless surfaces as an emic emphasis in the imaginaries of the 
capacities of self-tracking. For holistic therapeutic practices, the individual person 
and her/his ‘unique’ life, experiences and aspirations are the focus of practices to 
govern and modify people, whereas control and dividualisation reach beyond and 
below the personal by means of the collection and aggregation of masses of data. 
We claim that while many therapeutic practices are concerned with encouraging 
people to discover their unique modes of action for self-improvement, digital self-
tracking today becomes functional by focusing on self-control and by improving 
modes of action already predetermined in the devices’ code. In what follows, we 
will take a closer look at everyday experiences of self-tracking and discuss these 
experiences as reflective of anticipatory regimes of action.
Self-tracking as a therapeutic regime of anticipation
So far we have seen that self-tracking is often presented as a holistic means 
of self-inspection despite its tendency to disassemble the self into (longitu-
dinal collections of) functions and variables, which encourages further self- 
inspection rather than ‘holistic’ self-knowledge. In this section, we focus on the 
ways in which self-tracking assemblages are narrated to facilitate the idea and 
ongoing pursuit of a good – or, rather, better – life. We thus show how the data 
assemblages gathered in self-tracking practices unfold into therapeutic regimes 
of action in everyday lives.
When people speak of their self-tracking practices they usually say that self-
tracking makes aspects of the self (activity levels, sleep quality, etc.) ‘more real’. 
Sari, a woman in her late forties, speaks about how the Polar Loop device enables 
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her to convince herself that she is ‘really doing something’ in the sense of daily 
activity. Specifically, she has tried to fight against a risk of type 2 diabetes that 
has been brought to her attention by medical professionals. When Timo (male, 26) 
talks about tracking daily movement and calorie consumption, he readily recog-
nises the very limited employability of individual measurements and says that he 
does not necessarily check on the measurements on a daily but rather on a weekly 
basis. Despite this, he points out that the accumulation of data reveals patterns and 
creates a very tangible or ‘real’ history, evident in the repository of numbers and 
graphs. Through this timeline he can then reflect on and analyse ‘how things have 
been going’ in his life in a more general sense. It can be argued that self-tracking 
usually makes sense to people as a practice of acquiring knowledge about devel-
opments in terms of specific functions, which is also thought to reveal a bigger 
picture of one’s own life through futures and histories of potential health, physical 
fitness and wellbeing.
However, despite such experiences, what is characteristic of interviewees’ nar-
ratives is the pervasive tension between becoming a self-informed subject and 
constantly pushing the boundaries of self-knowledge further. In many cases, then, 
self-tracking in practice becomes anticipatory (see e.g. Adams et al., 2009) rather 
than evidentiary. Many interviewees acknowledge that self-tracking may provide 
quite a lot of self-awareness and promote joy and delightful moments when the 
self is actualised as ‘active’, for example, by reaching 10,000 steps or by produc-
ing a good sleep score daily or, even better, consistently, but they also reflect that it 
may easily turn into a repetitive practice, the main attraction of which is to predict 
and control. As the ‘tracks’ always lead on, self-tracking can spark ever further 
interest in the self, which makes the idea of the self as an experience of something 
‘whole’ quite questionable. For example, Veli, a 28-year-old male, reflects that 
it is really ‘quite silly’ to engage in sleep tracking because in a sense one already 
knows how one sleeps. Nevertheless, he self-tracks because the data logs ‘provide 
motivation for improvement’; that is, the logs and linear graphs psychologically 
move him to develop himself. This highlights the tendency of self-tracking to 
produce a processual regime of action in terms of datafied self-mapping.
It is our claim that through fragmentary holism, the purpose of self-tracking 
often becomes the process of self-assembly itself, as a sense of self-control is 
pursued. Relating to dividualisation, it seems that self-tracking as a therapeutic 
assemblage engenders a mode of action that enables not holistic self-awareness 
per se but rather an information-deprived relation to the self on pre-established 
scales. In other words, the self becomes highlighted as potential. This relates to 
how, in the context of border security, Amoore (2011: 28) speaks of algorithmi-
cally forged ‘data derivatives’ that do not centre on ‘who we are, not even on what 
our data says about us, but what can be imagined and inferred about who we might 
be’. Self-tracking data derivatives are another example of how improvement is 
linked with attempted control of potential futures and threats.
In terms of specific threats, our analysis of the promotional material points 
out that self-tracking devices are often framed as quasimedical devices that are 
supposed to lead individuals towards health, longevity and regeneration. As such, 
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they both answer to and produce what anthropologist Joseph Dumit (2012; see 
also Schüll, 2016) calls a ‘double insecurity’ that the medical industry enacts: 
not knowing whether one is already ill and never knowing enough about illness 
prevention. The person is thus always potentially ill. Perhaps the clearest example 
of this in our interviews comes from Sakari, a 50-year-old male who is a very 
active self-tracker and describes himself as a scientist of his own life (cf. Heyen, 
2016). For example, he makes an effort to track his weight and relaxation (via 
heart rate) daily, his blood pressure regularly once a year, and occasionally he 
goes to a nearby laboratory to gain data on various biomarkers of his choice. All 
this provides him with ‘more data’ in his ever-expanding database of himself. 
In addition to quantitative data, he also carefully notes any events that may be 
symptoms of illness. (One example that he provided us with is ‘12th March, nose-
bleed, short duration, left nostril’.) He describes self-tracking as ‘at its best a very 
therapeutic practice’ in the sense of producing a ‘peace of mind’ and feelings of 
‘self-confidence’. However, he also states that a central product of self-tracking 
is the feeling of ‘panic’ or ‘terror’, especially when one sees results that deviate 
from normal reference values and seem unexplained to him. When asked about 
whether self-tracking has served his well-being or not, Sakari said that a sense of 
control provides him with a really ‘healthy feeling’. Explaining the negative side 
of tracking in more detail, Sakari specified his ideas on control:
It is really about an experience of control… because you cannot really control 
life, but you can feel that you are in control… and the negative comes from 
the kind of terror, especially in the face of [measurement] results that are 
somehow… unexplained […] and it seems hard for me to grasp what could 
be negative about [self-tracking]… like if you think that people get all hypo-
chondriac and they increasingly go to the doctor, well I think that’s a good 
thing in a way. Because this is preventive health care, and it’s better that you 
go early [to the doctor] to check up on some fine nuance, than going when 
you’re already sick.
For Sakari, self-tracking seems to become functional as self-control and an ongo-
ing struggle against illness. However, as his life and body are now spatially and 
temporally divided into ever-expanding data sets by and through self-tracking 
technologies, it is also quite likely that he will encounter situations in which the 
feeling of a loss of control, in the form of unexplained data, becomes tangible. 
He explicitly connects such scenarios with emotions of terror. Here we can see 
self-tracking as a therapeutic assemblage at work: self-tracking becomes thera-
peutic as a practice of continuous and preventive health-related control through 
the dividualising and fragmentary logic of the system. This fragmentation and 
production of self-related data derivatives mean that a sense of full control often 
remains elusive. In Sakari’s case, this is implied in the curious sense that self-
tracking seems both a vitally important and therapeutic task, but also, in the long 
run, a battle one cannot win, because ‘you cannot really control life’. Thus, the 
therapeutic assemblage of self-tracking produces its own purpose by opening up 
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the self and the body as potential and as an object of continuous control. The self 
becomes a data assemblage that is not, in fact, approached as a whole individual 
but as dividualised into trajectories of functions, traits and biomarkers, through 
monitoring of which a sense of control may be pursued.
As control of potential, self-tracking may be thought of as a constant strug-
gle against the ‘deviant’ within (Bode & Kristensen, 2015). While Sakari wages 
war on various fronts against ill health, in another example we see the struggle 
against the disorder and social ill of ‘laziness’ or ‘idleness’, familiar from main-
stream wellness- and efficiency-related activation discourses.6 Aino is a 39-year-
old female, a mother of three children who works in an executive role. She has 
a background in competitive sports so she has long been familiar with heart rate 
monitors and other gadgets by which one can optimise physical performance via 
metrics. For Aino, such techniques have now become a part of coping with the 
demands of working life. She says that an activity wristband motivates her to 
move more, and she feels that if she did not exercise she ‘would not have the 
energy to cope with [the] damn tough demands’ of a stressful job. Here, as with 
Sakari, the way in which self-tracking comes to serve as a useful technology of 
the self (Foucault, 1988) is by control of vital potential, although in this case 
self-tracking is more explicitly connected to the maintenance of one’s productive 
energy. Aino speaks about self-tracking as an ongoing process of avoidance of the 
lazy self always lurking in the shadows. She says that the whole point is to ‘give 
yourself a kick up the ass’ and ‘avoid the days when [my] activity is basically 
zero’. She wants to avoid inactivity, which she explicitly associates with ‘lazi-
ness’. In a quote Aino reveals how the device cooperates daily in establishing a 
sense of self-control:
Of course it was nice when in the summer I went golfing and I got a huge 
amount of steps… of course it was nice [smiles widely], like WOW, so many 
steps. But in normal life it is enough for me that the wristband vibrates [haptic 
vibration, a signal of achieving 10,000 steps] at some point of the day, that 
I’ve been active.
It goes without saying that a life with an activity tracking wristband that counts 
steps and measures sleep via movement of the body may enable different modes 
and patterns of self-control than a life with a weighing scale or with access to 
high-end laboratory testing. However, the logic of dividualisation in any case 
frames one’s relation to the self as a relation of control, because the production 
of the self as data assemblage highlights the self as potential. This is evident 
in Sakari’s and Aino’s cases. Sakari is potentially always in ill health, even (or 
perhaps especially) when there are no obvious indications of illness (see Dumit, 
2012). The complex assemblages of technical devices, laboratories and biographi-
cal notes seemingly enable the person to control this insecurity, although such 
assemblages also produce the self as an object of ‘tinkering’ (Pols, 2010) with 
fine-grained nuances. In a similar manner, Aino is potentially always ‘lazy’, since 
every day is another struggle against ‘laziness’ and ‘low energy’, which in her 
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case is determined primarily via step count. The process of self-management 
manifests itself as permanent avoidance of the illness of ‘zero’ activity.
We suggest that while everyday proactive self-tracking is often narrated in 
terms of the typical therapeutic parlance of self-discovery, self-exploration or 
self-improvement, interview narratives show that dividualisation and fragmen-
tation of the self are the primary characteristics of self-tracking. Although it may 
be said that self-tracking enables a process of self-discovery through the longi-
tudinal measurement of fragmented vital functions or activities, in functioning 
it also creates interests that tie individuals into these sociotechnical regimes of 
control. The functions of the data as therapeutic life management ultimately 
become anticipatory rather than evidentiary, as any individual event of tracking 
does not so much generate self-knowledge as position the self in a continuum 
of measurements through which future (and past) selves can be imagined and 
potentially realised. Self-tracking thus persistently produces knowledge-craving 
subjects whom it supposedly serves, and the self as a ‘whole’ remains persis-
tently unattainable. Self-tracking assemblages, then, present vivid instantiations 
of control through anticipation because, as we have seen, from marketing rheto-
ric to everyday experiences these technologies reveal the self as process and 
as potential, as something to be acted upon consistently in order to actualise 
a better life. Inasmuch as self-tracking assemblages are articulated as produc-
ing knowledge of something ’real’ about the self, they create a need to know 
by dividing a complex whole of life into trajectories and functions that extend 
indefinitely. This is fragmentary holism in action.
Therapeutic self-assembly and the politics of self-control
Deleuze (1995b: 179) wrote that whereas life in disciplinary societies is character-
ised by completions and new beginnings, like trajectories from families to schools, 
and from schools to work, ‘in control societies you never finish anything’. In this 
chapter, we have shown how self-tracking as a technology of the self often drives 
fragmentation rather than unity, and anticipation rather than knowledge. Self-
tracking enacts the self, through a focus on linear scales, as an ongoing process 
and potentiality rather than as something to be found as a whole and coherent. An 
important consequence is that self-tracking assemblages bring to everyday life a 
modality of being characterised by perpetual alteration. From the consumer per-
spective, the therapeutic ethos of holism and stability thus appears appealing and 
welcome as it promises control, yet it is ultimately futile within the assemblages 
that produce their raison d’être through producing a metastable existence – an 
existence that is constantly subject to change. Acting to manage this metastability 
associates self-tracking as a therapeutic regime with the anticipatory control and 
regulation of potentiality in political regimes. In the last section of our chapter, we 
probe briefly this political aspect of self-tracking as control.
Our analysis of self-trackers’ narratives brought up struggles against ill health 
and laziness, both of which are identifiable as long-running trajectories of strug-
gle in Western ethics. Considering these struggles further along with Deleuze’s 
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ideas of control society we may connect them with sociotechnical visions and 
programmes of ‘perpetual education’ and ‘personalised medicine’ which rely 
on processes of dividualisation. If we consider self-tracking, on a general level, 
as perpetual education – resonant with what Fotopoulou and O’Riordan (2017) 
call ‘biopedagogy’ – we can connect it with social programmes of activation. 
In critical social policy literature and in public discourse, ‘activation’ has typi-
cally referred to a variety of local and international policies, hugely influential 
across OECD countries, through which the unemployed or the ‘excluded’ have 
been made responsible for managing their labour power, working abilities and 
personal life in general (Eversberg, 2015: 173; Clarke, 2005: 448). Yet, as a pro-
gramme or an assemblage, activation is itself contingent; it takes shape in relation 
to neoliberal market rationale and the logics of restructuring of the welfare state, 
through which the state and public powers seemingly withdraw from securing 
individual lives and from interfering with them. Furthermore, ‘activation’ may 
work as an umbrella term that covers a variety of traits and qualities such as, for 
example, education, the utilisation of prior work experience, health, well-being, 
mental awareness or aesthetic appearance. All of these are closely intertwined 
with the ability to self-manage and maintain the social and economic utility – 
that is, labour capacity and productivity – of one’s own body. In this context, 
the point of self-tracking is to educate people not on their daily step counts or 
heart rates during sleep per se, but mainly on caring for and managing personal 
‘vitality’ by themselves in order to reduce the ‘deadweight’ in the productive 
system (see Eversberg, 2015). Activation is thus a programme that is actualised 
through mundane technologies far beyond its rhetorical target population, that is, 
the unemployed, the precariat and the ‘excluded’ who are typically not the target 
group for self-tracking devices. We see how activation becomes actual with Aino, 
who worries about – and finds therapeutic functions in – managing her energies 
and capacities, that is, her labour power, through a struggle against laziness in 
a demanding and stressful work environment. In Virve Peteri’s chapter in this 
book, we see spatial arrangements of the office space as a new mode of activation 
and mobilisation of workers and their labour power within organisations; in this 
chapter, we see parallel strategies of activation with self-tracking technologies in 
everyday life and outside organisational contexts.
Self-tracking as an assemblage of control also has an affinity, and perhaps 
a more concrete one, with a major imaginary of future healthcare envisaged as 
‘personalised, predictive, preventive, and participatory’ (Hood & Friend, 2011). 
The advocates of ‘personalised medicine’ conceive of it as being embedded in 
advanced biomedicine like genomics and stem cell technology and claim that it 
will improve clinical care and shift the emphasis of health care to prevention with 
the help of more precise and patient-centred medical knowledge (for an overview, 
see Tutton, 2014). In addition, personalised medicine is expected to consider-
ably reduce the costs of healthcare. Over the past few years, visions of person-
alised medicine have re-focused on the collection and appropriation of masses 
of health-related personal data (Prainsack, 2017; Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017). 
According to the promoters, data-driven medicine would enable anticipatory 
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health monitoring and preventive interventions, as well as medication and other 
therapies, targeted far more precisely at specific risk groups or individuals (e.g. 
NAS, 2011; Hood & Friend, 2011).
Self-tracking works in congruence with the data-driven personalised medi-
cine that is expected to revolutionise modern medicine, health policy and soci-
ety (NAS, 2011; Hood & Friend, 2011; Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; 
Pentland, 2013; Topol, 2015). This congruence builds through the logics of con-
trol and dividualisation, both of which are embedded in massive data sets and 
have a focus on individual parameters and malleable patterns (see Sharon, 2017). 
Personalised medicine is often seen as a frame for preventive lifestyle and proac-
tive medical interventions, supported by perpetual self-monitoring and control. 
As seen in our examples, many companies promoting self-tracking – as well as 
self-trackers themselves, such as Sakari – focus on the measurement of health-
related parameters of vital functions and behaviour and narrate self-optimisation 
by digital tracking devices in a manner similar to preventive healthcare.
Personalised medicine is expected to have effects across populations, societies 
and even globally. The dividualisation taking place in such practices also lays the 
ground for the pervasiveness of ‘therapy cultures’ as personal lives are perpetu-
ally in need of preventive interventions: for example, always rather potentially 
ill (metastable) than healthy organisms (stable). Personalised medicine is thus 
another political programme that lays the ground for the sociotechnical instan-
tiations and alterations that are shaping current therapy cultures towards a focus 
on ongoing self-control and metastability rather than healing, wholeness and 
stability.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we argue that while self-tracking can be theorised in terms of its con-
nections to the general therapeutic ethos of self-discovery and self- improvement, 
it is a data-driven practice of dividualisation. As such, it creates regimes of action 
that build on the idea of perpetual self-assembly and which thus fit uneasily with 
any overarching characterisation of ‘therapeutic cultures’. Instead of holistic and 
reflexive self-inspection we often see the fragmentation of the individuals and 
their lives into ‘functions’ and ‘qualities’ presented by graphs and charts, and in 
ways that focus on the self as a process that should be worked upon consistently. 
So, in terms of how these technologies come to serve life, they serve not as holis-
tic actualisation of the self but as a means of ongoing control and management 
of potential. As life-management techniques, these technologies have a tendency 
to actively produce the kinds of regimes of perpetual action that they promise to 
dissolve. Furthermore, self-tracking as a technology of the self exemplifies how 
current therapeutic assemblages can also intertwine with political programmes 
and discourses such as citizen activation and personalised medicine. We see self-
tracking as to some degree pertaining to the emergence of societies of control as 
sketched by Deleuze, especially through a focus on increasing complexity and 
persistent incompleteness, which both attract endless monitoring.
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Notes
1 Mika Pantzar (2012: 133) has noted that when Finnish technology developers such as 
Polar Electro tried to introduce and sell heart rate monitors to American consumers at 
the end of the 20th century, they faced resistance as it was thought unclear why the 
average consumer should need one.
2 https://www.polar.com/us-en/about_polar/press_room/polar_launches_polar_loop 
and https://support.polar.com/fi/support/the_what_and_how_of_polar_24_7_activity_ 
tracking?product_id=64271&category=faqs [accessed on March 23, 2018].
3 https://ouraring.com/ [accessed on March 28, 2018, italic as in original source].
4 https://store.heartmath.com/innerbalance [accessed on March 28, 2018].
5 For example, a measurement of sleep quality may be based on a simple parameter, such 
as movement, or it may be based on a combination of parameters, such as movement 
data, heart rate data and data on breathing rhythms.
6 For example, these discourses now frame sitting as a public health threat (Peteri, 2017) 
and manifest themselves in various campaigns in workplaces encouraging people to be 
physically active during workdays.
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Abstract
The contestation of expertise is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in the field of health and well-
being, on which this article focuses. A multitude of practices and communities that stand in contentious 
relationships with established forms of medical expertise and promote personalised modes of self-care have 
proliferated across Euro-American societies. Drawing on multi-sited ethnography in three domains – body–
mind–spirit therapies, vaccine hesitancy and consumer-grade digital self-tracking – we map such practices 
through the concept of ‘everyday fringe medicine’. The concept of everyday fringe medicine enables us 
to bring together various critical health and well-being practices and to unravel the complex modes of 
contestation and appreciation of the medical establishment that are articulated within them. We find three 
critiques of the medical establishment – critiques of medical knowledge production, professional practices 
and the knowledge base – which make visible the complexities related to public understandings of science 
within everyday fringe medicine.
Keywords
health and new technologies, lay expertise, patients, public understanding of science, science experts, 
studies of science and technology
1. Introduction
Sociologists of science have long been drawing attention to the changing status of expertise in 
contemporary societies (Collins, 2014; Wilcox, 2010; Wyatt et al., 2010). Although expertise and 
experts continue to enjoy high regard and trust in a number of spheres, contemporary media and 
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particularly the Internet have crucially transformed the ways in which expert knowledges are 
constructed and claims to expertise are made. A host of new ‘cultural intermediaries’, such as life 
coaches, food bloggers and lifestyle gurus, populate the media landscape and offer guidance on 
issues of health and well-being. Such forms of ‘lay expertise’, often drawing on experience-based 
expertise, have become increasingly influential in various arenas of social life (Wilcox, 2010). 
Harry Collins (2014; see also Collins and Evans, 2002) has pondered whether the apparent loss of 
public trust in scientific expertise means that more or less ‘anything goes’ in the contemporary 
expertise game, and some have even gone as far as envisioning the ‘death of expertise’ (Nichols, 
2017). Such accounts signal intensified struggles over what counts as expertise and who can be 
an expert.
The contestation of expertise is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in the field of health 
and well-being, on which this article focuses. A multitude of practices and communities that stand 
in a contentious relationship with established forms of medical expertise and promote personalised 
modes of self-care have proliferated across Euro-American societies. Often such practices have 
been captured through the concept of ‘complementary and alternative medicine’ (CAM), typically 
presented as ‘the other’ of the Western biomedical paradigm. However, as several commentators 
have pointed out, the concept of CAM and its many related terms, such as natural and traditional, 
are controversial (Barcan, 2011; Gale, 2014; Louhiala and Puustinen, 2012; Saks, 2003) in that 
they tend to connote a polarised understanding in relation to biomedical knowledge. Critique is 
rarely simply ‘against’ biomedical knowledge, but is rather a complex and even paradoxical mess 
of ideas pertaining to morally proper and individualised modes of health-related knowledge pro-
duction (see Jauho, 2016). As we will highlight in this article, many of the everyday self-care 
practices cannot be unambiguously categorised as either merely ‘alternative’ or ‘biomedical’, but 
they rather destabilise and negotiate the alternative-biomedical boundary in many ways.
This article tackles questions of expertise and health-related knowledge by drawing on multi-
sited ethnographic research into the ways in which users of different self-care practices perceive 
and encounter the ‘medical establishment’ – medicine, medical knowledge, medical expertise and 
health authorities. At the heart of our investigation lie the following questions: What rationalities 
and claims to expertise underlie engagement in these self-care practices? What relationships to the 
medical establishment are constructed in them? The purpose of the article is twofold. First, we 
make a theoretical contribution by introducing the concept of ‘everyday fringe medicine’ (EFM). 
This concept allows us to respond to the critique levelled at the concept of CAM and to capture the 
complexity of contestations of the biomedical paradigm in everyday self-care practices. Second, 
we illustrate this complexity by introducing three forms of critique of the medical establishment 
articulated within EFM that show how EFM practices both challenge and collaborate with bio-
medical modes of health expertise and science.
By addressing these questions, the article contributes to the literature on the public understand-
ing of science and the sociology of health expertise in three ways: first, by developing the novel 
conceptual tool of EFM to theorise the logics of everyday self-care practices and their relationships 
to medical knowledge and practices; second, by empirically highlighting the complexity of cri-
tiques of the medical establishment among EFM users and third, by making visible the complexi-
ties related to the public understanding of science. While in public discourse many forms of the lay 
appropriation of medicine continue to be framed as ignorance or misunderstanding of medical 
science, the modes of critique and contestation evident in EFM direct the gaze towards the social 
shaping of epistemic authority by elucidating various modalities of engagement with the medical 
establishment.
The article will proceed as follows. We will first outline the way in which our conceptual and 
empirical arguments developed during the course of a research project on self-care practices. We 
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will then relate our research to sociological discussions of ‘alternative’ health practices and intro-
duce in more detail the concept of EFM as a conceptual aid for investigating the multiple relation-
ships with the medical establishment in contemporary health landscapes. In the subsequent 
sections, we will illustrate three forms of critique emerging in our ethnographic materials, before 
providing conclusions.
2. Ethnographies of self-care
The research materials for this study come from the research project Tracking the Therapeutic: 
Ethnographies of Well-Being, Politics and Inequality (2015–2019), which investigated a variety of 
self-care practices in Finland. Taking an ethnographic approach, the project uncovered how and why 
people engage with everyday self-care practices and how they make sense of and experience them 
(Marcus, 1998). It also interrogated the multiple forms of knowledge that people produce, synthe-
sise and mobilise in caring for themselves and those close to them. In this article, we focus on three 
self-care practices studied on the project: body–mind–spirit practices, vaccine hesitancy and self-
tracking. We thus address a spectrum of contemporary modes of self-care ranging from ‘holistic’ 
and ‘natural’ practices to technoscientific practices and ‘hip’ consumer health technologies.
Finland offers an interesting case for studying evolving relationships to the medical establish-
ment, for several reasons. Finland is a Nordic welfare state with a strong public healthcare system, 
where there is a strong trust in medical authorities and science institutions (Finnish Science 
Barometer, 2019). The boundary between official medicine and its ‘alternatives’ is sharp. CAM is 
not officially recognised, and unlike in most Nordic countries, there is no legislation to regulate it 
(CAM Regulation, 2013). The discussion around different modalities of treatment is highly polar-
ised. While around 30% of Finns have used some form of CAM (Kemppainen et al., 2018), these 
treatments tend to be viewed with suspicion by medical professionals and authorities, as demon-
strated, for example, in the term ‘belief medication’, promoted by the Finnish medical profession-
als’ association (Finnish Medical Association, 2017).
Fieldwork on body–mind–spirit practices targeted both professional healers and people who 
performed the practices as part of their everyday self-care. Roughly half the research participants 
worked as full-time or part-time healers. However, the boundary between healers and those who 
perform body–mind–spirit practices as part of everyday self-care is blurred, since professional 
healers also engage in them in their own everyday self-care, while ‘non-professionals’ occasionally 
administer these practices to their friends or family members free of charge. We can thus conceive 
of them all as ‘practitioners’ in the sense described by Thomas McLaughlin (1996: 22), who sug-
gests that those who practise a given craft or skill always develop a ‘vernacular theory’ of their 
practice, that is, how it ought to be practised and the values, concepts and worldviews associated 
with it. The research participants were identified through the Internet and at a range of public 
events, as well as through a snowballing technique. All of them engaged with a wide array of 
practices, including mindfulness, reiki, life coaching, angel healing, yoga, art therapy, self-help 
reading, folk healing, acupuncture, reflexology, aromatherapy, astrology, herbal medicine, homoe-
opathy and many more. The research materials include interviews (n = 32, 30 women and 2 men), 
media materials (webpages, popular books, newspaper columns, etc.) and participant observation 
at a range of body–mind–spirit events. The interviews explored the practitioners’ experiences of 
and motivations for engaging with body–mind–spirit practices, the role these practices played in 
their everyday lives and in society more generally, their perceptions of and encounters with official 
medicine, and their political views and engagements.
Fieldwork on vaccine-hesitant families included ethnographic interviews with parents of par-
tially vaccinated or non-vaccinated children (n = 33, 31 women and 2 men) and observations on 
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social media. Participants were mostly reached through a vaccine-critical open Facebook group. 
Later, those who had already participated also referred more participants to the study. The partici-
pants had opted out of all or several of the recommended vaccines for at least one of their children. 
Some had fully vaccinated their older children before starting to question vaccination. The partici-
pants had a total of 97 children, aged between 23 years and 2 months. Of these children, 46 were 
unvaccinated, 38 were partially vaccinated and 13 were fully vaccinated until at least the age of 
6 years. The interviews covered three major themes: the experiences and reasons that had led par-
ticipants to question vaccination, their health attitudes and practices and their encounters with 
healthcare professionals. Participants were asked where they sought information about vaccines 
and how they evaluated the information they found from different sources. They were also asked 
whether they trusted medical research about vaccines.
Fieldwork on self-tracking included interviews (n = 19, 7 men and 12 women) with people 
who had recently conducted voluntary, proactive self-tracking using one or more consumer self-
tracking devices, such as activity tracker wristbands, sleep-tracking devices, heart rate monitors 
and laboratory measurements. It also included media materials, marketing materials on self-
tracking devices, observations at digital health-related events in Finland and observations of 
discussions in a Finnish self-tracking-related Facebook group (‘Quantified Self and Biohacking 
Finland’). Research participants were reached both through the abovementioned Facebook group 
and through people who had no known contact with such groups. Thus, the participants repre-
sented a heterogeneous group, as some were enthusiastic self-trackers or early adopters, while 
others had very limited experience with such technologies. The interviews covered their motiva-
tions for and experiences of self-tracking, and how they viewed the significance and future 
development of self-tracking. Participants were not explicitly asked about their relationship with 
official or alternative modes of health knowledge, but these themes emerged spontaneously in 
the course of the interviews. Most research participants did not express explicit doubts about 
science or medicine and used the devices to ‘stay in shape’ according to expert guidelines. 
However, more experienced self-trackers mentioned their desire to employ self-tracking as a 
mode of personal data analytics.
Our analysis focuses on the interview narratives and media materials, with ethnographic obser-
vations providing contextual sensitivity and background information for the interpretative work. 
The research materials were analysed using qualitative content analysis driven by the theoretical 
focus of the article. The analysis first centred on the boundaries and hierarchies between EFM and 
biomedicine (both medical practice and medical research) described by the participants. In the 
subsequent rounds of analysis, we traced the participants’ relationship to biomedical research and 
knowledge, as well as their engagements with the medical community and health authorities. We 
discovered that despite the apparent differences in the three self-care practices we addressed, simi-
lar themes and arguments kept surfacing regarding the medical establishment and especially scien-
tific medical expertise. Moreover, in all these sites, the arguments tended to reflect a notable 
interest in and multifarious attachments to medical science and biomedicine, instead of simple 
ignorance or hostility. This led us to examine in more detail what these different health practices 
could reveal about the changing and tumultuous social terrain of health expertise. By bringing 
together the research materials gathered during fieldworks, our ultimate aim was to relate these 
sites of self-care to each other and flesh out ways in which EFM users made sense of their relation-
ship to biomedicine, medical practices and encounters with medical personnel. When thinking 
about how to conceptualise the different forms of self-care in relation to the social construction of 
expertise, we felt restricted by the existing conceptual frameworks. Discussions of ‘complementa-
rity’, ‘alternative health’ or counter-expertise did not seem fitting to describe the complexity of the 
practices or their critiques of medicine. We then arrived at the concept of EFM, through which we 
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were able to tie together these different domains of self-care and their interaction with medical sci-
ence and biomedical modes of thought and action.
On the basis of our analysis, we identified three forms of critique: (1) the critique of medical 
knowledge production, (2) the critique of medical professional practices and (3) the critique of 
medical experts’ knowledge base. It is important to note that these different types of critique are 
not mutually exclusive but overlap in many instances. The point here is not that all practices 
reflect all these forms of contestation equally (they definitely do not), but merely that all of these 
practices work as everyday regimes of self-care in which contestation (or acceptance) of medical 
expertise is negotiated. In our analysis, we have aimed to present the forms of critique in a suc-
cinct manner and illustrate how critique towards health knowledge promotes both evaluation of 
and engagement with medical knowledge or the medical establishment. Our main contribution 
relates to the concept of EFM, which we suggest can be employed to further research on both 
‘traditional’ and emerging forms of health-related knowledge production in the context of public 
understanding of science and expertise. The empirical illustrative analysis in this article serves 
to underline this point.
3. From complementarity to EFM
Traditionally, the term ‘fringe medicine’ has encompassed a wide range of therapies and health 
practices, such as herbal remedies (Evans, 2001) and hydropathy (Peeters, 2010), that are situated 
‘at the fringes’ of official or generally accepted forms of healthcare. However, the concept is sel-
dom used compared with the more familiar concepts of ‘complementary’, ‘alternative’, ‘tradi-
tional’, ‘quack’ or ‘irregular’ (on these concepts, see Gale, 2014). Studying CAM, Derkatch (2016: 
7) suggests the terms ‘fringe patients, fringe illnesses, fringe practitioners and fringe health mod-
els’ to describe broad means of caring for one’s own health which ‘fail, somehow, to fit within the 
accepted boundaries of mainstream scientific medicine’. Inspired by this elaboration, we suggest 
that the term ‘fringe medicine’ can capture the multiple traditional and modern forms of self-care 
practice that critically engage with biomedicine or can be situated at the boundaries of medicine 
and medical practice. To this concept, we have added the temporal dimension of ‘everyday’ to 
emphasise that such self-care practices often constitute a routine part of daily life. Of course, in 
common sense thinking, it might be argued that whereas a mode of self-care, such as vaccine hesi-
tancy clearly ‘does not fit’ with the biomedical paradigm, the data-oriented rationality of tracking 
and analysing one’s activity or sleep with digital gadgets in many ways does. However, even the 
latter form of everyday self-care is most often labelled – by technology developers, users and 
medical instances alike – as ‘non-medical’ technology, and often, for various reasons, as inade-
quate on its own for the individual to really understand their health and well-being. In this sense, 
self-tracking too can be argued to occupy the biomedical fringe. The crucial point, however, is that 
although they take a critical stance, none of these practices seek to entirely abandon or reject bio-
medicine or science-based knowledge.
The important question, then, is not the extent to which EFM practices comply with, resist or 
even reject dominant medical practices by adopting non-normative health behaviours, as some 
previous research has outlined (e.g. Keshet and Popper- Giveon, 2018), but rather how these forms 
of everyday health behaviour ‘mix and match’ biomedical and alternative modes of knowledge and 
practice in acting on and knowing about one’s health and well-being. At the heart of EFM is the 
acknowledgement of its contradictory character; the ways in which it both aligns itself with bio-
medical expertise and seeks to transform it. For us, the term EFM highlights how self-care prac-
tices build not only on the contestation of scientific expertise but also on the appropriation and 
acceptance of medical science; not only on the rejection of biomedical knowledge but also on 
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active interpretations of and ‘working with’ medical knowledge and scientific or evidence-based 
modes of knowledge production on health and illness.
Thus, EFM allows us to capture a broad set of practices and groups that share certain values, 
traditions and modes of knowing about health and well-being that appear to challenge biomedical 
practices in some ways while also supporting them in other ways and suggesting new modes of 
collaboration with them. Importantly, while the term ‘alternative’ denotes exclusion from that 
which is hegemonic (Barcan, 2011; Gale, 2014), ‘fringe’ focuses on that which is on the edge, 
boundary or margin (or maybe marginalised). EFM is not ‘complementary’; sometimes it is 
almost fully aligned with biomedicine, and usually it is somewhere in the grey boundary zone 
between many intersecting worlds. Thus, unlike the concept of CAM, EFM does not assume a 
medical starting point and does not position any health practice a priori as being on the ‘outside’ 
(due to lack of evidence, for example); rather, it adopts a novel, social scientific point of depar-
ture, especially in relation to the growing contestation of expertise. While the concept of ‘fringe 
medicine’ could be perceived as value-laden and pejorative, we do not mean to employ it as such. 
Instead we wish to underline the constant negotiation and co-creation of expertise by highlighting 
the ways in which those ‘at the fringe’ engage with and negotiate medical scientific knowledge 
production and professional practices. Taking a cue from the call in social studies of science and 
expertise to pay close attention to the formation of systems of knowledge with an open mind 
(Harding, 2008; Wilcox, 2010), our analysis addresses the ways in which users of EFM assemble 
health knowledges by relating to knowledge production in medicine (medical research), expert 
knowledge (the work of physicians and other professionals) and official health recommendations 
(e.g. by state authorities).
Previous research on the public understanding of science pertaining to groups that are critical of 
the medical establishment has shown that in public discussions and academic circles alike, many 
forms of the lay appropriation of scientific claims still tend to be framed as public ‘misunderstand-
ings’ (or ‘ignorance’) of science or constructed as ‘the other of science’ (Goldenberg, 2016; 
Harambam and Aupers, 2015). Such work evinces that despite discussions since the mid-1990s of 
the inappropriateness of the deficit model – that is, the tendency to see the public as ignorant or 
poorly informed – there is still more to explore in the understanding of science among its publics 
(Goldenberg, 2016; Harambam and Aupers, 2015; Jauho, 2016; Stocking and Holstein, 2009; 
Wynne, 1995). In line with this research, we argue that the deficit model obscures how EFM users 
critically and selectively engage with and negotiate medical science and expertise. Similarly to 
Harambam and Aupers’s (2015) study of conspiracy theorists, our purpose is not to assess the truth 
value of EFM epistemologies but rather to highlight the social processes through which the rela-
tionship to scientific knowledge and expertise is built up in EFM.
Quite early on in our research, we noticed that EFM practitioners did not perceive anything a 
priori wrong or suspect about pursuing medical knowledge through scientific means. Rather, the 
critical arguments revolved around moral, humanistic, epistemological and evidence-based ration-
alisations of how scientific knowledge production, medical professional practices and the formula-
tion of the medical knowledge base should work ‘better’. In the following sections, we will lay out 
three forms of critique present in our research materials to demonstrate EFM users’ rationalisations 
of health practices, as well as the intersections of such rationalisations among the three EFM 
domains we studied. By so doing, we will illustrate the ways in which practitioners of EFM seek 
to both challenge and collaborate with the medical establishment. The analysis is not meant to 
compare different EFM domains or to set up stark contrasts between them. Rather, our goal is to 
demonstrate the analytical purchase of the conceptualisation of EFM by teasing out the discursive 
strategies and rationalisations through which all these practices may be thought to hover at the 
fringe of biomedicine.
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4. Critique of medical knowledge production
The first form of critique centres on medical knowledge production. It addresses most notably the 
logic of (medical) capitalism, and more specifically the idea that health is subjugated to market 
logic and profit. Research participants were sometimes deeply concerned that economic interests 
dictated research, treatment and the overall politics of health, which rendered medical science and 
expertise unreliable or suspect, if not downright corrupt. This critique conjured an image of a ‘bio-
medical complex’ through which economic, political and medical interests intertwined and rein-
forced each other.
The participants considered that a substantial amount of medical research on the safety and 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical products was biased, flawed or distorted. They were concerned 
about the negative side effects of medications and vaccinations and argued that such products 
were pushed onto the market, despite their known side effects. In their view, biomedical research 
failed to meet the moral and ethical standards required of the field, and medical knowledge often 
took the form of corporately induced ignorance. A typical line of argument was summarised by 
Jenny, a vaccine-hesitant parent, who argued that ‘scientific data is a bit questionable because what 
is being researched, what the hypotheses are and how research is being done is tied to money’. 
Irene, the mother of an unvaccinated child, echoed this by saying that pharmaceutical companies 
could confirm the results they wanted by doing choice work on how they delimited or cropped 
the data and which differences or significances they chose to highlight. A typical suggestion for 
the transformation of medical research in such critiques was to point out the ties that researchers 
or research funders might have, or to rationalise and cite examples of the ways in which research 
might have been distorted by the picking and choosing of results or data. Another major concern 
was the perceived distortion or corruption of medical science due to the dominance of pharmaceu-
tical companies in the funding and conduct of biomedical research. Hanna, a body–mind–spirit 
practitioner, argued,
They just medicate and medicate in order to barely keep you alive, and then you need more drugs, since 
there are always side effects, and of course it’s good that they can keep you alive because then they can sell 
you more drugs.
Part of the critique was also targeted against the biomedical paradigm as ‘the only game in 
town’ (Barcan, 2011), that is, the only form of evidence and expertise that is recognised. The par-
ticipants complained that if EFM knowledge or experiences did not fit this paradigm, they were 
rendered invisible and deemed irrelevant. This was summarised by Pia, an entrepreneur in her 40s 
who practised body–mind–spirit techniques:
There’s so much alternative care and knowledge available, including research, but because it is not medical 
research it is not accepted in the healthcare system. Why? Because they just keep repeating that it’s not 
medically proven, although there’s loads of studies on functional medicine that have shown, for example, 
that milk is not good for people. . . . But because these are not biomedically studied, they do not exist.
It is important to note that even those who were most explicitly critical of medical capitalism 
typically did not reject medical research or science as such, but rather problematised the funding of 
clinical research and expressed concern over how vested economic interests shaped health policies 
and care practices. In their view, scientific knowledge should be free from vested interests – a cri-
tique directed at the ‘purported neutrality or objectivity of scientific research’ (Harambam and 
Aupers, 2015: 473). Of course, the critique that medicine has been commodified, and that health 
has become subject to the capitalist logic of profit-making, is not new; it is a long-standing critique 
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in both holistic health movements and the social sciences (see e.g. Dumit, 2012; McKee, 1988). 
What is interesting today is how such critique takes shape in relation to emerging contemporary 
and technoscientific forms of everyday self-care.
While in interviews with self-trackers this type of critique was not explicit, and many self-
trackers expressed strong trust in the medical establishment, some participants did draw links to 
‘biohacking’, referring to discourses about approaching one’s body as a system to be ‘hacked’ in 
the original (positive) sense of the word, that is, tweaked and improved by tinkering with it on 
one’s own terms. Interestingly, the local Finnish manifestation of the global ‘Quantified Self’ 
movement (see Lupton, 2016) – Quantified Self and Biohacking Finland – has in recent years been 
pioneered and personified by a trio that consists of a technology entrepreneur, a nutrition expert 
and a medical doctor who is a practitioner of functional medicine. They have all appeared as speak-
ers in numerous health-related events and together have published the popular non-fiction book 
Biohacker’s Handbook (Arina et al., n.d.), and their public performances have reflected a tense 
relationship with biomedicine-based knowledge in multiple ways. For example, the biggest Finnish 
daily published a piece on biohacking in November 2013 where one member of the trio told having 
self-cured a stress-based ulcer (Frilander, 2013). He had achieved this by first reading through 
hundreds of scientific articles and then developing a systematic personal programme that involved 
tracking a multiplicity of biomarkers with consumer-grade self-tracking technologies and using 
private laboratory testing services because all one could get from official healthcare was medicine 
that seemed to help only for as long as it was taken. Here the ‘work’ done with medical research 
involved reading medical literature and using it to design a regime of personal self-care that built 
on lifestyle changes and nutritional choices instead of medicine. So in biohacking and self-tracking 
discourse, medical science is revered, but self-tracking may become constructed as a sociotechni-
cal domain of self-care that enables personal ‘science-based’ knowledge production while also 
incorporating discourses of suspicion towards medicine or medical products. It can convert into 
full-blown moral critique against corruption if official (health) information is perceived as mis-
leading or skewed. Such moral critique was also articulated by another member of the biohacking 
trio, who claimed that official Finnish nutrition guidelines are designed to serve the interests of 
local food industry (Simola, 2013), a critique often voiced by body–mind–spirit practitioners and 
vaccine-hesitant individuals, too.
The main object of this form of critique, then, is the field of medical and health-related science 
and expertise in their sociopolitical context, often pointing to the corruptive influence of medical 
capitalism. In this sense, the critique points to the ‘invisible hands’ (Sismondo, 2018) of pharma-
ceutical industries and other commercial actors behind biomedical knowledge production, which 
is one of the common ways in which health practices are positioned at the ‘fringe’. This ‘corrupt’ 
and/or capitalist logic of health may be abandoned or ‘rejected’ in everyday practice by deliber-
ately adopting a stance of opposition through the selective utilisation of biomedical products. For 
example, some of our vaccine-hesitant families and body–mind–spirit users explained that they 
might consult a medical doctor to receive a diagnosis but then treat the condition with EFM, for 
example, by homoeopathic methods. Furthermore, some body–mind–spirit therapy users and self-
trackers talked about gathering data – by analogue and digital means, or, for example, using con-
sumer services for laboratory tests without a doctor’s referral – and then doing interpretative work, 
seeking to balance their health through a personalised assemblage of medical and EFM knowledge. 
These examples highlight how EFM practices draw on many knowledge regimes and practices, not 
only medical, although biomedicine usually remains sometimes in the background, sometimes in 
the foreground and at least as a safety net in case all else fails.
We argue that EFM users in no way deem science in general or medical science, in particular, 
to be useless or irrelevant (see also Harambam and Aupers, 2015: 473). Rather, and similarly to the 
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findings of studies of lay perceptions of medication (Webster et al., 2009), they maintain that bio-
medical research and practice should ensure patient safety and be based on efficacy, and that the 
avoidance of side effects should be stressed more than is currently the case. The medical establish-
ment, in the form of scientific literature and/or expert knowledge, should be developed through 
both the idea of personalised self-care and the attempt to ‘purify’ it by challenging medical capital-
ism. In this critique, although participants are taking issue with the practices of medical knowledge 
production, they are also expressing a desire to participate in the articulation of the ethical and 
moral principles of research and health knowledge. They demonstrate their desire to engage in 
defining the practices of scientific research and especially in delineating its responsible conduct. 
They also strive to explore and politicise the consequences of the commercialisation of research. 
Thus, while being a way to challenge and criticise medical knowledge production, this critique also 
highlights the possibility that EFM users’ concerns may have gone unrecognised by the medical 
establishment (Wynne, 2006: 219).
5. Critique of professional practices
The second form of critique targets the bio-reductionist professionalised medical expert system, 
the thrust of the critique being medical professionals’ unwillingness and inability to ‘meet people’ 
as emotional, spiritual and communicative human beings. It also partly reflects a more general 
perception of the medical (scientific) expert system as exclusive, unreachable or too bound up with 
its own impersonal and mechanistic ways. For many, it is not just medical treatments and medica-
tions that have healing power and constitute care but also, very importantly, communication and 
embodied encounters between patients and health professionals. The participants criticised health 
professionals for not being capable of, or not being allowed to, ‘connect’ on a personal or emo-
tional level and acknowledge emotions as a significant part of human life and health. While many 
readily acknowledged that a visit to a doctor was often necessary, they harboured doubts about the 
system’s capabilities to care for or heal them. Despite these participants’ critical views, in practice, 
there seemed to be a tendency similar to that found by Attwell et al. (2017): even the most vocifer-
ous critics of the medical establishment relied on medical knowledge in some instances, such as 
with broken bones, but they tended to seek emotional and bodily healing encounters elsewhere, in 
the EFM domain.
Many participants proposed that medical professionals should fulfil their function of care in 
society by taking emotions seriously, as well as by acknowledging personal experience and expe-
riential knowledge as crucial resources for successful care. The participants recounted incidents 
when medical personnel and experts had been blasé, indifferent and (too) ‘professionalised’ in 
relation to people’s own experiences and systems of knowledge. Such critique typically identified 
medical training as a root cause of this. Medical training was seen as overlooking the emotional 
and spiritual dimensions of health and illness, and as leaving medical professionals unwilling or 
unable to acknowledge patients’ needs, experiences and competing knowledge claims. Isabel, a 
vaccine-hesitant mother, explained this point:
The problem is, if you go see a doctor or a nurse and you say that we really suspect that we’ve experienced 
adverse effects from a drug or a vaccine. But they firmly believe in what they’ve been taught. So they 
judge you very easily. They don’t even let you finish talking. And that suppresses all discussion.
Nora, a body–mind–spirit therapist argued that ‘what really makes these treatments effective is the 
therapist’s presence to the client, that the client can feel that, for once, she gets seen, heard and 
accepted’. Nora attributed a crucial healing effect to this recognition and compassionate validation 
of the client’s experiences’ (see also Sointu, 2006).
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Among self-trackers, it was typically recognised that medical personnel may or may not be 
open to people’s own deductions about actual or potential health threats, or about states that people 
had monitored or observed in their data. For example, it could be perceived that doctors can be 
somewhat uneasy about letting patients step into their territory of expertise. Also, as is typical in 
biohacker discourses more generally, while medical expertise was typically highly appreciated, 
participants sometimes implied that doctors treated illness mechanically, instead of really adhering 
to the complexities of well-being. For example, Jari, who had been rigorously measuring various 
aspects of his life for years, and whose motivation to self-track was now mainly to conduct an 
ongoing ‘expedition into himself’, clearly held medical expertise in high regard, but also pointed 
out that there was now a ‘big discussion’ about well-being in the sense that various events and 
seminars explore different dimensions of well-being grow in popularity. He highlighted the mean-
ing of happiness for well-being said there was no straightforward definition of well-being, although 
‘doctors might say that well-being is the absence of a diagnosed sickness’. Especially in relation to 
preventive care, such articulations imply that holistic and ‘alternative’ influences work to shape 
self-tracking into a practice that opens up possibilities both to support biomedical knowledge pro-
duction and to criticise the expert system as too professionalised or too set in its own ways.
This critique resonates with the discourse of ‘personalised healthcare’ (Topol, 2015; see also 
Harris et al., 2010; Sharon, 2017), which encourages health-related participation, proactive action 
and self-awareness. Personalised medicine is often presented and promoted as a field of collabora-
tion and partnership between official medical professionals and actual or potential patients. 
However, with its emphasis on individual action and responsibility for one’s own well-being, it can 
also be both reflective and formative of varying degrees of critique of medical expert systems. As 
has also been argued for CAM modalities, for EFM users holism may act as a form of recognition 
of the multiplicity of emotions, thoughts and lifestyles (Barcan, 2011: 25).
In this critique, the existence of a professionalised medical expert system is not questioned; 
rather, it is seen as inflexible, wrongly calibrated or incapable of performing its function in society 
because it is reductionist instead of holistic, or not open to dialogue. The critique is thus not primar-
ily against the expert system as such, but points to EFM users’ concerns about failures in emotional 
and embodied communication practices, lack of recognition and/or society’s inadequate accept-
ance of personal experience as a crucial resource for fulfilling care functions. On the other side, 
these concerns may be interpreted as a willingness to further develop the good practice of medical 
professionals. Also, it can be highlighted that EFM users’ focus on assessing professionals’ com-
municative practices points towards important interconnections between trust and dialogue that 
may have gone unrecognised by the medical establishment (Goldenberg, 2016: 574).
6. Critique of the knowledge base
The third type of critique focuses on experts’ knowledge base, which consists of population-level 
recommendations and evidence-based guidelines. It stresses the significance of personal evidence 
and the individual’s personal knowledge production alongside population-level generalisations. 
The participants employed a variety of methods from personalised experience-based or data-based 
knowledge that for them constituted evidence.
Our research participants often expressed a willingness to experiment on their own lives and 
bodies, and even to act as a ‘scientist of one’s own life’, as one of the self-trackers put it. They were 
often keen on experimenting, for example, with various body–mind–spirit therapies, nutritional 
choices, exercise patterns, creative practices (singing, dancing, painting etc.) and other behavioural 
changes to improve their health and well-being and on seeking to ‘validate’ their experiences of the 
effects of such choices through self-compiled data (in the context of self-tracking as a research-like 
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activity, see Heyen, 2020). For self-trackers, digitally compiled data enabled a possibility to inves-
tigate, for example, how changes in everyday habits affect sleep, recovery or blood pressure. In the 
body–mind–spirit sphere, an alternative therapist Marcus had ‘tested’ flower remedies on himself 
and his dog, searching for evidence that these remedies ‘really worked’:
I have used these remedies and experimented with them. The first case where I clearly saw the effect was 
my Australian terrier. She had a urinary tract infection that had been treated with antibiotics and 
homeopathy, but they didn’t help. So I thought let’s try these flower remedies, and within two days the dog 
was well.
Here the term ‘data’ may refer to a range of evidence, from digital measurement logs (such as those 
that self-tracking applications record) to mental records of one’s own experiences.
In this way, the participants acted as active producers and collectors of knowledge and assem-
bled bits and pieces of information in an attempt to create a personalised or situated system of 
meaning (for similar results, see Broom, 2009; Pantzar and Ruckenstein, 2017). They compiled 
knowledge from a range of sources: medical and psychological research, but also from their per-
sonal experiences and those of friends, relatives and acquaintances, Facebook groups, blogs, web-
sites, and books and training sessions on alternative medicine, popular psychology and new 
spirituality. Thus, while drawing on scientific knowledge to formulate their perceptions of health 
and their relationship to evidence-based recommendations, EFM users also assembled ‘social 
ideas, religious beliefs, situated experiences and specific worldviews’ (Wilcox, 2010: 55). Through 
this kind of assemblage, the participants critically assessed, redefined and diversified the knowl-
edge base of medical recommendations and guidelines.
While many acknowledged that ‘anecdotal evidence’ from personal experience did not neces-
sarily prove anything in a scientific sense, they sometimes tried to connect their experiential or 
data-based evidence with scientific evidence, as a mode of personal science and practical knowl-
edge production (see also Heyen, 2020). Some self-trackers brought up the idea that in their inter-
actions with medical experts, they could ‘prove’ something through data, or that in encounters with 
medical personnel, the data could act as an intermediary that also backs the expertise of the doctor, 
as doctors would not have to rely merely on what the patient says. Simultaneously, EFM practition-
ers may end up working on their own interpretation of experts’ evidence-based terms and some-
times also seek to transform the meaning of ‘evidence’. What is central in these instances of 
experimentation is the participants’ perceived adherence to the principles of scientific scepticism. 
Medical knowledge was not necessarily prioritised over other forms of knowledge, as long as there 
was some kind of perceived systematic scepticism involved, whether this scepticism manifested in 
digital data-based experimentation or in other forms of rationalisation through trial and error.
As with the other two forms of critique, the critique of recommendations and guidelines may 
also be seen as inclined towards collaboration with experts. Erika, a mother of five partly vacci-
nated and non-vaccinated children, was actively engaging with representatives of the National 
Institute for Health and Welfare, trying to work with them to find answers to questions that had not 
been sufficiently answered by existing scientific evidence:
I’ll ask questions if I have them, and I’ll see if they have another answer [than the one I’ve found]. I like 
to see what the experts think. [. . .] They do know a lot, it’s just that sometimes they leave relevant 
information out [when communicating about health].
However, she lamented that the representatives of health authorities would often end the discus-
sion ‘when the questions get too tough’. In some ways, the participants’ views complied with 
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what Giddens (1991: 3) has called the ‘institutionalisation of the principle of radical doubt’ in 
late modernity, which insists that ‘all knowledge takes the form of hypotheses: claims which 
may very well be true, but which are in principle always open to revision and may have at some 
point to be abandoned’. It is important to underline that this form of critique may also be inter-
preted as an adoption of the ideal of the neoliberal self-monitoring and self-governing health 
citizen (Wyatt et al., 2010), even though it sometimes manifests in forms that are deemed ‘unor-
thodox’ or even dangerous by official medicine.
This critique voices a willingness to participate in both macro-level and micro-level knowledge 
and ‘evidence’ production. Here we see a strong drive towards collaborative action, as users of 
EFM wish to bring their own evidence to the table. Based on the ethnographies, we do not know 
for sure to what extent the participants collaborate with the medical establishment, and their notions 
could be interpreted as attempts to demonstrate their rationality in an ethnographic interview situ-
ation. However, it seems that the participants are willing to produce material from their own expe-
riences and data collection activities to feed into and reform recommendations and guidelines (cf. 
Jauho, 2016: 338). This may highlight that the issue has not aroused enough attention in the medi-
cal establishment. Also, they are eager to ask ‘wicked questions’ about evidence, and they expect 
to get credible answers to their concerns, suggesting that among many EFM users’ perhaps irra-
tionalised concerns, there might be some unrecognised reasonable questions (see also Wynne, 
2006: 219).
7. Conclusion
In this article, we have suggested the concept of EFM to bring together various critical health and 
well-being practices and to unravel the complex modes of contestation and appreciation of the 
medical establishment articulated within them. While we do not suggest that the concept of EFM 
should (or even could) entirely substitute for the concept of CAM, we argue that EFM allows us to 
address and rectify some of CAM’s problematic aspects. The first is that the concept of EFM can 
better capture the multiplicity of self-care practices and their varying relationships with the medi-
cal establishment than the dichotomous approach suggested by CAM. We have shown that even in 
instances that tend to be interpreted as ignoring science and/or spreading misinformation – accusa-
tions often levelled against vaccine-critical expressions and body–mind–spirit practices – we find 
active attempts to apply the scientific ideals of ethical conduct, rational scepticism and evidence-
based knowledge, albeit in ways that may clash with medical knowledge. Second, EFM’s location 
at the boundary allows us to appreciate that the same people can be both critical and compliant 
simultaneously or can accept the medical establishment on some issues while opposing it on oth-
ers, whereas the CAM concept – somewhat unjustly – indicates blank opposition to the medical 
establishment. Third, we wish to highlight that while CAM tends to foreground exceptionality, the 
concept of EFM captures practical and (at least from the point of view of users themselves) normal 
daily routines that belong to the continuum of practices that users might perform for their health. 
Fourth, as a much-used concept, CAM has attained some stability as a set of practices defined by 
the medical establishment, for example, as a ‘Medical Subject Headings’ entry term (National 
Library of Medicine, 2020) or a medical association’s definition of therapies that automatically fall 
outside the medical realm (Finnish Medical Association, 2017), whereas the concept of EFM 
allows us to include emerging practices and new conglomerations of activities that mix and match 
issues that CAM treats as incommensurate.
Thus, the concept of EFM has enabled us to shed light on the broader phenomenon of critique 
and contestation of the medical establishment. All three forms of critique show that people do not 
simply reject biomedicine but seek to appropriate its ways or ideals as part of their everyday modes 
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of self-care. We wish to conclude by drawing broader critical conclusions on the basis of our analy-
sis. First, we have highlighted that all the EFM domains addressed in this article afford both a cri-
tique of medical knowledge production, professional practices and medical experts’ knowledge 
base and a will to contribute to and improve them. Rather than waging the straightforward crusade 
against science which ‘non-medical’ health practices are often accused of in public debates, EFM 
users express a willingness to collaborate and engage with the medical establishment. This points 
to the need for the medical establishment to develop public engagement with its critical or ‘oth-
ered’ groups. This may be achieved by sharing the activities of medical science with the public, 
encouraging and listening to critical groups’ feedback regarding medical professionals and engag-
ing with the public when formulating recommendations and guidelines based on evidence.
The latter point has consequences that need to be thought through in the context of medical 
knowledge production, in medical professional work and in the formulation of population-level 
evidence-based guidelines and recommendations. It might be beneficial to approach patients as 
knowledgeable subjects who are able to engage with medical knowledge. Also, it is important to 
acknowledge that there is knowledge production among the public of which scientists and medical 
practitioners may not be aware and that people are using and referring to this knowledge in their 
health practices. It may be important to assume that time needs to be spent on encounters with 
patients, and that the work of professionals needs to focus increasingly on explaining the bases of 
biomedical knowledge production, the professional practices themselves and the bases for scien-
tific evidence. Medical encounters thus require dialogue, negotiation and the translation of differ-
ent epistemes and systems of knowledge.
In relation to the simultaneous embrace and critique of biomedicine and its ideals, it is notewor-
thy that within all the EFM practices in this study, the critique also frequently turned inwards. This 
meant that the EFM practitioners drew moral boundaries between ‘rational critics’ and ‘irrational’ 
fellow practitioners. In this way, they were often involved in identity work, delineating the con-
tours of what counts as ‘legitimate critique’. They sought to disidentify themselves from those they 
perceived as ‘extremists’, ‘conspiracy theorists’ or ‘amateurs’, or more generally from those whom 
they saw as not taking the principles of scientific scepticism and evidence-based thinking seriously, 
or as uncritically adopting everything they read online rather than ‘using their own brains’ and 
demonstrating critical thinking and an appreciation of professional knowledge. One reason for this 
presentation of the self as a critical subject might be the desire to demonstrate one’s potential abil-
ity to collaborate with medical researchers, professionals and experts, and thereby to gain legiti-
macy for EFM as a form of care. In part, this inward critique can also be seen as an attempt to 
further popularise, elevate and even professionalise the status of critical practices (cf. Givati and 
Hatton, 2015) that are often stigmatised in society.
Finally, as we have argued, rather than being ignorant about scientific principles, inattentive to 
societally, economically and culturally bounded mechanisms of knowledge production, or compli-
ant with any kind of mistreatment in communications between professionals and patients, EFM 
users’ accounts could be interpreted as strategic action geared towards drawing the lines between 
good and bad practices of knowledge production and between ideal and unsuccessful patient–
professional communication and towards creating a division between evidence-based and experi-
ential knowledge. In other words, they could be interpreted as creative boundary work (Gieryn, 
1999) that aims to create a space to define the medical establishment and simultaneously legitimise 
various EFM practices and actions. EFM users seem to be aiming to raise the status of EFM and/
or gain symbolic recognition by employing the language and logic of scientific knowledge produc-
tion and expert actors such that they themselves are also players in the expertise game. This bound-
ary work and the power game related to it remain to be explored further in future research.
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